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1.  THE INTERACTIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION (ITP)

(Initially called: the Reflexive Theory of Perception.)

A naturalistic theory of perception attempts to explain basic perceptual phenomena purely in terms of causal and dispositional concepts and relations.  Arguably the most basic theory of this kind would be one in which an object X is perceived by a person Z just in case X causes Z to acquire some disposition D to causally interact with X.  Or more specifically, according to the ITP, person Z perceives object X to have some property P just in case X causes Z to acquire some P-related classification disposition Dp with respect to X.   Such classification dispositions can also be used to explain what makes a perceptual state representational.

ARTICLES (PDF links)

Forthcoming: "More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory," Minds and Machines.
This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article "Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality," (Vol. 18, pp. 527-546).    Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about.  The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception (ITP). But intentionality is preserved via purely abstract propositions about the world that index, or correlate with, appropriate cognitive states.
  Further reasons as to why intentionality must be abstract are provided, along with more details of an II-style account of representation, language use and propositional attitudes.  All cognitive representation is explained in terms of classification or sorting dispositions indexed by appropriate propositions.  The theory is also related to Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM), with some surprisingly close parallels being found in spite of the purely dispositional basis of the II theory.  In particular, Fodor's insistence that thinking about an item cannot be reduced to sorting dispositions is supported via a novel two-level account of cognition--upper level propositional attitudes involve significant intermediate processing of a broadly normative epistemic kind prior to the formation of sorting dispositions.  To conclude, the weak intentional realism of the II theory--which makes intentional descriptions of the world dispensable--is related to Dennett's 'intentional stance' view, and distinguished from strong (indispensable) intentional realist views.  II-style dispositions are also defended.

"Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception," Philosophical Psychology 23(2010), pp. 23-42.
Realistic uses of Virtual Reality (VR) technology closely integrate user training on virtual objects with VR-assisted user interactions with real objects. This paper shows how my Interactive Theory of Perception (ITP) may be extended to cover such cases. Virtual objects are explained as concrete models (CMs) that have an inner generation mechanism, and the ITP is used to explain how VR users can both perceive such local CMs, and perceptually represent remote real objects. Also, concepts of modeling and representation are distinguished. The paper concludes with suggestions as to how the ITP methodology developed here could be extended to iconic external representations and models generally.

"Semantics Naturalized: Propositional Indexing Plus Interactive Perception," Language and Communication 29 (2009), pp. 1-25.
A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the non-semantic sciences, but with a much more specific propositional indexing scheme than previous naturalistic proposals were able to achieve.

"Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality," Minds and Machines 18 (2008), pp. 527-546.
A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them.

"A Reflexive Dispositional Analysis of Mechanistic Perception," Minds and Machines 16 no. 4 (2006), pp. 479-493.
The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception.  Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been--perhaps surprisingly--almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably perceptual mechanisms enhance evolutionary fitness by facilitating sensorily mediated causal interactions between an organism Z and items X in its environment. A 'reflexive' theory of perception of this kind is outlined, according to which an organism Z perceives an item X just in case X causes a sensory organ zi of Z to cause Z to acquire a disposition toward the very same item X that caused the perception. The rest of the paper shows how an intuitively plausible account of mechanistic perception can be developed and defended in terms of the reflexive theory. Also, a compatibilist option is provided for those who wish to preserve a distinct informational concept of perception.

"Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved," Acta Analytica 20 no. 3 (2005), pp. 11-31.
Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains.   They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on.   But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases.  A critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability.

"A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 no. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 583-601.
A naturalistic concept of perception should be epistemically continuous with naturalistic elements in more traditional concepts of perception, biologically possible and functionally effective, mechanistically realizable, and capable of resolving or avoiding, at least in principle, standard causality problems with respect to perception when incorporated into an appropriate naturalistic theory of perception. A reflexive dispositional theory is provided that can fully satisfy all of these requirements, as well as providing a preliminary account of perceptual intentionality and non-veridical perceptual content.

"The Perception of Representational Content," The British Journal of Aesthetics 45 no. 4 (October 2005), pp. 66-89.
How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint?   An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence.  A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world.  In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable.

"The Reflexive Theory of Perception,"  Behavior and Philosophy 33 (2005), pp. 17-40.
The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself.  This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework.  The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception, in that, according to the RTP, any X-caused and X-directed dispositions are genuinely perceptual--including affective, attitudinal, and immediately activated purely action-directed behavioral dispositions.  Thus the RTP has the potential to provide the foundations for a broadly behavioral counter-revolution in cognitive science.

"Dual Recognition of Depth and Dependent Seeing," Interdisciplines: Art and Cognition Workshop, June 2005.  HTML.
An explanation of the seeing of depth both in reality and in pictures requires a dual content theory of visual recognition. In addition, there are two necessary conditions on genuine seeing of depth-related content. First, the right kinds of dependence relations must hold between a physical picture, its content and its perceiver, and second, the perceiver must be in an appropriate, functionally defined perceptual state.

"Naturalized Perception Without Information," The Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 no. 4 (2004), pp. 349-368.
The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views.

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Last Updated: June 24, 2010