Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination is thus the mother of Representationalism, which insists that it is mental intermediaries that make other things and other people available to the subject of experience. When stimulated the senses produce representations or images, and it is only by grace of appropriate causal origin that these count as of or about external objects. Consequently, all the senses directly reveal about external objects is how they affect us; they show us nothing of how such objects are in themselves.

However paradigmatic this picture has become, it must be swept aside in order to command a clear view of the matter. But the picture is grounded in a battery of arguments with a considerable lineage and much to be said for them.

The argument from hallucination begins from the disputed, but not ultimately deniable, fact that there could be cases in which delusional and veridical sensings really are indistinguishable from the point of view of the one enjoying them. It attempts to confound so-called Direct Realism by concluding that quite generally objects of the same category exhaust all that is directly present in delusional and veridical sensings. Yet this conclusion seems at odds with the evident fact that veridical sensing is an original source of knowledge of external particulars. Sensing continually expands the topics of our thought and talk. By contrast, hallucination is in this respect derivative, in a quite precise sense, which I shall attempt to explain.

It thus appears that the objects present in veridical sensing are not exhausted by those that could be given to a mere hallucinator.

Many who take that view have attempted to diagnose definitively the error in the argument from hallucination. Success has proved elusive.\(^1\) There are a variety of arguments from hallucination. One such argument seems to me to contain no error at all; namely the explanatory appeal to a common factor in veridical sensing and hallucination in order to account for (i) subjectively seamless transitions between certain cases of sensing and hallucination, and (ii) the distinctive features of hallucination itself.

Yet I am a “Direct” Realist, and a radical one at that.

If this combination of Direct Realism and acceptance of an argument from hallucination seems puzzling, I suggest that this is because many of the currently dominant options in the philosophy of perception are ill-posed.\(^2\) This is particularly true when it comes to the controversy between so-called Conjunctivists and Disjunctivists over the nature of hallucination and veridical sensing.

Throughout, I mainly shall concentrate on seeing. The central points can be straightforwardly adapted to sensing in general.

1. The Conjunctive Analysis of seeing has it that when a subject is seeing

(i) the direct object of her visual awareness is not some particular in the external environment, but something that she could be aware of even if she were hallucinating.

and – the crucial conjunction –

(ii) By contrast with the hallucinatory case, her visual awareness is appropriately caused by some external particular in the scene before the eyes. Thanks to this causal connection the material particular counts as an indirect object of experience.\(^3\)

Any Sense Datum Theory that treats sense data as the only objects of immediate awareness, and treats the distinction between hallucination and seeing along the lines of (ii), is obviously a version of the Conjunctive Analysis. But other models, sometimes offered as real alternatives to such Sense Datum Theories, such as the Adverbial Theory and various Intentionalist accounts of
visual experience, can also take a Conjunctive form. Central to the Conjunctive Analysis, as I am understanding it, is the deployment of the idea of a direct object of experience and the implication that the only direct objects of experience are those that could be presented in hallucination.

2. There is an influential argument for the Conjunctive Analysis, an argument from observations about hallucination and a very plausible principle governing causation. The argument also serves to introduce the contrast between direct and indirect objects of experience. It will be instructive to see just what is wrong with this argument, and whether it nonetheless serves to provide some constraints on an account of hallucination.

The argument for the Conjunctive Analysis begins with and depends on a distinction; a distinction between the fact that someone is hallucinating, which entails that he is not seeing, and the fact that he is enjoying an act of awareness of a certain kind, a mental act with a certain character and directed at certain objects, namely the act of awareness that happens to be involved in hallucination. The point of the distinction is to suggest that this second is a kind of act that might happen to occur in non-hallucinatory cases as well. The subsequent argument aims to have us accept that the kind of act of awareness involved in hallucination supervenes just on the state of the subject’s brain, in the sense that an occurrence of an act of such a kind requires no more than the subject’s brain being in a certain state.

To that end, the next observation is hard to resist: Whatever the relevant state of the subject’s brain might be, the subject can get into the relevant state in two relevantly different ways. In the standard case – the case of seeing – that state is the last effect of a causal chain beginning with light coming from the object, then continuing with the stimulation of the retina and the optic nerve, then involving the activation of the visual cortex. In the non-standard case – the case of hallucinating – the earlier parts of the causal chain involving the external object, light (and perhaps the optic nerve) are bypassed. The same kind of state of the visual system, indeed the same kind of total brain-state, can be produced either way.
Now we have a crucial step. If in the case of hallucination such a total brain state is sufficient for the act of awareness involved in hallucination, how could it cease to be sufficient for that kind of act of awareness when the very same kind of total brain state is caused by a longer, more involved causal process, say the causal process characteristic of seeing? The act of awareness involved in hallucination has a certain character, and is an awareness of whatever object it is an awareness of, just thanks to the occurrence of that total brain state.

In defense of the step, the following sort of thing can be said. If we were to hold that a different kind of act of awareness – say, one with different kinds of objects – was caused or constituted by the same kind of brain state when that brain state was itself caused in the standard way then we would be committed to something extremely odd. We should have to suppose something akin to action at a distance. For the brain state would have to “look back” and inspect its causal antecedents in order to see what mental act to cause or constitute. Otherwise, how could brain state “know” that it should cause or constitute direct awareness of things in the environment when it was preceded by a normal causal chain going all the way out through the visual system to an external object? How could the brain state “know” to instead cause or constitute the kind of visual awareness involved in hallucination, awareness which is not of any object there in the scene before one’s eyes, in the case where there was no such normal external connection? Obviously there is no such action at a distance or “looking back”. The brain state does not know such things. Irrespective of how it is caused, the brain state causes or constitutes an act of awareness with a certain character and directed at certain objects, the very type of act of awareness that occurs in the hallucinatory case.

We have no choice then, so the argument goes, but to suppose that in the pair of cases at hand the same type of proximate physical cause produces or constitutes the same type of immediate mental effect, i.e. the type of act of awareness that is present in the case of hallucination. That is to say that the same type of act of awareness is present in a case of seeing and a case of hallucination. Since types of acts of awareness are plausibly individuated by the types of objects that they present to the subject, this common type of act
of awareness is not an awareness of objects of different types or categories. It is an awareness of the kind of thing that one could be aware of even if one were hallucinating.

Although that is a substantial result (if it is a result), as yet the argument has not delivered the Conjunctive Analysis. For all the argument has shown so far, it remains an open possibility that in the case of seeing as well as the common act of awareness there is another act of awareness, to wit, the act of being directly aware of external objects and their visible features. Since acts of awareness are plausibly individuated by their direct objects, this would be an act of awareness not identical with any act of awareness common to seeing and hallucination.

The second part of the argument for the Conjunctive Analysis mops up. It examines versions of this last possibility and aims to rule out those inconsistent with the Conjunctive Analysis.

To proceed in just this way: One option is that this further act of awareness that is seeing is wholly distinct from the common act of awareness, i.e. does not overlap with it or include it as a proper part. But this is difficult to accept. For it would follow that in the case of seeing there are two wholly distinct acts of visual awareness, the one awareness of external objects and the other awareness of what one could be aware of even if one were hallucinating. Now consider the qualitative aspect of what a subject is aware of in the two allegedly distinct mental acts. Surely it would have to be the same or at least subjectively indistinguishable for the subject. Otherwise a subject who has been seeing lights on in a ceiling and who has his seeing “short-circuited” by direct stimulation of the relevantly active parts of his brain would be in a position to notice that the change has taken place. And we know that this need not be so. (The reasons for granting this premise are set out in detail below.) Thus we are involved in supposing that whenever a subject is seeing there are two wholly distinct – as it were parallel – acts of visual awareness, each of the same or indistinguishable qualities. And that is not a comfortable resting place. Accordingly, we should reject the first option.

The remaining options are that the two acts of awareness have a part in common or that the one wholly contains the other. But it is puzzling how to model this. What is it for one act of awareness
to overlap another or include another as a proper part? One act of awareness might be directed at a second and so have the second as its object, but this is not at all relevant here. For neither seeing nor the common act of awareness is an act of awareness whose object is an act of awareness.

The friend of the Conjunctive Analysis offers what he supposes is the only tenable model. The act of awareness involved in seeing must simply be the common act of awareness “augmented” in a certain way, namely by being causally connected to external particulars. The act of awareness involved in seeing must be no more than the common act of awareness, an act of awareness that also happens to count as “of” external objects because it is appropriately caused by those objects. In seeing there is no second act of awareness with a different direct object. In seeing there is a single act of awareness whose direct objects are exhausted by what one could be aware of even if one were hallucinating. But that act of awareness has external particulars as its “indirect” objects in just this sense: It is appropriately caused by those external particulars.5

This argument for the Conjunctive Analysis is an inference to an explanatory model that purports to best account for the consequences of the narrow supervenience of the act of awareness involved in hallucination.6 The argument also has the advantage of explicating the otherwise obscure distinction between direct and indirect objects of awareness: something gets to be an indirect object by being the appropriate cause of an act of awareness already individuated in terms of other objects of awareness. The argument elaborates an old thought, which some find in Malebranche, who puts matters this way:

Now on the supposition that the world was annihilated and that God nevertheless produced the same traces in our brains . . . we should see the same beauties . . . What I see when I look at your room will be visible even should your room have been destroyed and even I might add, if it had never been built.7

In modern jargon; having the kind of awareness involved in hallucination supervenes on states of one’s brain. Those states could match the brain states of one who is seeing. So the one who is seeing must be having the same kind of awareness, albeit caused by appropriate objects.
Despite the venerable credentials of the argument, we should reject the Conjunctive Analysis of veridical sensory awareness, especially its maneuvering with the direct/indirect distinction. What is so odd about the analysis is that it entails that the objects of hallucination are present to us in a way that external particulars cannot be, *even when we are seeing external particulars*. We should instead hold out for a view to the effect that when we see, or more generally sense, external particulars those particulars are no less “directly” present to us than anything is in hallucination.

That is after all the best explanation of why the external particulars that are sensed can be immediately demonstrated, and so become topics for thought, talk and, in fact, even subsequent hallucination. Such immediate demonstration does not go by way of the conjectural hypothesis that there really are external objects which are the appropriate causes of the acts of sensory awareness that one is enjoying. Yet someone who accepted and lucidly understood the Conjunctive Analysis would be justified in regarding the presence of external particulars as at most a reliable conjecture concerning extrinsic connections between his visual experience and external causes. So even when he takes himself to be seeing and not hallucinating he might express his lucid understanding by picking external objects out as ‘the appropriate causes of this sensory experience’. But as against this implication of the Conjunctive Analysis, our relation to the things we are seeing is not well captured in this way. We can successfully demonstrate them without relying explicitly or implicitly on such a conjectural causal description. When we see particular things, they are just presented as there to be attended to and demonstrated. They are the antecedent hinges to which we can attach descriptions that then serve to identify things not seen or sensed. Without external particulars immediately seen or sensed, the whole scheme of descriptive identification of particulars would be ungrounded.

In order to attend to and demonstrate what we see, we certainly need no more in the way of implicit auxiliary assumptions than we need to attend to and demonstrate the items that we hallucinate. This suggests that external particulars are as “directly” present to us as anything that is present to us in hallucination.
Moreover, the Conjunctivist’s direct/indirect distinction has no phenomenological rationale. There is no good phenomenological sense in which, when I see the pattern in the Persian carpet, which pattern I could also hallucinate, I am more directly aware of the pattern than I am of the carpet. We should aim to do without this invidious distinction, which counts the particulars we see as derivative objects of awareness.

Nonetheless, the argument from the narrow supervenience of hallucination presents a challenging constraint. We must find a way to combine the common object of awareness that is arguably present in hallucination and seeing with the no less “direct” awareness of external objects that is definitive of seeing. We cannot treat the common object of awareness and the objects of the act of seeing as wholly distinct. Nor should we treat the distinctive objects that are seen as “indirect” objects of awareness in the fashion of the Conjunctive Analysis. We need to put the common object of awareness together with the distinctive objects which we see without merely tacking on to the common object of awareness the external objects which we see.

Before developing a positive account which does precisely this, let me deal first with the now widespread claim that no such account is really needed, thanks to the viability of so-called “Disjunctivism”.

