Introduction to Philosophy

Fall 2011 Test 3

 

 

1.  According to Descartes, É

 

a. what I really am is a body, but I also possess a mind.

b. minds and bodies canÕt causally interact with one another, but God made the world in such a way to make it look like they do.

c. cats have immortal souls.

d. conscious states always have physical causes, but never have physical effects.

e. what I really am is a mind, but I also possess a body.

 

 

2.  Substance dualism is the view that É

 

a. there are two kinds of minds.

b. there are two kinds of Òbasic stuffÓ in the world.

c. there are two kinds of physics.

d. there are two kinds of people in the world, those who break the world into two kinds of people, and those that donÕt.

e. material substance comes in two forms, matter and energy.

 

 

3.  Physicalism (as described—and rejected—by Jackson) claims that É

 

a. there is no immaterial mind or soul.

b. everything can (in principle) be explained by physical or material laws and principles.

c. there is only one kind of basic stuff in the world.

d. everything that exists is made of matter.

e. all of the above.

 

 

4.  One problem with mind/body dualism is that É

 

a. it apparently cannot explain how minds and bodies could interact causally.

b. it apparently cannot explain how bodies could interact causally with each other.

c. it apparently cannot explain how minds could interact causally with each other.

d. it denies the existence of matter.

e. it denies the existence of mind.

 

 

5.  Idealism (as discussed in the last chapter) É

 

a. is a variety of substance dualism.

b. urges us to have high moral standards.

c. is a variety of substance monism.

d. is a variety of materialism.

e. none of the above.

 

 

6.  Belief in life after death is apparently incompatible with É

 

a. BerkeleyÕs idealism.

b. the view that mental states are identical to brain states.

c. theism.

d. the view that minds and bodies constitute two different kinds of basic substance.

e. bad breath.

 

7.  Eliminative materialismÉ

 

a. claims that mental states are really just brain states.

b. denies the existence of brain states.

c. is a variety substance dualism.

d. claims that mental states donÕt really exist at all.

e. none of the above.

 

 

8. Physicalism is (or includes) the view that É

 

a. every physical thing has both a mind and a body.

b. all information/truth is ultimately information/truth about psychological (i.e., mental) things.

c. our current science of physics provides a complete description/explanation of the universe.

d. itÕs a good idea to have an annual physical.

e. all information/truth is ultimately information/truth about physical (i.e., material) things.

 

 

9.  Which of the following is not a variety of substance monism?

 

a. Epiphenomenalism.

b. Eliminative materialism.

c. The identity theory.

d. Idealism.

e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of substance monism.

 

 

10. Which of the following is not a variety of materialism?

 

a. The identity theory.

b. Substance dualism.

c. Eliminative materialism.

d. Epiphenomenalism.

e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of materialism.

 

 

11. According to the identity theoryÉ

 

a. a personÕs true identity resides in his/her immaterial soul.

b. no two blades of grass are completely identical.

c. minds are identical to souls.

d. mental states are identical to brain states.

e. no two souls are completely identical.

 

 

12. Epiphenomenalism is (or includes) the view that É

 

a. qualia are caused by physical events, but do not themselves cause physical events.

b. some (but not all) physical events are caused by mental events.

c. all physical events are caused by mental events.

d. there simply are no such things as qualia (or other mental events).

e. qualia cause physical events, but are not themselves caused by physical events.

 

 

13. ÒPain = C-fiber stimulation.Ó  This statement É

 

a. must be true if the identity theory is true.

b. must be false if the identity theory is true.

c. could be true even if the identity theory is false.

d. could be false even if the identity theory is true.

e. presupposes the truth of mind/body dualism.

 


14. According to Gertler, if the identity theory is true, it follows that É

 

a. it is possible for there to be mental states that arenÕt brain states.

b. my true identity resides in my immaterial soul.

c. only some (not all) mental stares are actually brain states.

d. no two brains are identical.

e. itÕs not possible for there to be mental states that arenÕt brain states.

