| John Dilworth:
Research Overview 2. |
2. DOUBLE CONTENT AND FIELD THEORY
See also subsections:
2B. Orientational Field Theory
There are at least three reasons why the interactive theory of perception (ITP) needs to be supplemented with a further theoretical structure involving two separable kinds of content--a Double Content theory of perceptual representation.
First, perceptual constancy phenomena provide cases in which widely varying kinds of input perceptual data are nevertheless properly classifiable in similar terms. For example, correct perception of a white surface should represent or classify it as being white, but the actual light reflected from such a surface may vary widely, depending on factors such as the time of day or other ambient illumination considerations. So minimally what is needed is a general account of how cognitive processing can achieve accurate results, in spite of variations in input data. Some kind of two factor or double content analysis of representational content is needed to adequately distinguish the actual data received from its correct worldly interpretation.
Second, such perceptual constancy issues are closely related to input indeterminacy issues: perceptual data isn't specific enough to determine which of a range of possible two factor content analyses of it is the correct one. For example, an elliptical image on the retina might be an image of an elliptical shape seen head-on, or instead of a circle seen from an oblique perspective. So one content factor must integrally involve aspectual or perspectival factors in perception, that must be disentangled from standard object-related factors such as the actual shape of an object.
There is also a third aspect of perceptual representation not explained by the ITP, in which divergences from fully determinate, realistic data are used for broadly artistic and expressive purposes. For example, a pencil drawing of a person can seem highly realistic, in spite of the fact that the white paper and gray pencil markings are very unlike the person's actual features. Also, this artistic medium of pencil drawing can add a dimension of expressive and stylistic meaning to realistic portrayals, which any adequate comprehensive theory of perception must also recognize and explain. One result of these artistic considerations is a comprehensive double content theory of art, which attempts to explain all artistic phenomena in double content terms.
I provide a basic explanation of cognitive double content processing in terms of an original Orientational Field theory. A field is a basic kind of cognitive data structure, such as a color wheel. In double content processing, two or more instances of the same field are processed. A field has both an intrinsic orientation or top element--defined by its being correct perceptual content--and a field orientation relative to other copies of the same field. In perceptual constancy cases, a cognitive system achieves constancy by appropriate compensations for the differing field alignments of the input data field and correct data field respectively.
BOOKS
The Double Content of Art (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005). Information Amazon
The Double Content view is the first comprehensive theory of art that is able to
satisfactorily explain the nature of all kinds of artworks in a unified way — whether
paintings, novels, or musical and theatrical performances. The basic thesis is that all
such representational artworks involve two levels or kinds of representation: a first
stage in which a concrete artifact represents an artwork, and a second stage in which that
artwork in turn represents its subject matter.
ARTICLES (PDF links)
(Forthcoming)
"Depictive Seeing and Double Content," in (eds.) C. Abell and K. Bantinaki,
Philosophical Perspectives on Picturing, Oxford University Press.
A picture provides both configurational content concerning its design features,
and recognitional content about its external subject. But how is this possible,
since all that a viewer can actually see is the picture's own design? I argue
that the most plausible explanation is that a picture's design has a dual
function. It both encodes artistically relevant design content, and in turn that
design content encodes the subject content of the picture--producing overall a
double content structure. Also, it is highly desirable that a resulting double
content theory for pictures should be closely integrated with a related double
content account of perceptual content generally, so as to avoid suspicions of ad
hoc theorizing that would apply only to pictorial content.
The resulting theory should also be able to explain the inevitable ambiguities
involved in abstracting two levels of visual content from a single visible
surface, as well as explaining the systematic relations between the two kinds of
content. I provide an orientational theory--based on a recently developed
spatial logic of orientational concepts--for this purpose, and show how
depictive and perceptual content in general can be usefully explained in these
orientational terms. This account of picturing also integrates well with a
previously developed, more generic double content theory of art, and it is also
plausible in cognitive science terms.
"The Abstractness of Artworks and its Implications for Aesthetics,"
Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66:4 (Fall 2008), pp. 341-353.
Artworks have at least some necessary content properties, as do abstract
entities such as propositions. But no concrete item, whether an object, event,
process etc., could have any necessary content property. So no artwork could be
identical with a concrete item. Hence artworks must be abstract. I also argue
that artworks are only contingently connected with concrete items, just as
propositions are only contingently linked to their linguistic tokens.
"The Propositional
Challenge to Aesthetics," British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (April
2008), pp. 115-144.