3. One way to avoid saying that items are present to us in hallucination in a way that external particulars could never be present to us, even when we are seeing, is to avoid saying much at all about hallucination. In the contemporary debate, the Conjunctive Analysis is often opposed by self-styled “Disjunctivists”, who pursue this strategy in a principled way. They hold that there is nothing more to be said about pairs of indistinguishable veridical and delusive sensings of say, a dagger hanging in the air, than the following. In the veridical case one is seeing a dagger hanging in the air, while in the delusive case one merely seems to be seeing a dagger hanging in the air. On this view, there is no neutral condition – the appearing of a dagger – common to indistinguishable cases of seeing and hallucination. There is only a neutral disjunctive description that applies to both cases. You are either seeing a dagger or you just merely or falsely seem to be seeing a dagger. Call it ‘the appearing
of a dagger’ if you like, but remember that that is just shorthand for a disjunctive report, not the description of a kind of mental act common to hallucination and seeing.  

The Disjunctivist has a quick way with the argument from the narrow supervenience of the act of awareness involved in hallucination. What narrowly supervening act of awareness? According to the Disjunctivist, all we need is to recognize the fact that people hallucinate. And it is agreed on all sides that the fact that someone is hallucinating does not narrowly supervene on his brain state. For there could be neural duplicates, one of whom is seeing while the other is hallucinating. The Disjunctivist just denies that there is an interesting type of mental act that supervenes just on one’s brain state. Seeing a dagger does not, and merely seeming to see a dagger does not. The first step in the argument for the Conjunctive Analysis – the crucial motivating distinction – is rejected.

4. It is worth noting that Disjunctivism is self-consciously a strategy for resisting Conjunctivism, not the mere negation of Conjunctivism. So both could be false. Disjunctivism is a disjunctive account of the neutral notion of sensing, or more specifically, of having a visual experience. It’s central claim is that there is no act of awareness common to cases of hallucination and seeing. On the other hand, the Conjunctive Analysis is an analysis of seeing by genus and differentia; an analysis that first demarcates the genus of visual experience in terms of a conjunct that could be satisfied whether or not one was seeing or hallucinating, and then attempts to differentiate seeing by way of a second conjunct that requires a certain kind of causal connection between the subject’s experience and an external object. And it is crucial to the Conjunctive Analysis, as I am understanding it, that it makes the invidious distinction between direct and indirect objects of awareness. Accordingly, as against both Disjunctivism and Conjunctivism there could be a common factor – an act of awareness common to hallucination and seeing – but no good sense in which the objects of hallucination are more direct objects of awareness than the objects seen.

Thus, rejecting the Conjunctive Analysis is one thing, accepting the Disjunctive View is quite another. In fact, the Disjunctive View
is deeply unexplanatory when it comes to accounting for (i) certain phenomenologically seamless transitions from hallucination to seeing, and (ii) the distinctive nature of hallucination itself.

5. Here is an example that will serve as our stalking horse. You are undergoing an operation for an aneurysm in your occipital lobe. The surgeon wants feedback during the operation as to the effects of the procedure on the functioning of your visual cortex. He reduces all significant discomfort with local anaesthetic while he opens your skull. He then darkens the operating theater, takes off your blindfold, and applies electrical stimulation to a well-chosen point on your visual cortex. As a result, you hallucinate dimly illuminated spotlights in a ceiling. (You hallucinate lights on in a ceiling. As yet, you are not at all aware of the lights or the ceiling of the operating theater.) As it happens, there really are spotlights in the ceiling at precisely the places where you hallucinate lights. However, these real lights are turned off, so that the operating theater is too dark to really see anything. (Well, all right, the surgeon has a small light to see into the back of your skull.)

While maintaining the level of electrical stimulation required to make you hallucinate lights on in a ceiling, the surgeon goes on to do something a little perverse. He turns on the spotlights in the ceiling, leaving them dim enough so that you notice no difference. You are now having what some call a ‘veridical hallucination’. You are still having a hallucination for you are not yet seeing the lights on in the ceiling, the explanation being that they still play no causal role in the generation of your experience. Yet your hallucination is veridical or in a certain way true to the scene before you; there are indeed dim lights on in a ceiling in front of you.

In the third stage of the experiment the surgeon stops stimulating your brain. You now genuinely see the dimly lit spotlights in the ceiling. From your vantage point there on the operating table these dim lights are indistinguishable from the dim lights you were hallucinating. The transition from the first stage of simple hallucination through the second stage of veridical hallucination to the third stage of veridical perception could be experientially seamless. Try as you might, you would not notice any difference, however closely you attend to your visual experience.
Of course, at the level of brain states, there will be some causal explanation for this experiential seamlessness. Whether one’s brain is stimulated by the scene before one’s eyes or by the direct application of electrical impulses, the effects on one’s brain will be very similar in respects relevant to the causation of experience. This explanation in terms of brain states raises another explanatory question, which is our real concern. When we say that either way the effects on the brain are very similar in respects relevant to the causation of experience, we rely upon a picture according to which the differences at the level of brain states make no discernible difference at the level of experience. It is very likely that there are some intrinsic differences between the brain processes in the two cases. The idea of such differences not making a discernible difference at the level of experience begs for a characterization of what is taking place at the level of experience. Accordingly, our question is: What kinds of things can visual experience be a relation to so that in a case of hallucination and a case of seeing there need be no difference which the subject can discern? In itself, appeal to ever so slightly different brain states cannot answer that question.

It is a question that the Sense Datum Theory is designed to answer. According to that theory, in indiscernible cases of hallucination and veridical perception one is directly aware of mental items, that is, items which would not exist but for the experiences in question. Because of the similar or identical mental qualia they instantiate, these mental items are indiscernible, or at least not discernible by the subject in the circumstances. The difference between hallucination and veridical sensing is then this: in the veridical case the mental item is appropriately causally related to non-mental items, e.g. the lights on in the ceiling, that the mental item represents. In virtue of that relation holding in the veridical case one is aware of non-mental items by being aware of a mental item. The Sense Datum Theory can thus naturally endorse the Conjunctive Analysis of experience. For in its Non-Phenomenalist forms, the Sense Datum Theory treats veridical experience as the enjoying of an interior mental state that happens to be appropriately caused by an external non-mental item. The experiential element in seeing, the visual awareness involved in seeing, is something that could occur whether or not there are external objects.
But, once again, this is to provide a bad candidate for seeing. Of all of our mental acts, sensing in general, and seeing in particular, is the best candidate for direct acquaintance with the thing sensed or seen, and not just with something that could be present to us whether we are genuinely sensing or hallucinating. Hence the lack of appeal of any view which has it that items could be present to us in hallucination in a way that external particulars could never be present to us, even when we are seeing.

That is the insight properly emphasized by the Disjunctive View. But the Disjunctive View is not the best vehicle for developing the insight. The Disjunctive View has nothing satisfactory to say in answer to the pressing question: What kinds of things can visual experience be a relation to so that in a transition from a case of visual hallucination to a case of seeing there need be no difference which the subject can discern? Once the resources are found to address this question, the Disjunctive View will fall to the wayside.

In order to answer the pressing question, some friends of Disjunctivism have resorted to higher-order attitudes or acts to try to provide an account of delusive experience.\(^9\) On this view, you are hallucinating lights on in a ceiling when it falsely seems to you that you are seeing lights on in a ceiling. Visually hallucinating a dagger is falsely seeming to oneself to be seeing a dagger.\(^10\)

As against this, being susceptible to visual hallucination is a liability which just comes with having a visual system, i.e., comes with being able to see, and does not require the operation of the ability to think or believe or reflectively grasp the fact that you are seeing, any more than seeing requires this. It is not a higher-order mental act than the act of seeing itself. Consider, to vary an example of David Armstrong’s, a dazed truck driver, who in the middle of the night negotiates the entrance to the Nullaboor Highway. Being on the verge of falling asleep, the driver is not aware of what he is doing. But what he did required him to see the traffic lights. Yet since he was oblivious to what he did, it seems forced to say that he seemed to himself to be seeing the traffic lights. Likewise, by a happy coincidence, a dazed truck driver could have had a veridical hallucination of the lights, again without his seeming to himself to be seeing the lights. To hallucinate lights, it need not seem to you that you are seeing lights. Hallucinations need not be grand
nor phantasmagoric. They need not even be noticed by the hallucinator. One might hallucinate without ever noticing it, just as one never notices most of the faint after-images that fill one’s visual experience.

The same thought emerges from a natural construal of the simplest animal seeing and hallucination. A fully “mind-blind” animal, an animal without attitudes directed at its own sensory acts, say a cane toad, could see the lights moving in the highway and scurry away. Likewise by happy coincidence, the same cane toad could suffer a veridical hallucination of lights moving and scurry away. In neither case does it deploy the concept of itself seeing things. So there is nothing which corresponds to the cane toad’s seeming to itself to be seeing lights on the road. Why should hallucination, a certain kind of failure to see, require a more complex mental operation than seeing itself?

Furthermore consider that on the higher-order view of hallucination, hallucinating some number n lights is, on a first pass, to be analyzed as falsely seeming to oneself to see n lights. Now take a mixed case; a case of seeing the eleven lights on the ceiling while at the same time hallucinating eleven lights one for one “alongside” the lights one is seeing. In such a mixed case it could seem to one that one is seeing more than twenty lights. There is an explanation for this: one really is seeing eleven lights and is hallucinating another eleven lights. But now on pain of incoherence we cannot tolerate the view that one’s hallucinating eleven lights is its falsely seeming to one that one is seeing eleven lights. For by hypothesis, one is seeing eleven lights, and one is falsely seeming to oneself to be seeing more than twenty lights.

So the account should be developed as follows: hallucinating n lights is just to be analyzed as falsely seeming to oneself to see n more lights than one is in fact seeing. But we can ask for an explanation of why one falsely seems to oneself to be seeing n more lights than one is in fact seeing. And the natural, appealing and correct explanation is that one is hallucinating n lights. By treating this explanans as analytically equivalent to the explanadum, the higher-order attitude account of hallucination leaves no room for a perfectly good explanation.
The same point can be made against the theory in its unrefined form: It is because you are hallucinating n lights that you seem to yourself to be seeing n lights. But the point is, if anything, more compelling when the theory takes on the needed refinement: It is because you are hallucinating n more lights than you are really seeing that it seems to you that you are seeing n more lights than you really are seeing. The higher-order attitude account makes nonsense of perfectly good explanations by identifying explanans and explanandum.\textsuperscript{11}

On top of all that, the higher-order attitude proposal – that visually hallucinating an F (or some number n Fs) is falsely seeming to oneself to be seeing an F (or n Fs) – faces still another objection, the objection from blindness denial. One night in bed I am struck blind, but I am so traumatized that I still seem to myself to be seeing the gloomy room around me. Need I be enjoying a visual hallucination of the room around me for this to be true? Not at all; it could be that I have no visual presentation whatsoever, yet my denial of this consists precisely in my seeming to myself still to see the room around me. Of course, this may in some sense be less than the full-blooded “falsely seeming to oneself to see” that does crucially involve visual hallucinations. But allowing that very distinction between kinds of seeming to see just serves to highlight the need for a substantive account of visual hallucination. And furthermore, there is the intermediate case of blindness denial in which I mistake an eidetic memory of a recent visual experience for a present visual experience. Although I am falsely seeming to myself to see an F, I am not visually hallucinating an F. So not only is falsely seeming to oneself to see an F not necessary for visually hallucinating an F, it is not sufficient either.

Moreover, just considering the case of blindness denial helps to make vivid the explanatory import such remarks as: It is because you are hallucinating eleven lights that you seem to yourself to be seeing eleven lights. For the case of blindness denial shows that the cited explanans is not the only case in which the explanandum might hold. It could be a genuinely empirical question whether one seems to oneself to be seeing eleven lights because one is hallucinating eleven lights or because of one or another form of blindness denial.
The moral of the foregoing is this: Instead of the higher-order attitude account of hallucination, we need a first-order account of the objects of seeing and of hallucination, an account that explains why one could be mistaken for another, even though in seeing one is aware of external objects while in hallucination one is not. We should reject the Conjunctive Analysis, while also rejecting odd suggestions such as that all subjectively indistinguishable cases of hallucination and seeing have in common on the side of experience is that they are disjuncts in a disjunction, or that hallucination is an act of a higher-order than seeing.

After all, hallucination is a distinctive kind of mental act, related in systematic ways to veridical perception and illusion. Once such relations are set out in some detail, Disjunctivism will appear in its true colors, namely as a defensive failure fully to engage with the philosophical terrain. Disjunctivism’s methodology is backwards; it arises as an attempt to answer the argument from hallucination, and not from an investigation of the distinctive features of hallucination itself.

6. The first philosophical question to ask about hallucination is whether it really admits of an act/object analysis. Is the hallucinator really encountering a genuine item in some category or other?

