Introduction to Philosophy
Fall 2011 Test
4
1. The determinist
believes that...
a. the
future determines the past.
b. whatever
happens outside human beings is necessitated to happen, but our free actions
are an exception.
c. whatever happens
is necessitated to happen by prior events in accord with laws of nature.
d. physical
events are caused by previous events, but mental events are not.
e. some
events are not caused by previous events, but are caused by God.
2. Which of the following is not a feature of causal and effect relations (as classically understood)?
a. Causes must desire their effects.
b. Causes must happen before their
effects.
c. Causes must be in physical
contact with their effects.
d. Causes necessitate their
effects.
e. None of the above (i.e.,
they are all features of causal relations).
3. The Principle
of Universal Causality asserts that É
a. the
universe was caused by a principle.
b. every event was
caused by a previous event.
c. some
events are uncaused.
d. mental
states have affects, but arenÕt caused.
e. principles
are caused by universals.
4. According to the Psychological Argument
for DeterminismÉ
a. our actions are
caused by our desires, but our deepest desires are not freely chosen.
b. psychologists
are determined to be less intelligent than philosophers.
c. psychological
states are uncaused, but everything else is.
d. psychological
states are the ultimate causes of everything that happens.
e. our
actions are caused by our desires, and even our deepest desires are freely
chosen.
5. According to the Psychological Argument
for determinism É
a. since
we choose our deepest desires, our voluntary acts are caused by factors within
our control.
b. because
everything physical has a physical cause, all human behavior must have a
physical cause.
c. because
everything psychological has a psychological cause, everything in the universe is
caused.
d. our
physiology is determined by our psychology.
e. since we cannot
choose our deepest desires, even our voluntary acts are caused by factors
outside our control.
6. According to the Physiological Argument
for determinism É
a. our
physiology is determined by our psychology.
b. because
everything physical has a physical cause, all human behavior must have a
physical cause.
c. because
everything psychological has a psychological cause, everything in the universe is
caused.
d. everything
other than our free choices has a physiological cause.
e. mental
events have mental causes and physiological events have physiological causes.
7. The Principle
of Universal Causality asserts that É
a. mental
events, but not physical events, are caused by previous events.
b. whatever
happens outside human beings is necessitated to happen, but our free actions
are a universal exception.
c. everything
causes something.
d. physical
events, but not mental events, are caused by previous physical events.
e. whatever happens
is necessitated to happen by prior physical events according to universal laws
of nature.
8. The relation between freedom (in its most general sense) and
moral responsibility is that É
a. we donÕt hold
people morally responsible for their behavior unless they acted freely.
b. we
donÕt hold people morally responsible for their behavior if they acted freely.
c. we
are morally responsible only if we choose to believe that we are free.
d. we
are free only if we choose to believe that we are morally responsible.
e. we
are morally responsible only if we are not free.
9. The crucial difference between contra-causal
freedom and merely voluntary
behavior is that É
a. contra-causal
freedom is possible even if everything is caused by a previous physical event,
but mere voluntary behavior is not.
b. contra-causal
freedom is possible only if no behavior is voluntary.
c. behavior
can be voluntary only if contra-causal freedom is impossible.
d. merely voluntary
behavior is possible even if everything is caused by a previous physical event,
but contra-causal freedom is not.
e. merely
voluntary behavior is contrary to causal freedom.
10. The crucial difference between voluntary and involuntary
behavior concerns É
a. whether
the behavior was caused or uncaused.
b. whether
what caused the behavior was itself caused or uncaused.
c. whether
anything in the universe is caused or uncaused.
d. whether or not what
caused the behavior was a person choosing to act.
e. whether
or not the person acting has contra-causal freedom.
11. To say that someone had contra-causal freedom concerning some
act is to say that É
a. the
act was caused by factors beyond that personÕs control.
b. the
act wasnÕt voluntary.
c. the
act was freely caused by that personÕs contrary nature.
d. the person could
have acted otherwise.
e. the
person could not have acted otherwise.
12. Determinists and Indeterminists
agree about É
a. whether
or not every event has a cause.
b. whether
or not anyone is ever morally responsible for their behavior.
c. the kind of
freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
d. all
of the above.
e. none
of the above.
