

Introduction to Philosophy
Fall 2019—Test 3

1. According to *Descartes*, ...

- a. what I really am is a body, but I also possess a mind.
- b. minds and bodies can't causally interact with one another, but God fools us into believing they do.
- c. cats and dogs have immortal souls, just like us.
- d. conscious states always have physical causes, but never have physical effects.
- e. what I really am is a mind, but I also possess a body.

2. Which of the following would *Descartes agree* with?

- a. We can conceive of existing without a body.
- b. We can conceive of existing without a mind.
- c. We can conceive of existing without either a mind or a body.
- d. We can't conceive of mental substance.
- e. We can't conceive of material substance.

3. *Substance dualism* is the view that ...

- a. there are two kinds of minds.
- b. there are two kinds of "basic stuff" in the world.
- c. there are two kinds of physical particles.
- d. there are two kinds of people in the world—those who divide the world into two kinds of people, and those that don't.
- e. material substance comes in two forms, matter and energy.

4. We call a property "*accidental*" (as opposed to "essential") when ...

- a. it is the result of a car crash.
- b. it follows from a thing's very nature.
- c. it is a property a thing can't lose (without ceasing to exist).
- d. it is a property a thing can lose (without ceasing to exist).
- e. it is a property only a thinking thing could have.

5. *Descartes* is a ...

- a. materialist.
- b. idealist.
- c. epiphenomenalist.
- d. Hungarian composer of classical music.
- e. mind/body dualist.

6. According to *Descartes*, *material things* are ...

- a. extended (i.e., they occupy space), but non-thinking (i.e., they are not subjects of conscious experience).
- b. thinking (i.e., they are subjects of conscious experience), but non-extended (i.e., they don't occupy space).
- c. both thinking and extended.
- d. neither thinking nor extended.
- e. things that exist only in our minds.

7. *Descartes* argues that *minds and bodies cannot be identical* because ...

- a. minds are divisible, but bodies are not.
- b. minds occupy space, but bodies do not.
- c. bodies are divisible, but minds are not.
- d. bodies are conscious beings, but minds are not.
- e. qualia are really just brain states.

8. One problem with *mind/body dualism* is that it ...

- a. apparently cannot explain how minds and bodies could causally interact with one another.
- b. apparently cannot explain how bodies could interact causally with other bodies.
- c. apparently cannot explain how minds could interact causally with other minds.
- d. mistakenly claims there are two kinds of matter.
- e. mistakenly claims there are two kinds of mind.

9. *Idealism* (as discussed in the last chapter) ...

- a. is a variety of substance dualism.
- b. urges us to have high moral standards.
- c. is a variety of substance monism.
- d. is a variety of materialism.
- e. none of the above.

10. Belief in *life after death* is apparently incompatible with ...

- a. Berkeley's idealism.
- b. materialism.
- c. theism.
- d. dualism.
- e. the view that mental states are not identical to brain states.

11. *Physicalism* (as described by Jackson) claims/implies that ...

- a. there is no immaterial mind or soul.
- b. everything can (in principle) be explained by physical or material laws and principles.
- c. there is only one kind of basic stuff in the world.
- d. everything that exists is made of matter.
- e. all of the above.

12. *Eliminative materialism*...

- a. claims that mental states (such as thoughts or feelings) are identical to brain states.
- b. denies the existence of brain states.
- c. is a variety substance dualism.
- d. denies the existence of mental states (such as thoughts or feelings).
- e. is a variety of the identity theory.

13. Which of the following is *not* a variety of *substance monism*?

- a. Epiphenomenalism.
- b. Eliminative materialism.
- c. The identity theory.
- d. Idealism.
- e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of substance monism.

14. Which of the following is *not* a variety of *materialism*?

- a. The identity theory.
- b. Substance dualism.
- c. Eliminative materialism.
- d. Epiphenomenalism.
- e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of materialism.

15. According to the *identity theory* ...

- a. a person's true identity resides in his/her immaterial soul.
- b. no two blades of grass are completely identical.
- c. minds are identical to souls.
- d. mental states are identical to brain states.
- e. no two souls are completely identical.