To begin on this issue, there seems nothing incoherent about Macbeth’s self-interrogation: ‘Is this a dagger, which I see before me . . . or a fatal vision proceeding from a heat oppressed brain?’ That remains so even if his question is paraphrased as ‘Is this, which I see before me, a dagger or a fatal vision proceeding from a heat oppressed brain?’

The paraphrase highlights the appeal of an act/object account of hallucination. For it is natural to construe the thought the paraphrase expresses as a truly demonstrative thought, the having of which involves the hallucinator demonstrating an item and wondering to which category it belongs. In this sense the hallucinator’s thought has a character and demonstrative content analogous to, say, the thought naturally expressed by ‘Is this, which I see before me, a dagger or a hologram of a dagger proceeding from some clever technology?’ In each case it seems that the subject has attended to, and gone on to demonstrate an item, which is then the topic of
his thought. As a result, there is in each case a determinate correct
answer to the demonstrative question that the subject poses. So we
may suppose that the “this” in question in the first, Macbeth-like
case is not a dagger but a fatal vision, whatever exactly that turns
out to be. And we may suppose that the “this” in question in the
second case is not a dagger but a dagger-hologram. In both cases an
item in some category or other is presented to the subject and then
demonstrated. The character of the items in question determine the
character of the sensory consciousness enjoyed by the subjects. In
this respect, hallucination is akin to visualizing, in that its character
as a sensory experience seems determined by an item that occupies
the subject’s visual attention.

Compare another case, where a serious demonstrative construal
seems quite forced. Suppose that Frederick seeks the Spear of
Longinus, the spear that according to John’s Gospel pierced the
side of Jesus on the cross. Frederick then discovers Form Criticism,
and realizes that it is somewhat likely that the author of this very
late gospel interpolated such an event so that a certain prophesy of
Isaiah would appear to be vindicated. So Frederick wonders ‘Is this
which I am seeking a real spear, or merely a fiction from a pious
legend?’ Here it seems clear that the occurrence of ‘this’ is not
really a demonstrative occurrence. It is not that Frederick is in any
sense presented with some item, which occupies his visual atten-
tion and which he then demonstratively identifies so as to consider
what category of thing it is. Frederick’s thought could be expressed,
without loss, in this demonstrative-free way: ‘Is what I am seeking
a real spear, or merely a fiction from a pious legend?’ So although
the object of Frederick’s seeking is the Spear of Longinus, this does
not force on us a serious act/object analysis of seeking. For to say
that the object of Frederick’s seeking is the Spear of Longinus is
just to say, in a roundabout way, that Frederick seeks the Spear
of Longinus. Yes, the verb ‘seeks’ obviously takes a grammatical
object, but this does not show that seeking is always a relation to
some item or other.

Contrast hallucination, where the argument for the act/object
analysis does not depend on the fact that the verb ‘hallucinates’
often takes a grammatical object, but rather on the fact that halluci-
nation seems to serve up distinctive items for demonstration; items from which, as we shall see, we can learn certain novel things.

So I shall take it as a point against any account of hallucination if it does not treat hallucination as a distinctive kind of mental act directed upon an item that can occupy the subject’s visual attention. I do not say that this is anything like a full-dress defense of the act/object account of hallucination. Such a defense would have to engage with the subtleties of the Adverbial Theory. I mean only to provide a preliminary constraint, which an adequate theory might, in the end, flout. Still, a theory which was as explanatory as the allegedly adequate theory while nonetheless treating hallucination as a distinctive kind of directedness toward an item would be the one to prefer. That, at any rate, is what we shall be aiming for.

If we accept the act/object model of hallucination, we then must investigate the objects of hallucination. They show at least three interesting features.

The first is that although we can hallucinate real things and real people, no such hallucination could be an original source of de re thought about those particular things or people. In this way, hallucination differs from veridical sensing, which characteristically provides new particulars as topics for thought and talk. I can hallucinate my mother talking to me on the phone, but I could not do this unless I already had an independent way of making singular reference to my mother. If I had been abandoned to the monks at birth and knew nothing of my mother or of mothers in general, then I could not hallucinate my mother talking to me. Even if I hallucinated a woman who happened to look just like my mother, there would be nothing that would make that hallucination of my mother, as opposed to my aunt, or any other woman who appeared like her. Hallucination does not introduce particular topics for thought and reference. Hallucination of a specific mother or a specific dagger is parasitic upon antecedent singular reference to that mother or that dagger.

The point may be thrown into sharper relief by way of a putative counterexample to the claim that hallucination could not be an original source of de re thought about particulars. Suppose that in the fashion of The Manchurian Candidate, our hero is subjected to deep brain washing, but in this case to the following effect: One year
after the brain washing he will hallucinate a particular politician he has never heard of, but is about to meet. The content of the hallucination will compel our hero to passionately kiss the politician when he meets him on a public occasion, thereby causing the politician to lose a crucial part of his electoral support. Surely, so the objection goes, our hero’s hallucination was of the politician he was about to meet for the first time. So wasn’t that hallucination an original source of *de re* thought, thought about the very politician that he subsequently met and kissed?

My answer will be no surprise. To the extent that we take the hallucination to be of the very politician in question, and not simply of a template that the politician happens to satisfy, to that extent we are thinking of the hallucination as a sort of mental picture which counts as of the politician because of the referential intentions of the brainwashers. It is only in so far as they intended our hero’s hallucination to be of the politician that it is of the politician rather than just of a template that he happens to satisfy. Again, it is antecedent singular referential intentions, antecedent *de re* thoughts, which give the hallucination its directedness towards a particular person.

The next observation about the objects of hallucination involves a direct contrast on just this point, a contrast between hallucinating particulars and hallucinating the qualities that are either common to the senses or peculiar to the sensory modality in which one is hallucinating. I can secure my *first* singular reference to the quality cherry red or to the structural property C major by way of hallucinating a scene or a tune. Frank Jackson’s Mary could come to know what red is like by hallucinating a red thing or by having a red afterimage. Indeed, we shall later encounter a case which implies that, as a matter of empirical fact, the paradigm red – the reddest of the reds – can only be presented in delusive experience. One can come to know what “supersaturated” red is like only by after imaging it. While one is after imaging it, one could compare how much more saturated it is than the reds exhibited by the reddest of the standard Munsat color chips, there before one on the table. Likewise, a painter might discover in hallucination a strange, alluring color, which he then produces samples of by mixing paints in a novel way. Here we have all the signs of *de re* knowledge of quality. One comes to know what certain qualities are like, and so one is able
to place them in a quality-space with other qualities of the same family.14

I know of no satisfactory Disjunctivist account of the fact that hallucination can provide us with original de re knowledge of quality but not original de re knowledge of particulars. And as we make more observations about hallucination as such, the irritating unhelpfulness of Disjunctivism will become more evident.

The fact that hallucination can provide us with original de re knowledge of quality reinforces the case for the act/object account of hallucination. If I acquire original de re knowledge doesn’t there then have to be a res from which I acquire it? The Adverbial Theorist will insist that the only res in play is an experience of a certain type. But the de re knowledge which hallucination can provide seems to be de re knowledge of a quality, and not necessarily of any experience type. I need not focus on any experience type as such. Indeed, I need not conceptualize my hallucinatory experience in any way. I may not even recognize that it is an hallucination, or even raise the question for my own consideration. Still, I can learn from my hallucination what a certain shade of red is like. How can I do this unless my hallucination involves awareness of that shade, unless that shade is an object of my awareness?

Furthermore, the fact that hallucination can provide us with original knowledge of quality, but not original knowledge of particulars, suggests that the primary object of hallucination is somehow more qualitative than particularized, that it is individuated in terms of properties rather than in terms of particulars.

A third observation reinforces this suggestion, for it points to one way in which particular objects of hallucination get determined as such. Suppose Noddy’s aunt has a voice that sounds exactly like the voice of Noddy’s mother. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays Noddy dwells on his mother and her many virtues. On the other days of the week Noddy dwells on his aunt and her many virtues. Noddy also has a tendency to hallucinate, especially when he gets maudlin. So on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays Noddy hallucinates his mother calling his name over and over on the phone. On the other days of the week, Noddy hallucinates his aunt calling his name over and over on the phone. All this could be true even if all the qualities of Noddy’s auditory presentations are the same on each day of the
week. If one hallucinates a certain sound and it immediately strikes one as one’s mother talking on the phone then it just follows that one has hallucinated one’s mother talking to one over the phone. Mutatis mutandis with one’s aunt talking to one over the phone. In such cases there is a sense in which one cannot go wrong about just who it is that one is hallucinating. For in such cases who it is one is hallucinating is determined by whom one immediately takes it to be. If I waver and ask myself – ‘Is it my mother or my aunt that I am hallucinating?’ – no particular person will be determinately the object of my hallucination.

Contrast the case of actually hearing one’s mother over the phone. As it turns out, Noddy’s family is very close. Both his mother and his aunt are concerned about Noddy’s mental state, and they call him regularly. They have an arrangement that divides the labor of calling. Noddy’s mother calls on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and Noddy’s aunt calls on the other days of the week. But one Friday, Noddy’s aunt substitutes for Noddy’s mother. When she calls Noddy immediately takes himself to be hearing his mother. It immediately strikes him as his mother talking to him on the phone. But he is wrong about who it is that he is hearing on the phone. It is his aunt and not his mother. The particulars that are the objects of hearing are not determined by how the qualitative auditory array strikes the subject, in contrast to the particular objects of auditory hallucination, which are often so determined. (Perhaps they are determined within qualitative limits – even if I crazily take the hallucinated sound of my name to be Abraham Lincoln giving the Gettysberg Address, I won’t have hallucinated Lincoln giving the Gettysberg Address. But something close to this seems possible in dreams, in which, for example, a blowfish might immediately strike me as William Jefferson Clinton.)

This suggests that we should distinguish primary and secondary objects of hallucination, where the secondary object is determined by how the primary object immediately strikes the subject. If the primary object were not particular but rather qualitative, this would explain why, when it comes to particulars, hallucination cannot be an original source of de re thought. As a first pass, hallucination gets to be of or about particulars as a result as striking the subject as of
or about those particulars. Its so striking the subject depends upon the subject’s existing repertoire of singular reference.

This predicts that one might have hallucinations that one does not construe as of this or that particular thing but simply takes on their own qualitative terms. Suppose I become a connoisseur of my own drug-induced hallucinations and dwell on their qualities as such. When I simply contemplate my hallucination it need not strike me as of this or that particular thing. If, in my contemplative mood, my hallucination does not strike me as of this or that particular thing then it will not be of this or that particular thing. So even if I had a visual presentation that was in every way just like that enjoyed by a hallucinator of a dagger, I might be hallucinating nothing more than a dagger-like array of visible qualities. I would be enjoying this primary object of hallucination and there would be no secondary object.

My thesis will be that items suited to be the primary objects of hallucination are the factors in common between hallucinations and corresponding veridical sensings, common factors that explain the possibility of seamless transitions from cases of hallucination to cases of veridical perception.

But before we turn to a general account of the primary objects of hallucination we need to remove the implication that hallucination gets to be of or about particulars only as a result of striking the subject as of or about those particulars. This certainly does happen, but it also seems that hallucinations can come with singular reference to certain particulars somehow built in. Cathected thought about one’s mother might not only cause a specific hallucination but may also anchor the reference of that very hallucination to one’s mother. To the extent that this is possible – and I only want to allow it as a possibility – a subject may be wrong about the secondary object of his hallucination. His hallucination may immediately strike him as of his aunt, even though it is of his mother. Likewise, one might sensibly wonder among a group of similar particulars which it is one is hallucinating. This might serve to make some sense of the psychoanalytic idea of a purely latent particular object of hallucination, one that is not at all manifest to the hallucinator.

Even if cathected thought about one’s mother or about a certain dagger anchors the singular reference of a hallucination to that
mother or that dagger, there is no need to qualify our earlier claim that hallucination is wholly derivative when it comes to singular reference to particulars. The supposition of “anchoring” itself presupposes antecedent singular reference to the mother or the dagger by way of the cathected thought responsible for the hallucination.

What does need elaboration is just the account of the relation between the primary and secondary objects of hallucination. Let the primary object incorporate everything about which the hallucination could provide original de re knowledge. Then we should allow that the particulars that are the secondary objects of the hallucination might be determined by two different mechanisms – the mechanism of anchoring or the mechanism of the primary object striking the subject a certain way. So in the right circumstances, Noddy could have a hallucination that was of his mother and of his aunt. It could be anchored to cathected thoughts about his mother, yet it could immediately strike him as of his aunt.

