Metaphysics 633  Additional and Supplementary Materials          John Dilworth

[2/14/07. Check Later for Updates]

[webpage: http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/Metaphysics633.htm]

Additional Materials 1:  Science-Based Papers on Constitution and Realization

Philosophers are usually quick to see relevant interconnections between related problems in different fields.  But remarkably enough, this has hardly happened at all yet with standard metaphysical problems concerning material constitution on the one hand, and broad philosophy of science and philosophy of mind problems of non-reductive physicalism, functionalism and multiple realization on the other.  So if you want to write something original that eventually might be publishable, here is a good underdeveloped area to work in.  Intuitively speaking, it's obvious that metaphysical issues of material constitution have everything to do with how the underlying physical reality, as studied by physics, somehow constitutes, or provides the physical substance for, ordinary material and biological entities.  But you'd hardly guess that from reading most of the selections in the Rea volume.  Here are a few corrective selections.

As a preliminary, George Bealer, in his Phil. Rev. '97 paper 'Self-Consciousness', argues that functionalism can't explain self-consciousness.  In reply, Sydney Shoemaker, in 'Realization and Mental Causation', in a 2000 World Congress of Philos. paper (an expanded ver. is in Physicalism and Its Discontents, eds. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer, pp74-98, Cambridge UP 2001), answers Bealer by distinguishing two separate functionalist tasks: explaining mental properties in terms of their causal inputs and outputs, with a separate account of what it is for those properties to be physically realized or constituted.   He has a 'subset' view of such constitution: the causal properties of the mental or cognitive state are a proper subset of those of the realizing physical state.  (Those who attended the Bowling Green Physicalism conference in the spring may remember that Andrew Melnyk, in his paper 'Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism', criticizes Shoemaker's subset view and offers an alternative).

A different way of supporting a causal subset view of constitution is provided by Jessica Wilson (who also presented at the Bowling Green Conf.) in an insightful March 2005 draft paper 'Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom'.  She argues that higher level realized objects have fewer degrees of freedom than their lower level physical realizers, so for that reason the causal powers of realized objects are a subset of those of their realizers.  (Wilson's approach also provides one of the clearest available defenses of non-reductive physicalism for non-cognitive items).

However, Carl Gillett in his penetrating Analysis '02 paper 'The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View' argues that such subset views of constitution are inadequate even in simple non-cognitive cases--and that there may be several levels of realization or constitution as well. Thus scientifically speaking, issues of constitution remain wide open for further exploration even in relatively simple, non-cognitive or non-mental cases. 

Additional Materials 2: JD, 2 papers, D1 and D2  

Paper D2, for Nov 30th (html format): "A Retrospective Replacement for Meaning Rules and Rule-Following"   

Powerful skeptical arguments by Wittgenstein, Kripke and others strongly suggest that there are no mental rules of meaning that we follow while thinking, believing and perceiving.  Nevertheless, virtually all commentators have attempted to resist such far-reaching skeptical conclusions.  But I argue that a more promising strategy for naturalists, in pursuit of a purely dispositional theory of meaning, is simply to accept the skeptical conclusions.  Then, as a substitute for the eliminated rules and rule-following, an appropriate dispositional replacement can be provided. 

 The suggested replacement is retrospective, in that it is based on prior cases of behavioral conformity to conventional applications of a supposed rule, rather than on prospective mental envisaging of a rule to be followed, as in standard non-skeptical accounts.  It is also shown how adequate replacements for concepts of normative rule-following, perception, and propositionally based true or false belief can be developed in this skeptical retrospective framework.

Paper D1, for Feb 28 2007 (html format): "Material Constitution as Comprehensive Representation"

A broadly representational, conceptualist approach to the material constitution of midsized objects is argued for.  Assuming a robustly realistic physicalism of ultimate particles etc., some account is needed as to how such real items are related to the midsized objects that we are evolutionarily conditioned to perceptually recognize.  A representational solution is proposed: various similarly located, changing clusters of ultimate particles each serve to represent to perception an invariant, self-same worldly object. 

     In order to make this solution workable, a concept of comprehensive representation--i.e., representation of all of the properties of an object--is introduced.  The solution is also unusual in its systematic integration of four areas often kept separate, namely problems in analytic ontology, issues of non-reductive physicalism, evolutionary psychology, and broad metaphysical debates about realism versus anti-realism.

[Basic Research aside/extra: in case anyone doesn't know, or has forgotten: to follow up on a writer or topic:
a) Use Google to find online papers plus author's websites with links or info on other papers;
b) Full text of almost all journals is available online, for easy access to them at WMU you can use my list of links:
     http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/journals.html
c) Use the Philosopher's Index for more in-depth searches--2 different links to it are on my list.]

Supplementary Materials

PPR 2003 discussions of Dancy's book

Catherine Sutton's Composition as Identity Resource Page
Janet Levin's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Functionalism
Achille Varzi's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Mereology (Part/Whole relations)
David Chalmer's Bibliography on Metaphysics of Mind
John Bickle's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Multiple Realizability
Ted Sider/Dean Zimmerman's Persistence Bibliography
Daniel Stoljar's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Physicalism
Brian Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopedia article on The Problem of the Many
Katherine Hawley's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Temporal Parts
Shieva Kleinschmidt's Bibliography on Things and Stuff
Roy Sorenson's Stanford Encyclopedia article on Vagueness