16. According to *Leibniz' Law*, if "A" and "B" are identical,

- a. they cannot have all the same properties.
- b. they must be twins.
- c. they must have all the same properties.
- d. their essential properties must be the same, but some of their accidental properties may be different.
- e. their accidental properties must be the same, but some of their essential properties may be different.

17. *Carruthers argues* for the identity theory because at least some *mental states* ...

- a. are actually identical to droplets of rain.
- b. are really events in your non-material soul.
- c. are apparently indistinguishable from other mental states.
- d. apparently cause physical events like the movement of your body.
- e. enjoy watching computers play the Imitation Game with each other.

18. *Carruthers believes* that ...

- a. all mental states are really brain states.
- b. only some mental states are really brain states.
- c. no mental states are really brain states.
- d. mental states don't really exist.
- e. mental states are states of an immaterial mind/soul.

19. *Carruthers* provides an argument that *at least some mental states are identical to brain states*. From this he infers that ...

- a. some mental states are identical to brain states, but some aren't.
- b. all brain states must be identical to qualia.
- c. even though computers don't have brains, they do have qualia.
- d. all mental states must be identical to brain states.
- e. exactly two of the above.

20. *If the identity theory is true*, then ...

- a. life after bodily death is impossible.
- b. nothing without a brain and/or a central nervous system could possibly feel pain.
- c. consciousness isn't *caused* by a brain state: rather, it *is* a brain state.
- d. all of the above.
- e. none of the above.

21. According to the *identity theory*...

- a. there simply are no such things as mental states.
- b. there simply are no such things as brain states.
- c. only computers that can play the imitation game have mental states.
- d. mental states are states of an immaterial soul.
- e. none of the above.

22. *Epiphenomenalism* is (or includes) the view that ...

- a. qualia are caused by physical events, but do not themselves cause physical events.
- b. some physical events are caused by qualia.
- c. all physical events are caused by mental events.
- d. there simply are no such things as qualia.
- e. qualia cause physical events, but are not themselves caused by physical events.

23. According to Jackson, *given that qualia are real*, ...

- a. physicalism must be true.
- b. materialism must be false.
- c. physicalism is the only remaining alternative to dualism.
- d. dualism must be true because epiphenomenalism is false.
- e. epiphenomenalism is the only remaining alternative to dualism.

24. Given the way that Jackson uses the term, which of the following are *not* “*qualia*?”
- the hurtfulness of pains.
 - the biological causes of pains.
 - the itchiness of itches.
 - the taste of a lemon.
 - the smell of a rose.
25. The *problem* that (the existence of) *qualia apparently poses for physicalism* is that ...
- qualia cannot be directly experienced, but can only be inferred.
 - truths/facts about qualia are not truths/facts from the science of physics.
 - truths/facts about qualia are not truths/facts from the science of psychology.
 - qualia are too small to be detected by current scientific instrumentation.
 - none of the above.
26. According to *Jackson*, a “*qualia freak*” is one who ...
- likes to eat small poultry for dinner.
 - is obsessed with a former United States Vice President.
 - believes that all information (truth) is ultimately information (truth) about physical things.
 - believes that all information (truth) is ultimately information (truth) about qualia.
 - none of the above.
27. *Qualia*, given the way Jackson uses this term, are ...
- physical things, explainable in terms of the laws of physics.
 - proof of substance dualism.
 - necessarily subjective, and so cannot be fully characterized by any objective scientific description.
 - non-existent, i.e., nobody actually has any.
 - necessarily objective, and so cannot be fully characterized by any purely subjective description.
28. According to Jackson, “*physicalism*” implies that everything that exists is physical (material) and that
- everything can, in principle, be explained by mentalistic or spiritualistic theories.
 - some things cannot, in principle, be explained by any purely physical theories.
 - nothing can, in principle, be explained by any purely physical theory.
 - everything can, in principle, be explained by some purely physical theory.
 - quale are really quite tasty.
29. Jackson believes that one could know everything there is to know about color perception and still not know what red *looks like*. From this he infers that ...
- there really isn't anything that red looks like.
 - there are facts that cannot be explained by philosophy.
 - scientists shouldn't be photographers or painters.
 - there are facts that cannot be expressed in the language of physics.
 - some people are “zombies,” with no inner life.