How then should we conceive of the primary objects of hallucination so that they could play the roles just described and be the common factors that are also among the objects of awareness in the corresponding veridical cases?

7. Here is a proposal concerning the primary objects of hallucination that at least has the right shape to account, first, for subjectively seamless transitions, and second, for the distinctive features of hallucination itself.

Consider the sensed field or scene before your eyes. Now attend to the relational and qualitative structure that is visibly instantiated there in the scene. It consists of just the properties and relations of which you are visually aware, when you are seeing the scene. It is a scene type or sensible profile, a complex, partly qualitative and partly relational property, which exhausts the way the particular scene before your eyes is if your present experience is veridical. This way that things are if your present experience is veridical involves a layout. Whichever particulars are implicated they have to stand at certain times in certain positions in a three-dimensional space at certain directions and distances from your position now. Despite including such relations to a particular place and time, the layout is
a relational type rather than a token, a universal rather than a particular. Different things could instantiate the same spatio-temporal layout.

The sensible profile or way the scene is involves more than the layout. For example, it includes the further condition that the relational layout be filled in with some particulars or other that have such and such qualities. But again, this way the scene is could be instantiated by many different groups of particulars. The way is not particular but universal, not a token but a type, albeit a complex of relational and qualitative universals or types. While the sensible profile itself can be instantiated in the scene before the eyes only if each quality and relation in the complex is instantiated there, some of the qualitative and relational parts of the complex could be instantiated in the scene before the eyes while the whole profile or complex itself is not instantiated there.

Your seeing the scene before your eyes is your being visually aware of a host of spatio-temporal particulars instantiating parts of such a profile or complex of sensible qualities and relations. The suggestion is that in the corresponding case of a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination you are simply aware of the partly qualitative, partly relational profile. This means that the objects of hallucination and the objects of seeing are in a certain way akin; the first are complexes of sensible qualities and relations while the second are spatio-temporal particulars instantiating such complexes. The visual system is adapted to put us in contact with the scenes or visible instantiations around us. When the visual system misfires, as in hallucination, it presents uninstantiated complexes of sensible qualities and relations, at least complexes not instantiated there in the scene before the eyes.16

A refinement is needed to capture the attractive idea that thanks to our conceptual sophistication we often non-inferentially see things as members of various kinds. As I wrote this, among the things that I was seeing out of the corner of my eye was an Italian greyhound, sitting under my desk. The Sony Corporation is now making dog-robots: they run, they bark and they wet the carpet. (Though that, I understand, is only available on the deluxe model.) I suppose that they can sit under desks. Perhaps Sony could make a dog-robot that out of the corner of my eye I might mistake for Lucca, the Italian...
greyhound. But if we are fully to capture what I was seeing when I wrote this, we would have to mention an Italian greyhound, seen \textit{as such}. My visual awareness was not merely qualitative in a way that allowed for some other kind of thing, a mere simulacrum of an Italian greyhound, being under my desk. The sensible profile that had to instantiated before me if my act of visual experience was to be veridical involves the kind Italian Greyhound, or so I suppose. After all, it was thanks to veridical experience and some modest conceptual sophistication that I first came pick out the breed Italian Greyhound by asking an owner on the street “What breed is THAT?”

Contrast a visual hallucination subjectively indistinguishable from what I saw when I wrote these words. Its primary object does not directly implicate any specific breed. It would be a “veridical” or accidentally correct hallucination if located in the right position under my desk there was Lucca the Italian greyhound, or a small whippet or an appropriately mocked up robot, or a Lucca-like hologram or whatever other similacrum you like to mention. While a hallucination or an afterimage might allow for direct demonstrative reference to a novel quality, such as supersaturated red, thereby originally providing me with a new topic for thought or talk, no hallucination or afterimage could be the original source of demonstrative reference to a novel breed or “natural” kind. Suppose someone ignorant of Italian greyhounds hallucinated a plausible profile. Nothing would make it of an Italian greyhound as opposed to, say, a stunted whippet.\footnote{17}

So it is not exactly right to say that a case of seeing Lucca and a corresponding case of hallucination involve the very same sensible profile or complex of sensible qualities, sensible relations and sensible kinds.\footnote{18} The profile that is the object of the hallucination is less demanding, in that it could be exemplified by a variety of different things of different kinds. In being presented with this less demanding profile, I am not presented with a breed, but only with the qualitative aspects of the breed, aspects that could be exemplified by an appropriate hologram or mocked up dog robot. So the proposal is that such less demanding sensible profiles – complexes of certain structuring relations and qualities, but not of genuine kinds – are the primary objects of hallucination. The structure of qualities that one might hallucinate is in fact a proper part
of the more demanding sensible profile that one is aware of in a corresponding case of seeing. In hallucinating an Italian greyhound a qualitative profile that could be satisfied by an Italian greyhound or a Sony dog-robot or a clever hologram is presented to me. When I see an Italian greyhound that qualitative profile is presented along with Italian Greyhoundhood. Which is to say that part of the seen profile involves the property of *being an Italian greyhound* qualified such and so, where ‘being qualified thus and so’ involves having the structure of qualities that one could indeed hallucinate.

The sensible profile account can be understood as a philosophical gloss on the notion of “seeing as”, one which simply draws out a certain ontological consequence of seeing some particular as of a kind, qualified thus and so, and standing in relations of proximity and distance to other particular of various kinds and variously qualified. In seeing Lucca as an Italian greyhound sitting under the desk I am aware of Lucca instantiating a certain sensible profile. Structured and merely qualitative parts of that same sensible profile can also be given to me in hallucination, but there is no sense in which they are given to me more directly than Lucca is when I see her. Moreover, when I see Lucca as an Italian greyhound sitting under the desk, there is no sense in which the property of being an Italian Greyhound sitting under the desk is more directly given to me than Lucca herself. The objects seen – instantiations of sensible profiles – are not “indirect” objects of awareness in the fashion of the Conjunctive Analysis. When we see them, our awareness of them is not mediated by anything of which we are more directly aware.

We can now satisfy the constraint that emerged from our discussion of the argument from the narrow supervenience of hallucination. We have a way of “combining” the kind of awareness that is present in hallucination and seeing with the no less “direct” awareness of external objects that is definitive of seeing. When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we hallucinate we are aware merely of the structured qualitative parts of such sensible profiles. Any case of hallucination is thus a case of “direct” visual awareness of less than one would be “directly” aware of in the corresponding case of seeing. In hallucination we are not aware of the visible instances which seeing presents, and we are not aware of the visible natural kinds which seeing presents. We are instead
aware of a proper part of what we are aware of in the corresponding case of seeing, a sensible profile that is no more than a certain layout of qualities.

The claim that we are “directly” aware of more in a corresponding case of seeing may still seem at odds with a common picture of psychophysical causation, a picture on which light reflected from the object seen first stimulates the retina, which then activates the optic nerve and then the visual cortex and then, finally, as a causal consequence of all this the act of seeing the object occurs. If seeing the object is thus understood as the first mental event at the end of a chain of physical events then the Conjunctivist is vindicated after all. For consider that in subjectively indiscernible cases of hallucination and seeing the very same kind of final physical events – say instances of the very same pattern of neural firing in the visual cortex – could be involved. But then by some sound version of the “same kind of proximate cause, same kind of immediate effect” principle it will follow that the very same kind of acts of awareness is found in the two cases. That is to say that the same kind of act of awareness is present in a case of seeing and a case of hallucination. Since types of acts of awareness are plausibly individuated by the types of direct objects that they present to the subject, you can’t in the two cases be directly aware of objects of different types or categories. The distinctive objects that we see are not the direct objects of any act of awareness that occurs at the end of a physical causal chain, they can only be assigned derivatively as the objects of that act because they were at some earlier relevant juncture in the physical causal chain. And this is precisely the sense of “indirect object” which the Conjunctivist had in mind all along.

Yet behind this supposed proof of the Conjunctive Analysis is a picture of the relationship between the brain and the mind familiar from newspaper cartoons, where thought and experience are depicted as a sort of mental bubble secreted from the head. That is, the decisive move in the conjuring game is to slide in the supposition that the connection between a physical processes and awareness is itself process causation, as if energy leaked from the external world into the mind via the brain.

As against this picture, the relation between seeing an object and the long physical process involving first the light coming from the
object and then the operation of the visual system is not the relation between a first mental effect and a prior physical process that causes it. Seeing the object is not the next event after the visual system operates. Seeing the object is an event materially constituted by the long physical process connecting the object seen to the final state of the visual system. Seeing the object is an event that is (as it actually turns out) constituted by a physical process that goes all the way out to the object seen. There is accordingly no “looking back” required by the last brain state or pattern of neuronal firing in order to determine whether to cause veridical awareness of external objects as opposed to the type of awareness involved in hallucination. There is no such “last” brain state that then causes seeing.

Seeing is an environment-revealing mental act that is materially constituted by a physical process that subtends the revealed environment. In this way, seeing is more than the solitary work of the visual system or, indeed, of the whole brain. Seeing goes all the way out to the things seen, the things with which it acquaints the subject. Things seen are thus “closer” to the subject than any mere external cause of a mental or brain event could be. That is why they are available for immediate demonstration, and hence as new topics for thought and talk.

The failure to understand the relation between the underlying causal process and seeing as material constitution, rather than process causation, is one of the deepest sources of the Conjunctive Analysis.

The constitutional basis for the act of awareness involved in hallucination is the state of the hallucinator’s visual system, while the constitutional basis for seeing is (as it actually turns out) the state of the visual system plus the appropriate causal influence by external things. The right causal connection does not itself cause seeing. The right causal connection guarantees that the visual channel is open so that direct visual awareness of external things takes place. There are thus distinctively different acts of awareness involved in hallucinating and seeing, individuated by different objects of awareness.

Nevertheless, just as the constitutional basis for a hallucination can be a proper part of the constitutional basis of another,
subjectively indiscernible, act of seeing so also the objects of a hallucination can be proper parts of the objects seen in another, subjectively indiscernible act of seeing. The sensible profile account models exactly this. When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we hallucinate we are aware merely of sensible profiles which are structured qualitative parts of the sensible profiles whose instantiations we see. Because such hallucinated sensible profiles can mimic particularity, in a sense to be explained, we can undergo subjectively seamless transitions from hallucination to seeing and back again. The common awareness of qualitative sensible profiles is the common factor that Disjunctivists have missed.

8. This account of hallucination will not seem viable to those who hold that we can never be aware of uninstantiated complexes of qualities and relations. But it seems difficult to hold to this general principle. Concentrate again on the scene before you, and attend to the way the scene is. Here you are concentrating on a general manner of presentation of a scene that happens to be satisfied by the scene before your eyes. That manner of presentation is not given to you linguistically, for no words could exhaust the dense specificity of the way the scene looks to you. What is that non-linguistic manner of presentation if it is not a complex of sensible qualities and relations? What is it to attend to such a manner of presentation if it is not to be aware of it?

‘Ah,’ the opponent will say, ‘but this is by hypothesis a complex of qualities and relations instantiated in the scene before the eyes – you want a complex that is not instantiated there!’ But the opponent is here trying to hold to an unstable stopping point. For it is contingent that the scene before you is just the way it looks to you to be. You could be aware of the complex of sensible qualities and relations without that whole complex being instantiated. In the minimal case you could be suffering a local illusion, say a Muller-Lyer illusion to the effect that two lines before you are unequal. Then the complex of sensible qualities and relations will not itself be instantiated, even though many components in the complex will be instantiated. In the extreme case, in which you are enjoying a
full-blown, phantasmagoric hallucination, none of the qualities or relations will be instantiated.

In this way, sensible profiles that happen not to be instantiated in the scene before the eyes raise no more ontological difficulties than items with which many philosophers are already quite comfortable, namely those manners of presentation that happen to have no referent. As we shall see below, the analogy between sensible profiles and manners of presentation is no accident. Sensible profiles are manners of presentation that are themselves presented in sensing. Indeed this is a distinctive aspect of sensory experience, one that marks it off from belief or thought. Sensory manners of presentation are themselves sensed.