13. Compatibilists and Determinists
agree about É
a. whether or not
every event has a cause.
b. the
kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
c. whether
or not anyone is ever morally responsible for their behavior.
d. all
of the above.
e. none
of the above.
14. Compatibilists and Indeterminists
agree about É
a. whether
or not every event has a cause.
b. the
kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
c. whether or not
anyone is ever morally responsible for their behavior.
d. all
of the above.
e. none
of the above.
15. When dÕHolbach
says that Òchoice does not prove freedom,Ó
what he means is that É
a. we
canÕt choose to believe that we canÕt choose.
b. we
canÕt prove that we ever act voluntarily.
c. even
if we can choose what to believe, we canÕt believe what we choose.
d. even when we
choose how to act, our choices themselves are still determined.
e. we
should choose not to choose.
16. Ayer
believes that moral responsibility
(for our actions) requires É
a. that
our action wasnÕt caused.
b. that
we could have acted other than we did.
c. that
our action wasnÕt voluntary.
d. that our action
wasnÕt constrained.
e. none
of the above.
17. According to Ayer, to say that one event
causes another implies that É
a. events of the
second kind regularly follow events of the first kind.
b. the
first kind of event occurs regularly.
c. the
first event has the power to make the second event happen.
d. all
of the above.
e. none
of the above.
18. According to Ayer, people (mistakenly) believe that the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility is incompatible with the principle of universal causality because they misunderstand É
a. astrology.
b. psychology.
c. quantum
mechanics.
d. what
it means to say that an act is voluntary.
e. what it means to
say that one event causes another.
19. Ayer believes that
causes É
a. necessitate
their effects.
b. force
their effects to happen.
c. sometimes
donÕt have any effects at all.
d. all
of the above.
e. none of the
above.
20. Compatibilists believe that É
a. every
event has a cause.
b. moral
responsibility is possible even if every event is caused by a previous event.
c. we
are less determined than the determinist thinks we are.
d. all
of the above.
e. (a) and (b) above, but not (c).
21. Determinists believe that moral
responsibilityÉ
a. is
possible only if we never act voluntarily.
b. requires that we
have contra-causal freedom.
c. is
possible only if agent causation is distinct from event causation.
d. is
possible only if we always act voluntarily.
e. (a)
and (b) above, but not (c).
22. Compatibilists believe that
moral responsibility É
a. is
impossible.
b. is
possible only if there really is such a thing as agent causation.
c. requires only
that we act voluntarily.
d. requires
that we have contra-causal freedom.
e. is
possible only if some acts have no cause.
23. According to Compatibilists,
our behavior can be called (ÒmerelyÓ) voluntary
É
a. only
if we could have acted other than we did.
b. only
if it was caused by an agent and not by a previous event.
c. only
if its immediate cause is something outside/independent of us.
d. even
if its immediate cause is something outside/independent of us.
e. even if we could
not have acted other than we did.
24. Compatibilists believe that to be morally responsible for our behavior,
a. that
behavior canÕt be voluntary.
b. that
behavior canÕt be caused.
c. we
must have contra-causal freedom.
d. that
behavior must be the result of agent-causation.
e. none of the
above.
25. Ayer believes that É
a. in
everything we do, we always act voluntarily.
b. we
never act voluntarily.
c. all of our
behavior is the inevitable result of factors that are ultimately beyond our
control.
d. moral
responsibility requires contra-causal freedom.
e. some
of our behavior is not the inevitable result of factors that are ultimately
beyond our control.
26. According to Baldner,
if determinism is true, É
a. it
is morally acceptable to rob banks.
b. it
is not morally acceptable to rob banks.
c. Baldner should go to
confession.
d. you
should stop taking this test.
e. nothing at all
follows about how we should act or what is morally acceptable.
27. Chisholm believes that É
a. the
existence of free will requires only voluntary behavior, not contra-causal
freedom.
b. the
existence of free will implies that agent causation is the same as event
causation.
c. the existence of
free will implies that agent causation is distinct from event causation.
d. free
will doesnÕt exist.
e. free
will is possible only if some human actions have no cause.
