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4.  HOW TO NATURALIZE SEMANTICS

A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of  perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the non-semantic sciences, but with a much more specific propositional indexing scheme than previous naturalistic proposals were able to achieve.

The resulting theory may be described as the Interactive Indexing (II) theory.  Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them.

ARTICLES (PDF links)

"More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory," Minds and Machines 20 (2010), pp. 455-474..
This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article "Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality," (Vol. 18, pp. 527-546).    Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about.  The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception (ITP). But intentionality is preserved via purely abstract propositions about the world that index, or correlate with, appropriate cognitive states.
  Further reasons as to why intentionality must be abstract are provided, along with more details of an II-style account of representation, language use and propositional attitudes.  All cognitive representation is explained in terms of classification or sorting dispositions indexed by appropriate propositions.  The theory is also related to Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM), with some surprisingly close parallels being found in spite of the purely dispositional basis of the II theory.  In particular, Fodor's insistence that thinking about an item cannot be reduced to sorting dispositions is supported via a novel two-level account of cognition--upper level propositional attitudes involve significant intermediate processing of a broadly normative epistemic kind prior to the formation of sorting dispositions.  To conclude, the weak intentional realism of the II theory--which makes intentional descriptions of the world dispensable--is related to Dennett's 'intentional stance' view, and distinguished from strong (indispensable) intentional realist views.  II-style dispositions are also defended.

"Semantics Naturalized: Propositional Indexing Plus Interactive Perception," Language and Communication 29 (2009), pp. 1-25.
A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the non-semantic sciences, but with a much more specific propositional indexing scheme than previous naturalistic proposals were able to achieve.

"Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality," Minds and Machines 18 (2008), pp. 527-546.
A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them.

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Last Updated: November 10, 2010