When we survey cases, the idea of awareness of sensible profiles uninstantiated in the scene before the eyes can come to seem quite natural. When we close our eyes and look at the sun we are visually aware of some specific shade of orange. Nothing having the shade is presented or given in experience. Similarly, in the pitch dark, one is visually aware of a certain shade of black (“brain-greyness”) and not of any black shaded (brain-grey) thing. It won’t do to say that one is visually aware of nothing in the pitch dark; the question could obviously arise as to whether there is a tint of indigo in what one is aware of in the pitch dark. The case of visual awareness of a quality in the pitch dark must stand as a difficulty for those views which hold that in all cases in which you have visual experience some physical particular is appearing to you, even if it is the air or the space before your eyes. In the pitch dark, you are not seeing the air or the space before your eyes. It’s too dark to see such things.

So far we have awareness of simple qualities – colors, not in any way spatially bounded. Let’s move to a complex qualitative and relational structure. There is a state that a subject can get into by being exposed to bright monochromatic unique green light (500 nanometers in wavelength) in an otherwise dark room for about twenty minutes. If we then turn the stimulus off, illuminate the room, and have the subject look at a small, not-too-bright achromatic surface, he will see a red afterimage. If the subject turns so that the afterimage is then superimposed on a small red background then something wonderful happens. The subject will then be afterimaging a supersaturated red, a red more saturated than any surface
red one can see, a red purer than the purest spectral red light, light with a frequency of around 650 nanometers.\textsuperscript{21}

Supersaturated red is a missing shade of red, which you can only after-image, i.e., can never see but only have presented to you as part of uninstatiated complex of sensible qualities and relations. In the case just mentioned, the complex will be the property of being a supersaturated red round thing at a certain changing distance and direction from the present position, at the present time. The relational element – the spatio-temporal layout as I have called it – mimics spatial and temporal extent and thereby mimics particularity, so that although it seems as if an after-image is a moving particular, in fact there is just a complex of sensible qualities and relations.

Of course it will be said, and quite rightly, that no property moves, and no mere complex of properties moves; and so, no sensible profile moves. But just as we made a distinction between primary and secondary objects of hallucination we can distinguish the primary features of the sensible profile that is the primary object of hallucination and the secondary features of the secondary, or construal-dependent, object. The features of the primary object are its properties, the properties pertaining to a certain complex of universals, properties such as containing supersaturated red as a constituent. The secondary “features”, the features of the secondary object, are given by how the primary object immediately strikes the subject as being. So thanks to containing certain properties in certain relations to continuous places and times, a primary object can immediately strike the subject as a moving particular, say as an evanescent supersaturated red patch sailing through the air. It isn’t anything of the sort, but nonetheless one proper report of the hallucination or the after-imaging cites the secondary object and its secondary features, as in ‘He after-imaged a supersaturated red patch sailing through the air.’

Likewise, it will be said that no sensible profile is supersaturated red.\textsuperscript{22} Being supersaturated red is a secondary or construal-dependent feature of the secondary object of hallucination, a matter of how a profile that contains supersaturated red might immediately strike a subject.

These observations about construal-dependence suggest a solution to the so-called problem of intensional identity, a problem that
arises in sharp form for the objects of hallucination. Macbeth could hallucinate very similar sensible profiles with a time gap in between. Macduff could also hallucinate very similar sensible profiles with the same time gap in between. The sensible profiles might strike Macbeth as the very same dagger, first appearing here and then there, whereas very similar sensible profiles might strike Macduff as a dagger appearing here and then a duplicate dagger appearing there. If so, the correct report of Macbeth’s hallucination would be of the same dagger appearing here and then there, while the correct report of Macduff’s hallucination would be of two different but similar daggers appearing, one after the other. This could be so even if all four dagger-simulating profiles were identical but for their constituent locations and times. The identity or difference of secondary “objects” of hallucination is a construal-dependent matter, a “secondary feature” determined by how primary objects strike the relevant subjects. A sign of this: Absent special cases such as those in which their respective hallucinations are anchored in thought about some actual dagger or daggers, no sense is to be made of Macbeth and Macduff hallucinating either the same or different daggers. The most vivid form of the puzzle of intensional identity asks how there could be items for which the issue of numerical sameness and difference does not even arise. And the solution to the puzzle is that there could not be such items.

Note well that appeal to construal-dependent objects is just a façon de parler. There are no genuine items whose numerical identity or difference is solely a matter of whether they strike a subject as numerically identical or different. When we talk of secondary objects of hallucination we are to be understood as talking of the objects that figure in certain correct reports of hallucination, the accusatives of the verb ‘hallucinates’ and its cognates. When we talk of secondary features of these “objects”, and specifically of their identity and difference, we are to be understood as talking of how certain genuine items, namely the primary objects, strike the relevant subjects. There is no need to suppose that there are further genuine, but somehow non-existent, items whose identity or difference is a construal-dependent matter. Our slogan should be that it is fine to talk of intensional objects of visual awareness, but there are neither merely possible nor inexistent intensional objects. (More
on this below when we contrast Elizabeth Anscombe’s account of intentional “objects” with Meinongian accounts.)

For another example of a complex sensible profile, consider the Waterfall Illusion. You look at a waterfall and then look away at a rope ladder hanging on the side of the cavern. The rope ladder is stationary and you see it as such. But you are also presented with upward movement of ladder rungs, somehow superimposed on what you see. You don’t believe that the ladder is both stationary and moving upward. You see the stationary rungs over there and at the same time you are presented with a complex quality – upward movement of the rungs over there – which if it were instantiated would be instantiated by the same rungs moving upward. But in the Waterfall Illusion, nothing is instantiating this quality; that is why it counts as an illusion.23

Thinking of sensible profiles as sensory manners of presentation helps explain why we can be taken in or deluded by certain hallucinations and illusions but not by others. In a convincing case of hallucination or illusion we are presented with a sensible profile which is typically presented only when it is instantiated. In the Waterfall Illusion something is presented that could not be instantiated and we are baffled and not taken in. The sensible profile or manner of presentation matches nothing we have seen before.

As a last example, in order to illustrate something of the range of qualities that might figure in sensible profiles, consider the case of the speckled hen. You hallucinate a speckled hen, one with a lot of speckles. Is there a reason to suppose that there is some definite number of speckles you hallucinated? Some insist on the completeness of the visual field, supposing that for each virtual point in the field there will be some determinate quality associated with that point. They then reason that since an apparent speckle will involve some pattern of discontinuity in determinate color, there must be a definite number of speckles that you hallucinated. Others deny that the visual field need be determinate in this way. This is presumably a substantive question about a matter of fact, albeit a matter of fact not easily ascertained. But notice that the sensible profile account can handle the possibility that experience is in some respects merely determinable. For one thing, merely determinable qualities like Having A Lot Of Speckles may figure
in sensible profiles. For another, the constituent qualities may all be fully determinate, but a certain sensible profile could strike a subject as being a hen with a lot of speckles, without it being the case that there is some number n, such that the sensible profile strikes that subject as being a hen with exactly n speckles.

Taking the primary objects of hallucination to be profiles or complexes of qualities and relations is isomorphic in certain ways to a one-sided Sense Datum Theory. According to this view, which H.H. Price dubbed ‘The Selective Theory’, in veridical experience one is aware of external physical particulars; while in hallucination one is aware of an internal mental object, which one can sometimes systematically mistake for an external physical particular. However the Selective Theory carries extra baggage. It explains subjectively seamless transitions by postulating a category of mental objects – the sense data – and a category of mental qualia had by just these objects. Neither category is needed on the sensible profile account.

As opposed to the categories of mental events, acts and states understood as aspects of an embodied person or animal, the category of mental objects, i.e. the category of mental particulars that are not themselves events, acts or states, is not a happy category. How can a mental object, something whose existence is directly dependent on a subject’s awareness of it, be at the same time complex and have the internal unity that makes for a complex particular as opposed to a complex of properties? The mental object or sense datum has no matter constituting it, and it has no capacity to maintain itself through change. So what unites its qualitative parts into a particular, re-identifiable over time? The absence of any good answer accounts for the silliness of questions concerning the numerical identity through change either of sense data or of mental objects quite generally. (The same point, I believe, applies to numerical identity of pains, and other bodily sensations, which suggests that the profile account might be adapted to bodily sensations.) The category of mental objects, a category that has wreaked so much confusion in our thinking about the mind, is the offspring of a restricted range of options within which to locate the primary objects of hallucination, and of delusory experience more generally. A bad Nominalism has been the enabler of a bad Mentalism.
The sensible profile account jettisons mental objects such as sense data in favor of partly qualitative and partly relational complexes, which whenever they are instantiated are always instantiated by physical particulars. Furthermore, there is no need for a category of qualia or mental qualities over and above the ordinary category of qualities. Hallucination is a mental act directed at sensible qualities and relations, but these qualities and relations are the familiar ones, which if instantiated could only be instantiated by physical particulars. What Frank Jackson’s Mary does not know is not what some mental quale is like. What she does not know is what redness is like. In not yet seeing red she has had no experience which reveals its nature. The interesting thing is that a hallucination or an after-image could help her just as much as a veridical experience could.

Indeed sometimes, as in the case of supersaturated red, you can come to know what the relevant quality is like only by hallucination or after-imaging. This would be my further challenge to those Disjunctivists like Hilary Putnam (at least the Hilary Putnam of his second Dewey Lecture) who see no force in the request to provide an explanation at the level of experience of subjectively seamless transitions. Do they also see no force in the request for an explanation of how hallucination and after-imaging can be a novel source of knowledge of quality, but not of particulars or of “natural” kinds like breeds?

So, the positive account of hallucination and of veridical sensing can be summarized as follows: In sensory hallucination one is aware of complexes of sensible qualities and relations. In veridical sensing one is aware of instantiations of complexes of sensible qualities, relations and sensible natural kinds. There are no qualia. It is ordinary qualities and complexes involving them that account for the so-called subjective character of experience.

9. Are there really complexes of qualities and relations of the sort I have been appealing to? Do they have a place in a serious ontology? Upon inspection, the general category of such complexes turns out to be a familiar one, and quite hard to do without. Consider the complex property of being an HCl molecule, i.e. the property of being a Hydrogen ion bonded to a Chlorine ion. For this property
to be instantiated, it must be the case that two other properties are instantiated, and furthermore that the instantiations of those two properties stand in a certain relation. To be specific: it must be the case that the property of being a Hydrogen ion must be instantiated, and the property of being a Chlorine ion must be instantiated, and the instantiation of the first property stand in the relation of bonding to the instantiation of the second. What accounts for this necessary connection between the instantiation of the property of being an HCl molecule and the instantiation of the following three things: the property of being a Hydrogen ion, the property of being a Chlorine ion, and the relation of bonding? The best explanation is that the latter three things are not wholly distinct from the complex property of being an HCl molecule. They are components of that property. That property is structured out of them.

This is just what we need to explain the ontology of sensible profiles, such as the property of being a red round supersaturated patch at a certain distance and orientation from me now. Profiles are what ontologists call structural properties, properties structured out of properties, relations and perhaps particulars. As emphasized in the remarks about the layout, a crucial relational element figuring in sensed complexes is really a structured relational property: the property of being at a certain distance and orientation from the observer’s position at the time of observation. There is of course no special obstacle preventing such relational properties from being components of more complex properties.

But it should be noted that whereas properties and relations simply exist or, as some say, exist at all times, this need not be true of relational properties. Relational properties are formed by saturating with particulars some but not all of the positions in a given relation. So, arguably, relational properties exist only when the saturating particulars exist. If Louis Armstrong no longer exists, not only does no one now sing with Louis Armstrong, but the relational property of singing with Armstrong no longer exists. So if we took the passage of time very seriously, so as to deny that times exist at any time other than when they are present, it then would follow that the time-involving relational properties which are crucial components of the primary objects of hallucination exist only during the relevant
hallucinatory episodes. So the primary object of a hallucination would exist only during the corresponding hallucinatory episode.

Even so, the complexes that are the primary objects of hallucinations have all the objectivity of Fregean senses. Contrary to the fundamental assumptions of the Mentalist treatment of hallucination, there is nothing essentially private about such objects. But for the medical impossibility of two people occupying the very same position at the same time, you and I could hallucinate the very same primary object. Of course, our hallucinations still would be different mental acts because we are different subjects. So you could not have my hallucination. But that is for the same reason that you could not have my vaccination.

The things that instantiate sensible profiles or complexes of sensible properties are the varieties of spatio-temporal particulars around us: objects, stuff of various sorts, events and states. These are the things that are seen as, or more generally sensed as, having the complex properties in question. Such complex properties or sensible profiles will also be the sort of things that are the primary objects of hallucination.

