

Updates to
DESIRE AND BELIEF

Introduction to
Some Recent Philosophical Debates

ARTHUR E. FALK

*Scroll down to the Table of Contents. Move your cursor over the chapter titles. There is a link to a revision anytime the open-hand icon changes to a pointing-finger icon. **Click on the title** to open the chapter. Revisions to the text are ongoing; at the top of each chapter is the date of last revision. There are also Acrobat “sticky notes.”*

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