30. Jackson thinks the existence of *qualia* is ...
- a. directly known by first-person experience.
 - b. highly probable but never certain.
 - c. observed in the behavior of others.
 - d. highly doubtful, but not impossible.
 - e. something that can be proven by scientific experimentation.
31. According to Jackson, *knowing everything about the physical stuff* that makes up the universe ...
- a. is knowing everything there is to know.
 - b. is not logically possible.
 - c. would tell us whether or not our friends are really mindless zombies.
 - d. would allow us to have knowledge of other people's qualia, but not our own.
 - e. would not by itself provide knowledge of what a rose actually smells like.
32. When Jackson says that "qualia are an *excrescence*," what he means is that ...
- a. they are excreted by quails.
 - b. they do not exist in the physical world, but only in an immaterial soul.
 - c. they are in principle unknowable, both in ourselves, and in others.
 - d. they are illusory, and simply do not exist in any sense.
 - e. even though they exist, they don't do (or cause) anything in the physical world.
33. According to Jackson, *epiphenomenalism* ...
- a. is a version of physicalism.
 - b. could account for the existence of qualia without accepting the truth of substance dualism.
 - c. is a version of idealism.
 - d. establishes the truth of substance dualism.
 - e. could account for the existence of qualia without accepting the truth of materialism.
34. *Turing* believes that ...
- a. only things with human brains can think.
 - b. only human beings capable of speech can think.
 - c. human beings that can't pass the Turing test can't think.
 - d. all of the above.
 - e. none of the above.
35. The *Turing test* determines that a computer can think when ...
- a. it does something it was not programmed to do.
 - b. the electronic signals of the computer processor are identical to those inside a human brain.
 - c. it performs math problems better than a human being can.
 - d. it can find a parking space before class at WMU.
 - e. its responses to questions are indistinguishable from the responses a human being would give.

36. What is the "*objection from consciousness*" to Turing's test?
- Testing consciousness is circular because one must be conscious to evaluate the test from consciousness.
 - Only conscious things think. Computers are not conscious. So, computers cannot think.
 - Science has shown that some animals that do not exhibit any linguistic behavior are in fact conscious.
 - Each of us has knowledge only of our own consciousness, so we can be sure only that we ourselves think.
 - In order to be conscious, a being must be created by God, not programmed by a human a computer scientist.
37. According to "**Strong Artificial Intelligence**" ("Strong AI"), an appropriately programmed computer
- could never pass the Turing Test.
 - probably couldn't pass one of Baldner's Intro to Philosophy tests.
 - merely manipulates symbols without understanding what they are supposed to mean.
 - actually has brain states.
 - understands the questions it receives and the answers it returns.
38. **John Searle** ...
- does not believe that a computer understands anything simply because it can pass the Turing Test.
 - does believe that a computer that can pass the Turing tests understands the questions it receives and the answers it returns.
 - doesn't like Chinese food.
 - believes that no machine could ever understand language.
 - none of the above.
39. According to Searle's **Chinese Room** thought experiment, ...
- understanding language involves nothing more than the ability to manipulate symbols according to formal rules.
 - understanding language involves something else in addition to the ability to manipulate symbols according to formal rules.
 - understanding language does not require any ability to manipulate symbols according to formal rules.
 - only native speakers of Chinese have the ability to manipulate symbols according to formal rules.
 - no one in the Chinese Room could ever develop the ability to manipulate symbols according to formal rules.
40. If you are **glad** this test and this chapter are finally over, ...
- you must not have any mental states.
 - you must have left all your brain states at home.
 - you must have run over and killed several baby qualia on the way to class this morning.
 - your "epi" must be really phenomenal.
 - you have learned by now that "e." is always the correct answer to question 40!