It is thus awareness of sensible profiles that provides the common factor. But notice that awareness of the sensible profiles that particulars have no more gets in the way of being aware of those particulars than my visual awareness of my fingers gets in the way of my awareness of my hand. Just as I see my hand as having five fingers, I more generally see particulars as having this or that sensible profile. (More on this below, when we focus upon the issue of indirection.)

Again, the common factor is merely a part of what I am aware of in the veridical case. It is of course the factor that is not in common, namely awareness of sensible particulars and sensible kinds, which makes all the difference.

10. There are really two differences here, the one having to do with acquaintance and the other having to do with propositional knowledge. With respect to the first difference, it is because we are aware of more than what we could ever hallucinate when we see or veridically sense that we can secure original reference to more by seeing or veridically sensing. The Disjunctivist’s mistake was to go in for overkill. To respect the distinctive role of sensing we
need to explain how an act of veridical sensing could acquaint us with more than the corresponding case of hallucination. But this is entirely compatible with recognizing a common factor in such corresponding cases. We need not insist, in the teeth of the phenomenology, that hallucination acquaints us with nothing.

To get a feel for the second difference, which concerns propositional knowledge, concentrate on the objects that the present account associates with veridical sensory acts. We sense what I have called instantiations of sensible profiles. These can be the stuff or continuants that are instantiations of kinds, and the states and events that are instantiations of properties and relations. So for example we see such things as gold or Lucca or Lucca chasing a cat or the sleekness of Lucca’s coat. And we will typically be prompted to immediately or non-inferentially judge such things as that it’s gold, or that it’s Lucca or that Lucca is chasing a cat or that Lucca’s coat is sleek. That is to say that on the present account our immediate perceptual judgements are formed as a result of awareness of their truthmakers.

I think that this points to a new and promising combination of Reliabilism and Foundationalism, one on which what is sensed neither justifies nor merely causes immediate perceptual belief, but instead confers the kind of authority on immediate perceptual belief which allows it in its turn to justify the inferential beliefs based on it. But that, as they say, is another story.\(^{28}\)

More to the present point, we have arrived at an account of what is distinctive about sensory manners of presentation of sensed particulars, and what makes sensing such particulars so different from discursive thought about them. As sensible profiles, sensory manners of presentation are themselves objects of sensory awareness. Sensory awareness thus acquaints us with sensible profiles, which are sensory manners of presentation of particulars.

Notice how this account bears on the question of whether and in what way sensory experience is conceptually demanding.\(^{29}\) As the friends of non-conceptual content insist, there is something very distinctive about sensory manners of presentation. Sensory manners of presentation are complexes of sensible properties, and they themselves are sensed. But this is compatible with a conceptualist claim to the effect that almost all sensing of particulars is sensing those particulars as thus and so, where sensing them as thus and so is a
deployment of a “conceptual” ability, an ability which is typically possessed only if one could go on to judge that they are thus and so.

By way of summary then, so long as we are clear about the distinctive character of sensory manners of presentation we can say that hallucination is a case of awareness of a sensory manner of presentation without awareness of anything which instantiates that sensory manner of presentation. Sensory manners of presentation are none other than (complexes of) the very sensible properties we see or more generally sense particulars as having.

Notice that our sensible profiles or sensory manners of presentation differ from Fregean senses in at least one important way. They do not determine reference. It is not the case that an experience involving a sensory manner of presentation counts as an experience of an external particular because that external particular happens to have a nature that matches the sensory manner of presentation. There is after all the possibility of veridical hallucination. One could have a veridical hallucination of a reddish glow around an artichoke, a hallucination produced in one by the artichoke in one’s midst emitting a kind of radiation that acts directly on one’s brain. The radiation could be of such intensity that the artichoke in one’s midst actually does glow red. But despite the match between the artichoke and the hallucinated profile one would not as a result be seeing the artichoke glowing red.

Frege’s view can still seem to leave the mind with the challenge of connecting with external particulars, a challenge that his view meets first by having mental acts of grasping senses and then having external particulars be the referents of those senses which they satisfy. But this is the wrong model for sensory consciousness. Sensing just takes in instantiations of sensible profiles, and not by way of an antecedent act directed toward a sense or a propositional content which external things may or may not satisfy. Propositional attitudes come in the wake of sensory acts directed at external particulars, and we get to conceive of the general conditions which external things may or may not satisfy thanks to our antecedent sensory awareness of instantiations of sensible profiles. The mind never faces the challenge of connecting to external particulars from the impoverished position of intercourse merely with items that one could anyway hallucinate. To the contrary, acts of sensing – seeing
Lucca, hearing Lucca chase the cat and so on and so forth – are individuated in terms of the external particulars they are directed at.30

This should put to rest one sort of worry about indirection. The present account is not one on which we sense external particulars by sensing manners of presentation or sensible profiles that they happen to instantiate. The sensible profiles or sensed manners of presentation do not determine reference to external particulars. We do not get to external particulars by entertaining them and having them determine external particulars. So it is not in general true that it is by having an experience involving a certain sensible profile that one is aware of external particulars.

Hallucination is a degenerate state, a failure of the visual system to function properly. When the visual system functions properly and one sees the scene before one’s eyes one has not overcome (thanks to causation or whatever) the challenge of connecting with external objects merely from a state common to hallucination and seeing. To the contrary, there is no such challenge; having external objects and their visible features disclosed to us is the default ability that comes with having a functioning visual system.

11. There is another source of the worry about indirection, namely the controlling influence of a thought that has wreaked havoc in modern philosophy. We could put that thought this way:

The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle: If two acts of awareness are qualitatively indistinguishable for their subject then objects of the very same type are directly presented in each act of awareness.

This principle expresses the idea of a “phenomenal bottleneck” in the sense that objects can only really get through to a subject, can only really be directly present to a subject, by making a distinguishable qualitative difference to the subject’s awareness. The principle also motivates the idea of sense data as direct objects of awareness, direct objects whose properties are determined by how things appear to the subject. It follows from the principle and the conception of sense data as direct objects of experience that there would have to be a distinguishable change in how things appear to a subject for different types of sense data to present successively to that subject.
To get a feel for the effect of the principle independently of commitment to sense data consider a pair of sensory experiences, the one veridical and the other hallucinatory, that are indistinguishable for their subject. According to the sensible profile account, the awareness of similar sensible profiles is what explains this indistinguishability from the subject’s point of view. The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle tells us that in each case the (direct) object of awareness is the same. Presumably it is the common manner of presentation or sensible profile. So to the extent that we are aware of external objects when we see, our awareness of them is indirect, mediated by awareness of a manner of presentation or a sensory profile.

The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle thus forces us to look behind the most common external object-invoking reports of what we see or sense. Suppose I first see a dog, then I blink, and then I see a tricky dog-hologram that has replaced the dog before me. I don’t notice the difference between the dog and the dog hologram. Yet I saw the dog and I saw the dog hologram. I was as directly aware of each of them as I ever am of anything. But the Principle says otherwise. Just because I mistook one for another, the Principle has it that the very same object was the only thing immediately present in these two cases, some object which is neither the dog or the hologram.

But now the Principle can be seen to be false. Suppose I am lying in bed as light gradually dawns in my room. Couldn’t my experience be of a continuously increasing brightness, as the morning moves from gloom to full daylight? But then there will be small differences in brightness that I do not notice because they fall below the threshold of just noticeable differences. The Principle implies that there can be no such unnoticed or, on a plausible weakening, unnoticeable differences in what I am directly experiencing. But this means there must be discrete jumps in the brightness I directly experience, jumps that are at least as wide as just noticeable differences in brightness. But paradoxically, try as might, I never am able to notice such jumps as I attend to my experience of the departing gloom. A simple logic gets me from the gloom to the brightness by differences that are not noticeable. The Bottleneck Principle delivers the consequence that the gloom and the brightness result in the very
same type of immediate object of awareness. But how is it that the
difference between the gloom and the brightness is clearly evident
to me?

Something like the Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle helps
motivate the false picture of the mind as facing a fundamental
challenge of engaging with external objects, a challenge that
even twenty years ago one might still have hoped to meet by
having immediate experience match and be appropriately caused by
external objects. (This combination of descriptive and appropriate
causation is now looking increasingly hopeless, so if there were a
real challenge it would be insurmountable.) The principle is also the
source of many curious conceits in modern philosophy. One such
conceit involves the search for a distinctive range of qualities laid
bare in experience, qualities corresponding to the presentation of
each thing that we ordinarily take ourselves to be aware of. David
Hume looks into his soul and finds nothing but fleeting impressions
and ideas, and thus concludes that the enduring self is a fiction.
William James discovers a distinctive persistent sensation at the
back of his throat, and absurdly takes this to be a presentation of
himself enduring over time. Each is manifesting the conviction that
for one to be present in one’s own introspective reflection there
must be a distinctive qualitative sign. Otherwise, nothing could
get through the bottleneck of experience and be present. So also,
Hume famously claims that there are no distinctive impressions that
could count as our being aware of external causation or identity
through time or the unity of qualities in a common substance. So
he concludes that we are never really aware of these things.

Even if we suspend Hume’s Mentalism, which has it that all we
could be directly aware of are impressions and ideas, and suppose
instead that we are aware of some external things, the tradition still
menaces us with further applications of the Bottleneck thesis.

Consider for example a worry which bamboozled G. E. Moore,
and which Thompson Clarke did much to clarify. Put aside Hume’s
Mentalism and suppose instead that we at least see the facing
surfaces of things around us. Even so, all of this is indistinguish-
able from a case in which the facing surfaces are just fronts, as in
a movie set. By the Bottleneck Thesis it follows that what we are
always aware of is never more than the facing surfaces of things. The
Bottleneck Thesis is thus incompatible with the natural idea that our sensory experience is directly of full-blown external objects, albeit an essentially aspectival experience of these objects, an experience of them from a viewing position that reveals only part of their nature.

This suggests that any appeal to the Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle to establish that we can only directly sense sensible profiles or sensory manners of presentation should not be taken as probative. For the Bottleneck Principle is just a summary of one controversial response to the very issue at hand, namely how much of the world is “directly” open to view. It just encapsulates the idea that our awareness of external, non-phenomenal objects can be at most “indirect”. It does not independently motivate that idea. In the end, it may simply represent an influential but unhappy stipulation about how to use the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. To which the response should be to simply avoid these terms, at least when they are intended in the stipulated sense.

Consider the case of seeing the facing surfaces of the particular things around me. Is it correct to say that I see the particular things that I do by seeing their facing surfaces? It is certainly true in most cases that if I were not seeing the facing surface I would not be seeing the thing. But does this entail that I see those particular things by seeing their facing surfaces, and entail this in the loaded sense that implies that my seeing of particular things is indirect?

Arguably, this last thing doesn’t follow. Take a case in which I see a thing without seeing its facing surface, as when I see my house on the hill from some miles away and so see it as a dot on the hill. I can’t make out the facing surface of the house, it’s too away for me to see that surface. So in this case I am not seeing my house by seeing its facing surface. Nor am I seeing my house by seeing a dot on the horizon. There is no dot there to see. But there is no reason to regard this case of seeing my house as a special, more direct and therefore less mediated way of seeing my house as compared to, say, looking at my house from the street. That would be absurd, and this suggests although I might often see my house by seeing its facing front this does not entail indirection in the relevant sense.

I see the particulars around me as having such and so facing surfaces. I also see those particulars as having backs. These are backs that I am not now seeing, but which would complete what I
am seeing in certain ways, were I to move and view those particulars in the round. This adumbrative aspect of ordinary seeing – as the translations of Edmund Husserl put it – is not well described by saying that the backs of the things that I see are indirect objects of my visual awareness. They are not objects of my visual awareness at all. I see things as having backs, backs of which I am not yet visually aware. “Indirect visual awareness” makes no sense here.

There is little to be said for the claim that I have indirect visual awareness of the particulars that I am seeing. For I am aware – as directly as I am ever aware – of the facing fronts of these particulars, and I although I am aware of these as having backs, I am not, even indirectly, aware of the backs of those particulars. What kind of novel arithmetic makes this add up to indirect awareness of the particulars, which in the present context we can think of as aggregates of their fronts and their backs?

No, the ‘as’-structure of sensory awareness is not the loaded ‘by’-structure of the friend of indirection. Similarly, it is not that we see particulars by being visually aware of the sensible profiles that they have or instantiate. Instead, we see them as having certain sensible profiles, which are after all just certain complex sensible properties. We may have to be visually aware of those sensible profiles in order to see particulars as having them, but this implies no indirection. Seeing with mirrors or through TV or the like aside, there really is no place for “direct” and “indirect” visual awareness.