28. Chisholm agrees with Ayer that É
a. moral
responsibility makes sense only if indeterminism is true.
b. the
opposite of ÒfreeÓ is Òunconstrained.Ó
c. no
one has contra-causal freedom.
d. everyone
has contra-causal freedom.
e. moral
responsibility doesnÕt make sense if our behavior is uncaused.
29. ChisholmÕs libertarianism agrees with indeterminism that É
a. we canÕt be
morally responsible if we couldnÕt have acted otherwise.
b. all
our actions are determined by prior events and the laws of nature.
c. no
one is morally responsible for their behavior.
d. we
can be morally responsible even if we couldnÕt have acted otherwise.
e. free
acts must be uncaused.
30. ChisholmÕs libertarianism agrees with compatibilism that É
a. we
canÕt be morally responsible if we couldnÕt have acted otherwise.
b. we
can be morally responsible even if we couldnÕt have acted otherwise.
c. no
one is morally responsible for their behavior.
d. even our free
acts must be caused by something.
e. all
our actions are determined by prior events and the laws of nature.
31. According to ChisholmÕs account of agent causation,
É
a. free
acts are caused by previous events, which are caused by previous events, and so
on.
b. free
acts are caused by agents, who are themselves caused to act in this way.
c. free acts are
caused by agents, who are not themselves caused to act in this way.
d. free
acts are uncaused.
e. agents
cause people to pay them 15% of their earnings.
32. One of the possible problems with the notion of agent causation is that É
a. no
one really understands what ÒeventÓ causation is supposed to be.
b. it
commits us to paying an agent 15% of our earnings.
c. it commits us to
the existence of a kind of ÒcausationÓ that we donÕt really understand.
d. it
commits us to a belief in the existence of God.
e. it
only applies to secret agents, like James Bond.
33. One of the possible problems with the notion of event causation is that É
a. no
one really knows who Chisholm is.
b. no
one really knows which events are caused and which arenÕt.
c. everyone
knows that there really arenÕt any events.
d. all
of the above.
e. none of the
above.
34. Indeterminists believe that moral
responsibilityÉ
a. is
possible only if we never act voluntarily.
b. requires
that we have contra-causal freedom.
c. is
possible only if agent causation is distinct from event causation.
d. is possible only
if we always act voluntarily.
e. (a)
and (b) above, but not (c).
35. Compatibilists and
Determinists disagree about É
a. whether
or not anyone is ever morally responsible for their behavior.
b. the kind of
freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
c. whether
or not every event has a cause.
d. all
of the above.
e. (a)
and (b) above, but not (c).
36. ChisholmÕs libertarianism claims that É
a. liberty
is better than fraternity.
b. free acts are
caused by agents, not by other events.
c. the
government shouldnÕt interfere with the private affairs of individuals.
d. free
acts are caused by other events, not by agents.
e. free
acts are uncaused.
37. According to Chisholm, a choice is not free if ...
a. the agent determined the outcome.
b. the choice is a result of oneÕs desires and
beliefs.
c. the agent acted voluntarily.
d. what we do is the result of random chance.
e. if Ayer says it isnÕt.
38. According to Chisholm, moral responsibility pre-supposes
that É
a. the
agent making the choice is in control of her behavior.
b. some event happened because an agent chose to act a
certain way.
c. the agent had the ability to choose otherwise in
the same circumstance.
d. All of the
above.
e. only (b) and (c), but not (a).
39. ChisholmÕs libertarianism disagrees
with indeterminism regarding the claim that É
a. we
canÕt be held morally responsible for behavior that is caused by factors
outside our control.
b. moral
responsibility doesnÕt require contra-causal freedom.
c. no
one is morally responsible for their behavior.
d. free acts must
be uncaused.
e. no
one has contra-causal freedom.
40. If you had a free will, É
a. you
would choose this (wrong) answer, just to prove that you could.
b. you
would have chosen not to answer this question at all.
c. you
wouldnÕt have chosen to be here today.
d. you
would tell your teacher that youÕd rather not get a free question at the end of
each test.
e. youÕd pick this
(correct) answer, because you want to know you got at least one answer right.