 

 

15. If the identity theory is true, then É

 

a. life after bodily death is impossible.

b. nothing without a brain feels pain.

c. consciousness requires a brain.

d. all of the above.

e. none of the above.

 

 

16.  According to the identity theoryÉ

 

a. there simply are no such things as mental states.

b. mental events are real, but causally impotent.

c. mental states are non-physical states that have physical causes and physical effects.

d. mental states are states of an immaterial soul.

e. mental states really are brain states, the way that lightening bolts really are electrical discharges.

 

 

17.  Gertler claims she can conceive of being in pain even without having a body.  From this she concludes that É

 

a. mental states are identical to states of the brain and/or central nervous system.

b. mental states are not identical to states of the brain and/or central nervous system.

c. it is impossible to have mental states without brain states.

d. it is impossible to have brain states without mental states.

e. none of the above.

 

 

18. According to Gertler, some thought experiments allow us to conclude that something really is possible or impossible, while others do not.  In the thought experiments that do allow us to reach such conclusions, this is because the concepts we use in these thoughts experiments É

 

a. are true.

b. are subjectively certain.

c. are sufficiently complex and confusing.

d. are valid.

e. are sufficiently clear and comprehensive.

 

 

19. According to Gertler, an important difference between our concepts of water and pain is that É

 

a. our concept of water includes that it (water) has a Òhidden nature.Ó

b. our concept of pain doesnÕt include any such Òhidden nature.Ó

c. unlike our concept of water, our concept of pain is such that there is no difference between seeming to be in pain and actually being in pain.

d. all of the above.

e. none of the above.

 

 

20. Regarding the question of mental causation, Gertler believes that É

 

a. it is less problematic than the question of physical causation.

b. it is much more problematic than the question of physical causation.

c. it is so problematic that it disproves dualism.

d. it is no more problematic than the question of physical causation.

e. it is so problematic that it disproves the identity theory.

 

 

21. Given the way that Jackson (and others) uses the term, which of the following are not Òqualia?Ó

 

a. the hurtfulness of pains.

b. the biological causes of pains.

c. the itchiness of itches.

d. the taste of a lemon.

e. the smell of a rose.

 

 

22. The problem that (the existence of) qualia apparently poses for physicalism is that É

 

a. qualia cannot be directly experienced, but can only be inferred.

b. qualia cannot, in principle, be described by any purely mentalistic theory or description.

c. qualia cannot, in principle, be described by any purely physical theory or description.

d. qualia are too small to be detected by current scientific instrumentation.

e. none of the above.

 

 

23. According to Jackson, a Òqualia freakÓ is one who É

 

a. likes to eat small poultry for dinner.

b. is obsessed with a former United States Vice President.

c. believes that all information (truth) is ultimately information (truth) about physical things.

d. believes that all information (truth) is ultimately information (truth) about qualia.

e. none of the above.

 

 

24. Qualia, given the way Jackson uses this term, are É

 

a. physical things, explainable in terms of the laws of physics.

b. proof of substance dualism.

c. necessarily subjective, and so cannot be fully described by any objective description.

d. non-existent, i.e., nobody actually has any.

e. necessarily objective, and so cannot be fully described by any subjective description.

 

 

25. According to Jackson, ÒphysicalismÓ implies that everything that exists is physical and that É

 

a. everything can, in principle, be explained by mentalistic theories.

b. most, but not all things, can, in principle, be explained by physical theories.

c. nothing can, in principle, be explained by physical theories.

d. everything can, in principle, be explained by physical theories.

e. quail are really quite tasty.

 

 

26. Jackson believes that one could know everything there is to know about color perception and still not know what red looks like.  From this he infers that É

 

a. there really isnÕt anything that red looks like.

b. there are facts that cannot be explained by philosophy.

c. there are facts that cannot be explained by psychology.

d. there are facts that cannot be explained by physics.

e. there really arenÕt any facts.