The extent of the “as”-structure of sensory awareness is dependent on the extent of the subject’s conceptual sophistication. Given increasing conceptual sophistication, the range of states and conditions of external objects that one can be immediately aware of increases. And this means that one is presented with richer and richer truthmakers for one’s immediate perceptual judgements. More and more of the world lies immediately open to view.31

12. We are now in a position to articulate just what is right, and what is wrong, in the so-called Intentional Object treatment of hallucination, and thereby explain the innocuous sense in which the secondary objects of hallucination are indeed “objects.”32

The Intentional Object treatment attractively holds to the act/object account of hallucination, while noting that in many cases
of hallucination the object does not exist. So I can hallucinate Nergal – the ancient Babylonian god of the netherworld; the cause of pestilence, fevers, and mephitic odors – even if Nergal does not, and perhaps could not, exist. So the friends of intentional objects conclude that in hallucination objects that do not exist, Nergal and his ilk, are sometimes presented to the subject.

Now whatever the charms of non-existent objects, this argument that they are sometimes the objects of hallucination is a bad one. It does not follow from the act/object account of hallucination and the fact that we sometimes hallucinate the non-existent that there are non-existent objects.

It doesn’t follow because, as we have seen, ‘the object of the hallucination’ is a rotten definite description. It can equally well pick out quite different things. We need to distinguish the primary objects of hallucination – the sensible profiles – from the “objects” they pick up from antecedent thoughts and the “objects” they sometimes strike subjects as being. The act/object account of hallucination is secured by treating hallucination as visual awareness of an uninstantiated sensible profile. If some such presented profile strikes a subject as Nergal, then the subject counts as hallucinating Nergal. But we need not think of this secondary “object” of hallucination as an object in the genuine sense required to secure the act/object account of hallucination. For that account is already secured by the existent primary object, the object that strikes the subject as Nergal.

We can proceed as follows. As a first pass at an account of hallucinating particulars, we can say that

X’s visually hallucinating @

where ‘@’ holds a place for a designator which putatively designates a particular, consists in this:

There is some sensible profile of which X is visually aware,
And X is not visually aware of instantiations of this profile in the scene before his eyes,
And either this profile strikes X as being @ or X’s visual awareness of the profile is caused in the right way by an earlier perception of @ or by thought to the effect that @ is such and so.33
Notice that the context ‘strikes X as being . . .’ is intensional, in
the bland sense that it does not follow from the fact that something,
say a dutiful father, strikes X as being, say, Santa Claus that Santa
Claus exists. It is a very heady doctrine that we need non-existent
intentional objects to account for what appears to be intensionality
in the bland sense. There may be some subtle semantical argument
that shows that this is so. But it would have to be of great generality,
and have nothing in particular to do with hallucination. So far as
hallucination itself goes, we can secure the act/object account of
hallucination by appealing to sensible profiles as primary objects
and treating apparent reference to secondary “objects” as the upshot
of the familiar fact that some contexts are intensional merely in the
sense of not having existential import.

So also, the context ‘is caused in the right way by a thought to
the effect that . . . is such and so’ is intensional, in the bland sense
of lacking existential import. Suppose a child dwells on the thought
that Santa Claus is not coming down the chimney this Christmas and
this causes him to hallucinate Santa Claus. His thought that Santa
Claus is not coming down the chimney is true, but it does not entail
that Santa Claus exists. If this is a case where his hallucination’s
being of Santa Claus amounts to an act of awareness of a certain
sensible profile being caused by and referentially anchored to the
child’s thought concerning Santa Claus, then we need not think
of the child’s hallucination as a genuine relation to a non-existent
object called ‘Santa Claus’. At least, we do not need to do this to
respect the act/object account of hallucination. The primary object
fills the bill, while the secondary ‘object’ is just assigned by way of
an intensional context. A semantic theorist might give some inter-
esting argument that we cannot make sense of thoughts to the effect
that Santa Claus is not coming down the chimney without recognizing
a non-existent thing named ‘Santa Claus’. But that argument
would have nothing in particular to do with hallucination. Again, as
far as hallucination itself goes, we can secure the act/object account
of hallucination by appealing to sensible profiles as primary objects
and treating apparent reference to non-existent secondary “objects”
as the upshot of the familiar fact that some contexts are intensional
merely in the sense of not having existential import. Of course some
secondary objects of hallucination are ordinary existents, such as
one’s mother or the dentist. But there is also the case in which the primary object of hallucination strikes the subject as d, where ‘d’ is an ostensible designator that in fact designates nothing. In this case we shall speak of *mere* (secondary) objects of hallucination. Clearly, mere objects of hallucination do not form a further category of items alongside ordinary existents. Such talk of mere objects of hallucination is just a way of recognizing that certain contexts are intensional and so can be filled in with ostensible designators which do not designate anything.

Against this background, it is something of an irony that two closest friends of non-existent objects, namely Terrence Parsons and Edward Zalta, have served up entities almost exactly like our profiles as, or as surrogates for, non-existent objects. Both Parsons and Zalta follow Alexis Meinong, who arrived at the startling conclusion that predication does not require existence. He thus took the view that there are objects, such as The Golden Mountain, which are such that although they do not exist nonetheless have properties, such as being golden and a mountain. Accordingly, a Meinongian treatment of hallucination will identify the object of hallucination with a non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination. So on this view Macbeth hallucinates a genuine item in an odd category, namely a non-existent thing which has the properties of being a dagger, being bloody and being before him.

If there were such non-existent objects they could be mapped onto sensible profiles and vice versa. But the fact is that as far as hallucination goes, we don’t need the non-existent objects alongside the profiles. The profiles simply exist. They are complexes of properties and some of them are the primary objects of hallucination. Nor, as we shall see, can the Meinongian non-existent objects be comfortably taken to be the secondary objects of hallucination.

Gilbert Harman is tempted by the Meinongian treatment of objects of hallucination in his paper ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’. In order to illustrate his Intentional Object treatment of delusory experience, Harman uses the example of Ponce De Leon searching for the Fountain of Youth. But the case of searching for the Fountain of Youth is actually very different from the case of hallucinating, say, a bloody dagger. The hallucination is an
encounter with some item that can capture the subject’s attention, an item that the subject can then go on to demonstrate. Searching is not like this. To search is not itself to encounter any item that captures one’s attention. So, when it comes to searching, the natural thing to say is that the context ‘searches for . . . ’ is intensional in the sense of not having existential import. This is, in effect, a way of denying the act/object analysis of searching for. And this seems the right response, since searching does not itself involve the presentation of an item.

Denying the act/object analysis of searching for is of course compatible with insisting that the expression ‘searching for’ always takes a grammatical “object”, an object which can be used in the answer to the question ‘What is he searching for?’ The important thing to recognize is that this grammatical “object” is not an item which searching for is a relation to. The grammatical object is a word or a phrase. The descriptive title ‘The Fountain of Youth’ is the grammatical object of ‘searched for’, but this is no evidence that searching for is a relation which held between De Leon and a non-existent object named ‘the Fountain of Youth’. Similarly, the descriptive phrase ‘a bloody dagger’ is the grammatical object of ‘hallucinated’ in the report ‘Macbeth hallucinated a bloody dagger’. But this is no evidence at all that hallucinating is a relation which held between Macbeth and a non-existent bloody dagger.

Elizabeth Anscombe develops this negative point in her paper ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’. Anscombe holds that intentional objects are no more than the direct objects of psychological verbs in correct reports of the thought and behavior of subjects. She also says that she does not intend this characterization to make intentional objects linguistic items of a particular grammatical kind, i.e. accusatives of transitive verbs. Her explanation of this deserves repeating. Consider whom Jack is said to have hallucinated according to (1).

(1) Jack hallucinated Jill.

That is the intentional object of Jack’s hallucination. And Anscombe is of course right, the correct answer to the question ‘Whom according to (1) did Jack hallucinate?’ is not ‘The word “Jill”.’ It is simply ‘Jill.’ Jill is thus, in Anscombe’s sense, the intentional object of Jack’s hallucination as reported in (1).
This relativization to a specific report remains undischarged on Anscombe’s account of intentional objects. For on her account

(2) Jack hallucinated a woman

also relates Jack to an intentional object, namely a woman. Now Anscombe offers us no way of making sense of non-trivial claims of identity of intentional objects across reports. The intentional object of a report is just what, according to that report, the subject is G-ing where “G” holds a place for the psychological verb figuring in the report. On Anscombe’s account, no sense has been given to the notion of the intentional object of one’s experience. Speaking strictly, one should refer to the intentional object of one’s experience as reported by using such and so sentence. As Anscombe’s own title implies, even if her intentional objects are not themselves grammatical objects, being related to one of her intentional object remains a grammatical matter. It has to do with the grammar of a report of a mental state.

Anscombe’s sense of intentional object is perfectly harmless, and it helps to explain what it is to be a secondary object of hallucination. They are intentional “objects” of experience in something like Anscombe’s jejune sense. They are what is cited in answers to questions of the form ‘What did the subject immediately take himself to be hallucinating?’ Of course, this is not any kind of move in the direction of Meinong, or of his contemporary followers Parsons and Zalta, who will always find what they regard as a genuine item, be it existent or non-existent, with just the properties any subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination.

Notice that Anscombe’s intentional objects do not themselves provide for an act/object account of the mental act of hallucination. For one thing they are report-relative in a way in which items that we immediately encounter in hallucination are not.

Nor does talk of report-relative intentional objects help explain the possibility of an experientially seamless transition from a case of hallucination to a case of veridical perception. When I hallucinate lights on in a ceiling certain sentences are made true by this event, e.g.,

(3) MJ is hallucinating lights on in a ceiling.
When I see the lights on in the ceiling certain sentences are made true by that event, e.g.,

(4) MJ sees the lights on in the ceiling.

What according to (4) does MJ see? Answer: the lights on in the ceiling. What according to (3) did MJ hallucinate? Answer: lights on in a ceiling. At the linguistic level the two answers exhibit a grammatical similarity between an indefinite description and a corresponding definite description. This mildly diverting grammatical similarity has no power to explain how the transition from the experience that (3) describes to the experience that (4) describes could be subjectively seamless. Only non-grammatical features, aspects of the experiences as such, could do that.

So as well as Anscombe’s innocuous intentional objects we also need the primary objects of hallucination, the sensible profiles which truly secure the act/object account of hallucination and account for subjectively seamless transitions.

The obvious cautionary remark is that whenever someone uses the shibboleth ‘the intentional objects of experience’ they should be interrogated as to whether they mean to be endorsing a substantial and controversial doctrine like those put forward by Meinongians such as Parsons and Zalta, or a minimalist doctrine of Anscombe’s sort. Much loose talk about intentional objects hovers indecisively between the two. As we have seen, the doctrines of Parsons and Zalta, at least as applied to sensing and hallucination, are unnecessary, and the Anscombe-style doctrine is incomplete; on its own it neither secures a genuine act/object treatment of hallucination nor accounts for seamless transitions.

13. To clinch the case against Meinongian accounts of hallucination we would need to show that the appeal to non-existent objects is not only unnecessary but also insufficient to account for the facts of hallucination. It seems that this is indeed so, for however the Meinongian multiplies non-existent objects to correspond to arbitrary, hallucination-prompted patterns of predication he must, in the end, also invoke construal-dependent “objects” that are not to be found among his non-existent objects. One case that strongly suggests just this arises from the partly fictionalized biography of John Nash, as depicted in the film, *A Beautiful Mind*. (I choose the
film rather than the book of the same name because it is in the film that we are confronted with the peculiar and philosophically engaging condition of Nash’s roommate.

As things are presented in the film, in the early fifties Nash comes to Princeton for graduate school and then meets his English roommate, whom he knows as Charles Herman. Charles appears to be pursuing an advanced degree in English Literature; he seems to be handsome, charming, funny, wise, supportive and a great drinking buddy. Indeed, he strikes the viewer as having all the virtues you might want in a friend. But Charles is wanting in one significant respect. He doesn’t actually exist. Charles is a mere object of Nash’s hallucinations. The interesting thing is that Charles nevertheless becomes a central figure in Nash’s life. Nash talks to Charles and Charles counsels Nash, who is desperately determined to have an impact on mathematics. Nash immediately and unhesitatingly takes Charles to exist, at least he does so during the early days at Princeton. Then, when Nash moves to M.I.T. Charles seems to betray him into the hands of a psychiatrist, a certain Dr. Rosen. Rosen ultimately persuades Nash that Charles is hallucinatory. This is a transformative moment for Nash. He has discovered that his best friend never existed. Even after many years of suffering, failure and emerging mental discipline, Nash still “sees” Charles – as the film depicts it, the very same Charles – with all his charm, jokes and supportive advice. But finally Nash adjusts; he simply takes Charles to be unreal, a figment of his imagination. Still, Charles “returns” from time to time, and it takes Nash all his effort to ignore him.