It is generally accepted that Picasso might have used a different canvas as the
vehicle for his painting 'Guernica', and also that the artwork 'Guernica' itself
necessarily represents a certain historical episode--rather than, say, a bowl of
fruit. I argue that such a conjunctive acceptance entails a broadly
propositional view of the nature of representational artworks. In addition, I
argue--via a comprehensive examination of possible alternatives--that, perhaps
surprisingly, there simply is no other available conjunctive view of the nature
of representational artworks in general.
"Representationalism
and Indeterminate Perceptual Content," Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences 6 no. 3 (2007), pp. 369-387.
Representationalists who hold that phenomenal character can be explained in terms of
representational content currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate
perceptual content, such as in the case of objects seen blurrily by someone with poor
eyesight, or objects seen vaguely in misty conditions. But this problem can be resolved
via provision of a more sophisticated double content (DC) view, according to which
the representational content of perception is structured in two nested levels.
I start by outlining the DC view via consideration of four closely related cases of
perceptual imprecision. Then, after a demonstration that the DC view can also explain
imprecise photographic content, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view
are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any
kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC
account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it
concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of
information in indeterminacy cases.
"In Support
of Content Theories of Art," Australasian Journal of Philosophy
85 no. 1 (2007), pp. 19-39.
A content theory of art would identify an artwork
with the meaningful or representational content of some concrete artistic
vehicle, such as the intentional, expressive, stylistic, and subject
matter-related content embodied in, or resulting from, acts of intentional
artistic expression by artists. Perhaps surprisingly, the resultant view that an
artwork is nothing but content seems to have been without theoretical
defenders until very recently, leaving a significant theoretical gap in the
literature.
I present some basic arguments in defence of such a
view, including the following. Content views of linguistic communication are
ubiquitous, so why should they not be applicable in artistic cases as well?
Also, propositional accounts of language involve two kinds of content
(the proposition expressed by a sentence, plus the worldly state of affairs it
represents), both of which kinds can be used in explaining artworks. In
addition, the differing modal properties of artworks and concrete artefacts can
be used to show that artworks could not be, or include, such physical
artefacts.
"The
Perception of Representational Content," The British Journal of
Aesthetics 45 no. 4 (October 2005), pp. 66-89.
How
can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze
is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint?
An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand
on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of
pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no
physical existence. A solution is proposed
that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double
content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally
autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely
physical world. In addition, a functionalist
concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional
concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically
intractable.
"The Double
Content of Perception," Synthese 146 no. 3 (September 2005),
pp. 224-243.
Clearly
we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual
content be explained or analyzed? I argue
that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of
content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of
an object X, and about the object X itself. On
this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y'(X') as
a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related
content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data.
Hence the relevant perceptual data Y'(X') must be 'de-contextualized' or
decoded to arrive at the X-related content X', resulting in a double content structure for
perceptual data, that persists in higher-order conscious perceptual content. Some implications and applications of this DC view
are also discussed.
"A Double Content Theory of
Artistic Representation,"
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 no. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 249-260.
The representational content or subject matter of a picture is normally
distinguished from various non-representational components of meaning involved in
artworks, such as expressive, stylistic or intentional factors. However, I show how such
non subject matter components may themselves be analyzed in content terms, if two
different categories of representation are recognized--aspect indication for
stylistic etc. factors, and normal representation for subject matter content.
On the account given, the relevant kinds of content are hierarchically structured, with
relatively unconceptualized lower level aspectual contents encoding or symbolizing higher
level conceptualized representational subject matter. Such an account is
strongly supported by the latest findings of cognitive science regarding levels of
conceptualization. The paper also demonstrates how the account given is compatible with
the actual pictorial competence of normal viewers of visual artworks.
"Dual Recognition of Depth and
Dependent Seeing," Interdisciplines: Art and Cognition Workshop, June
2005. HTML.
An explanation of the seeing of depth both in reality and in pictures requires
a dual content theory of visual recognition. In addition, there are two necessary
conditions on genuine seeing of depth-related content. First, the right kinds of
dependence relations must hold between a physical picture, its content and its perceiver,
and second, the perceiver must be in an appropriate, functionally defined perceptual
state.
"The Twofold Orientational
Structure of Perception,"
Philosophical Psychology 18, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 187–203.
I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of
objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of
low level perceptual processing--a double content structure. I present an 'orientational'
theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both
the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it
involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The
resulting theoretical structure is argued to be a broadly methodological or logical one,
rather than a substantive theory that is open to empirical refutation.
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