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RESEARCH OVERVIEW

    1.  The Interactive Theory of Perception

    2.  Double Content and Field Theory

    3.  Preliminary vs Resultant Perceptual Representation

    4.  How to Naturalize Semantics

    5.  Representation can Explain Generality

 1.  The Interactive Theory of Perception (ITP)

(Initially called: the Reflexive Theory of Perception)

2. Double Content and Field Theory  

There are at least three reasons why the interactive theory of perception (ITP) needs to be supplemented with a further theoretical structure involving two separable kinds of content--a Double Content theory of perceptual representation.

First, perceptual constancy phenomena provide cases in which widely varying kinds of input perceptual data are nevertheless properly classifiable in similar terms.

Second, such perceptual constancy issues are closely related to input indeterminacy issues: perceptual data isn't specific enough to determine which of a range of possible two factor content analyses of it is the correct one.

And third, divergences from fully determinate, realistic data can be used for broadly artistic and expressive purposes, whose roles in cognitive processing also need to be explained.

I provide a basic explanation of cognitive double content processing in terms of an original Orientational Field theory.  A field is a basic kind of cognitive data structure, such as a color wheel.  In double content processing, two or more instances of the same field are processed.  A field has both an intrinsic orientation or top element--defined by its being correct perceptual content--and a field orientation relative to other copies of the same field.  In perceptual constancy cases, a cognitive system achieves constancy by appropriate compensations for the differing field alignments of the input data field and correct data field respectively.

3.  Preliminary vs Resultant Perceptual Representation

The Interactive Theory of Perception (ITP), addressed in 1. above, does not directly consider a preliminary stage of perceptual representation that is prior to the final or resultant dispositions toward a perceived object that is a primary topic of the ITP.  This section 3. provides an overview of the general context in which the preliminary vs resultant distinction becomes salient for various philosophical projects.

4.  How to Naturalize Semantics

A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them.

 5.  Representation can Explain Generality

Generality phenomena concern the fact that apparently there can be multiple instances or tokens of abstract properties, types or universals.  Realist, conceptualist or nominalist theories traditionally have been proposed to explain such kinds of generality.  However, it has not previously been realized that the concept of representation enables a fundamentally different approach to generality of all kinds to be developed.  On this approach, generality is not explained in terms of abstract types, properties or universals.  Instead, it is explained in terms of the abilities of cognitive beings, such as ourselves, to use many particular objects or events to represent appropriate items.

For example, instead of saying that a piece of music is an abstract type that has individual performances of it as tokens, on the representational view each individual performance represents the relevant piece of music.  It is unproblematic that there can be many representations of the same thing, and that each representation may differ from others in various ways, so this kind of account can automatically explain how various qualitatively different performances of a musical work can nevertheless be all performances of the same work.  Also, since there can be representations of things that do not exist, such as Santa Claus or unicorns, the representational account can provide a fictionalist account of the ontology of musical works--a piece of music, such as Beethoven's 5th symphony, doesn't have to actually exist for it to be possible for there to be multiple performances of it, each of which equally represents it.

However, it might seem as if a representational account is fundamentally unsuited to explain sortal properties or universals, such as that of being an actual cow or a person.  It seems as if there really are cows, even though we might be prepared to give up on the existence of pieces of music.  Nevertheless, as I show in my article "A Representationalist Approach to Generality", the concept of representation can be appropriately extended to cover such cases.  In ordinary cases of representation, only some limited subset of the relevant properties are represented.  For example, a picture of a building represents only some of its properties, such as its frontal appearance from a particular angle.  But a comprehensive representation can be envisioned--an object which would represent all of the properties of an item.  This enables sortal properties to be dispensed with--instead of there having to be a sortal property of cowhood, instead it is only required that those items we usually refer to as 'cows' are capable of comprehensively representing all of the properties of a cow.   On this approach, there don't actually have to be any real cows, but only particular objects capable of comprehensively representing 'a cow'.  So all we need is a concept of cowhood, plus an implied list of what would be all of the real properties of cows if there were any, plus the capacity of individual objects--conventionally called 'cows'--to comprehensively represent 'a cow' that would have all of those properties.  In this manner a very economical, broadly Quinean view of the ontological priority of particulars and of the non-existence of typical sortal properties can be implemented.

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Last Updated: April 27, 2010