 

 

27. Jackson thinks the existence of qualia is É

 

a. directly known by first-person experience.

b. highly probable but never certain.

c. observed in the behavior of others.

d. doubtful.

e. something that must be argued for.

 

 

28. According to Jackson, knowing everything about the physical stuff that makes up the universe É

 

a. is knowing everything there is to know.

b. is not logically possible.

c. would still not entail knowledge of what a rose smells like.

d. would allow us to have knowledge of other peopleÕs qualia, but not our own.

e. would tell us who is going to win the next World Series.

 

 

29. When Jackson says that Òqualia are an excrescence,Ó what he means is that É

 

a. they are excreted by quails.

b. they do not exist.

c. they are unknowable.

d. they are illusory.

e. they donÕt do/explain anything.

 

 

30. According to Jackson, epiphenomenalism É

 

a. could account for the truth of physicalism.

b. could account for the existence of qualia without implying substance dualism.

c. is compatible with the truth of idealism.

d. establishes the truth of substance dualism.

e. . could account for the existence of qualia without implying materialism.

 

 

31. The Turing test determines that a computer can think when É

 

a. its responses to questions are indistinguishable from the responses a human being would give.

b. it does something it was not programmed to do.

c. the electronic signals of the computer processor are identical to those inside a human brain.

d. its responses are indistinguishable from the responses a pet dog could give.

e. it performs math problems better than a human being can.

 

 

32.  In what way(s) does Turing believe that his test is fair?

 

a. It only asks objective questions.

b. It does not discriminate based on the appearance of the one being tested.

c. The test relies only upon direct access to "inner states of consciousness."

d. All of the above.

e. None of the above.

 

 

33. What is the "objection from consciousness" to Turing's test?

 

a. Testing consciousness is circular because one must be conscious to evaluate the test from consciousness.

b. Only conscious things think.  Computers are not conscious.  So, computers cannot think.

c. Science has shown that some animals that do not exhibit any linguistic behavior are conscious.

d. Each of us has knowledge only of our own consciousness, so we can be sure only that we ourselves think.

e. In order to be conscious, a thing must be created by God, not programmed by a human being.

 

 

34. Turing's response to the "objection from consciousness" is that it leads to É

 

a. denying that other people think.

b. epiphenomenalism.

c. denying that the existence of qualia.

d. dualism.

e. denying that conscious beings think.

 

 

35. According to Turing, É

 

a. only computers can think.

b. only human beings can think.

c. only immaterial souls can think.

d. only computers that can play the imitation game can think.

e. none of the above.

 

 

36. Carruthers argues for the identity theory because (at least some) mental states apparently É

 

a. are identical to droplets of rain.

b. are really events in your non-material soul.

c. are identical to other mental states.

d. cause physical events.

e. cause computers to play the Imitation Game.

 

 

37. Carruthers believes that É

 

a. all mental states are really brain states.

b. only some mental states are really brain states.

c. no mental states are really brain states.

d. mental states donÕt really exist.

e. mental states are states of an immaterial mind/soul.

 

 

38. Carruthers discusses an argument against the Identity Theory known as the Argument from Color.  According to that argument (NOT his rebuttal of it)  É

 

a. some brain states are green.

b. some mental states are green.

c. all brain states are green.

d. all mental states are green.

e. none of the above.

 

 

39. In his rebuttal of the Argument from Color, Carruthers argues that É

 

a. after-images really are, literally, green.

b. after-images really arenÕt, literally, green.

c. some brain states really are, literally, green.

d. none of the above.

e. exactly two of the above.

 

 

40. If you are glad this test and this chapter are finally over, É

 

a. you must not have any mental states.

b. you must not have any brain states.

c. your mental states must really be messed up.

d. your brain must be under the influence of some mood-altering chemical.

e. you should chose e. as the correct answer.