One striking about the film is that it is able to visually present a secondary object of hallucination, namely Charles Herman, “who” at first is taken by Nash to be real and then to be unreal. The film makes an effective visual case that this is how it was for Nash over different parts of his life: first Nash took himself to be seeing and talking to a real person, Charles Herman; then he took the same object of hallucination, namely Charles, to be unreal, a mere figment of his imagination. This means that ‘Charles Herman’ is therefore quite an odd name, comparable in some ways to ‘Vulcan’ as used by the astronomer Jean Leverrier. Leverrier introduced the name ‘Vulcan’ to denote a planet between Mercury and the Sun, but he eventually came to suspect that Vulcan was nothing more
than a figment of his theory-driven imagination. The astronomer’s last view was the correct one; Vulcan was a figment of his theory-driven imagination, even though the name ‘Vulcan’ was introduced to name a real planet. The name ‘Charles Herman’ like ‘Vulcan’ is an empty name, it denotes nothing at all. But nonetheless Charles Herman is a mere object of hallucination, just as Vulcan is a figment of Leverrier’s imagination. (This suggests the resolution to the problem of empty names like ‘Vulcan’ will go by way of explaining such predicates as ‘is a figment of Leverrier’s imagination’ just as the problem of explaining empty names like ‘Charles Herman’ is resolved by explaining predicates like ‘is a mere (secondary) object of hallucination’. Nothing is achieved by treating the denotata of such names as items in the arcane category of the non-existent.)

In any case, how does this episode in the film raise a difficulty for the Meinongian treatment of hallucination? The Meinongian strategy is to identify the object of hallucination with a non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination. When it comes to Charles we may fairly ask whether the property of being real or the property of being unreal is to be bundled into the property characterization definitive of Charles. Neither will do at the exclusion of the other; instead what we intuitively want when it comes to Charles is an “object” that is first real, and then unreal.

It should come as no surprise to learn that the Meinongian is so ontologically profligate that he happily admits such objects. They don’t exist of course, but the Meinongian considers that to be no obstacle to their having such combinations of properties. However odd you might find that, this is not the special difficulty that the case of Nash’s roommate raises.

The difficulty is that making the property of being real first and unreal later a definitive feature of Charles (along with, say, his English charm and wise concern) clearly misidentifies the object of Nash’s first hallucinations of Charles, the ones Nash had upon entering graduate school. For Nash could have had those very same hallucinations with the very same object even if he continued to be taken in by his hallucinations throughout his whole life, even if he never came to regard Charles as unreal. In that case, if we follow the Meniongian rule of identifying the object of hallucina-
tion with an non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination then we would include reality, but not unreality, as a definitive feature of Charles. For the object of Nash’s first hallucinations was such a Charles, a Charles with no tincture of unreality. Hence, even with an extraordinary range of objects to choose from, the Meinongian fails to capture the “identity” across hallucinations of Charles, who was first taken by Nash to be real and then taken to be unreal.

The failure is easily diagnosed by the present account, which emphasizes the construal-dependent secondary “objects” of hallucination and their secondary, construal-dependent features. The identity across hallucinations of Charles is not a matter of objective preservation of significant properties by a genuine item, but rather a matter of how it strikes the subject of the hallucinations. The film *A Beautiful Mind* visually conveys what it supposes was immediately presented to Nash at different parts of his life. We see depicted different but somewhat similar sensible profiles which Nash took to be the very same thing, namely Charles, something which Nash first regarded as a real person and then as a figment of his imagination. There is no issue, at the level of Meinongian or other objects, as to how something that is a real person can be truly identical with something which is a figment of someone’s imagination. Talk of identity here, like talk of mere secondary objects, is a *façon de parler*, a way of conveying facts about how things strike the subject of the hallucinations.

Obviously, the case of Nash’s roommate will also tell against those theorists who treat the objects of hallucination as this-worldly abstracta individuated by their constituent properties, where the constituent properties are those the subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination. Charles, who starts out as real and then is evidently unreal, (if I may put it that way) is not to be found among such this-worldly abstracta. Once again, even an abstract entity that includes the property of being first real and then unreal will not do, since it would have also to be the object of Nash’s earliest hallucinations of Charles. But Nash could have had those very hallucinations individuated by their objects without ever, as it
were, ‘seeing through them’ and coming to regard his roommate as a figment of his imagination.

Our account of hallucination gives the following diagnosis of the case of Nash’s roommate. At various times throughout his life Nash is presented with a series of qualitatively related sensible profiles, which include visual, auditory and tactile qualities. These are the sort of sensible profiles that might be enjoyed by someone having veridical experience of a charming, supportive English roommate. At first, Nash takes the sensible profiles to be a certain Englishman, Charles Herman, whom he takes to be his roommate. Later, as he gains some control over his reactions to his hallucinations, Nash still takes certain sensible profiles to be Charles, but he regards Charles as a mere figment of his imagination. Hence the intensional “identity” of Charles through episodes in which “he” is regarded as real and unreal.

Perhaps some viewers of the film will see another, less subtle, possibility depicted there. First Nash takes the sensible profiles to be an English roommate. Later, as he gains control over his reactions to his hallucinations, Nash then takes similar sensible profiles to be mere figments of his imagination. Rather than rest anything on an interpretation of the film, it is enough to point out that the two interpretations represent two distinct psychological possibilities. The first interpretation but not the second captures the centrality of Charles, a mere object of hallucination, in Nash’s mental life. The sensible profile account with its resort to secondary, construal-dependent “objects” of hallucination distinguishes and deals with both interpretations.

Another route to the insufficiency of the Meinongian approach to hallucination derives from the fact that the object of hallucination is not wholly immanent. Its whole nature is not necessarily exhausted by how it strikes the subject. For example, my hallucination of a deep red patch could fade continuously, so that the reds I am visually aware of might be less and less saturated. A combination of physiology and an appeal to supervenience might support this claim of continuous fading. But then, thanks to the difference in grain between visual experience and what attention can reveal, there could be times t, t’ and t* such that:
What I experience at t will strike me as indistinguishable from what I experience at t′.
What I experience at t′ will strike me as indistinguishable from what I experience at t*.
Yet, what I experience at t will strike me as distinguishable from what I experience at t*.

The best explanation of this fact of the non-transitivity of indistinguishability, is that even in the case of hallucination the hallucinator can miss some of the qualitative features of his hallucination. If this is so then there will be more to the object of hallucination than how it strikes the subject. That means that we will go wrong by applying the Meniongian rule of identifying the object of hallucination with a non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination. As well as the construal-dependent secondary object of hallucination, we also need the construal-independent primary object of hallucination.

14. Our account of hallucination helps to settle the vexed question of whether hallucination narrowly supervenes, i.e. supervenes on the subject’s total brain state. There are really two questions here. One is trivial. The other has different answers depending on whether we are concerned with just the primary or also with the secondary objects of hallucination. The trivial question is whether the fact that someone is hallucinating supervenes just on his total brain state. The answer has to be no, of course, for there could be neural duplicates one of which is seeing, while the other is hallucinating.

The more interesting question emerges when we distinguish the fact that someone is hallucinating from his enjoying awareness of the kind of things involved in hallucination. This is a genuine distinction on any theory that allows that awareness of such things might be enjoyed even if the subject is not hallucinating but seeing. The sensible profile account, as well as the Conjunctive Analysis, are just such theories. So we may ask whether enjoying the kind of awareness involved in hallucination supervenes on one’s total brain state.

The answer depends on whether we are individuating that kind of awareness in terms of just the primary or also the secondary objects
of hallucination. Focus first on the primary objects – the sensible profiles. None of the familiar models of Externalism seem at all apposite in the case of awareness of sensible profiles. It is one thing to admit that the verbalized thoughts of a brain in a vat might come to be of or about processes in the computer stimulating the brain’s sensory inputs, quite another to allow the same for hallucinations, now understood as directed at complexes of sensible qualities and relations.

First of all, in many cases of hallucination there is no external causal connection to objects in the environment that is positively relevant to someone’s hallucinating this or that sensible profile. One’s brain could just go into a state that constitutes one’s hallucinating. So the kind of consideration that Hilary Putnam used to argue for Externalism concerning the thoughts of brains in vats does not get an intuitive hold here. However regularly produced by brain states outside my visual system my hallucinations of sensible profiles happen to be, they are not about the very states of my brain that are reliably causing them. Suppose, for example, that as a result of a drug-crazed youth, I spend the last ten years of my life hallucinating Vassarelli-like patterns, in a manner that is reliably casually produced only by certain recurrent states of my brain. It seems entirely odd to suppose that I have come to be visually aware of those states of my brain.

In other cases of hallucination, such as the surgeon directly stimulating one’s visual cortex, there is a relevant external cause but it is also clearly not what one’s hallucination, e.g. of patterns of light, is of or about. So neither Putnam’s thoughts about the brains in vats nor the familiar causal versions of Externalism apply in the case of hallucinating sensible profiles.

Secondly, in such primary hallucination there need not be any representational content whose reference is determined by the use of representations in the wider linguistic community. Neither the alleged externality of thoughts employing natural kind terms nor anything like Tyler Burge’s example of thoughts about arthritis applies in the case of hallucinating profiles, even if the subject happens to go on to describe what he hallucinated in such natural kind or socially determined terms.
Thus, if we are thinking of hallucinations as individuated in terms of their primary objects then there seems to be no obstacle to supposing that the kind of awareness involved in hallucination narrowly supervenes, i.e. supervenes on the total brain state of the hallucinator.\textsuperscript{40}

This in its turn decisively counts against the view that genuine non-existent objects are the primary objects of hallucination. For consider that for anyone who is seeing, it is possible that there is someone who is hallucinating, even though he is a neural duplicate of the one who is seeing. If we then take the primary objects of hallucination to be non-existent objects it will follow from narrow supervenience that in each act of seeing the one who is seeing is aware of a non-existent object as well as the good old “existent” objects there in the scene before the eyes. A repugnant consequence, and one that also shows that the primary objects of hallucination are neither inexistent tropes nor inexistent colored patches, as Panyot Butchvarov, among others, suggests. For the same reason, the primary objects of hallucination cannot be mere possibilia, as David Lewis and William Lycan have suggested. For mere possibilia are not among my objects of visual awareness when I am genuinely seeing the things around me.\textsuperscript{41} So the only position for the friend of possible or of non-existent objects to take is that such objects are the secondary objects of hallucination. But then the friend of possibilia or the non-existent will run afoul of the fact that such secondary objects often are construal-dependent. They often count as the correctly reported objects of hallucination just because the subjects construe the primary objects of their hallucinations in certain ways. And again, the resultant problem of intensional identity remains the ultimate stumbling block for both Possibilist and Meinongian accounts of secondary objects. For since the identity of secondary “objects” is construal-dependent, there just may be no answer to the question as to whether or not any of Macbeth’s secondary objects are identical with Macduff’s. That is the definitive sign that we are not here dealing with genuine items, not even genuine items in some special or arcane category such as the merely possible or the non-existent.

If we think of hallucinations as individuated in terms of their secondary “objects” as well as their primary objects then matters
of supervenience come out quite differently. For if a case of X’s visually hallucinating @ amounts to there being some uninstantiated profile of which X is visually aware, and this profile striking X as being @, then what X is hallucinating will depend on how things strike him as being. This in its turn will depend upon X’s antecedent repertoire of singular reference. The same dependence on X’s antecedent repertoire of singular reference is found in a case where X’s hallucinating @ amounts to there being some uninstantiated profile of which X is visually aware and X’s awareness of this profile being caused in the right way by a perception of @ or by a thought to the effect that @ is such and so. It is now a philosophical commonplace that two people who are neural duplicates could have different repertoires of singular reference thanks to their inhabiting different environments. Thus, in so far as we think of hallucinations as individuated by their secondary objects, hallucinations will not narrowly supervene, even on the total brain state of the subject.

15. Having provided a positive account of hallucination in the face of the denials of the Disjunctivists, it may now be helpful to assemble our difficulties with the Conjunctive Analysis. Recall that the Conjunctive Analysis is an analysis of seeing by genus and differentia; an analysis that first demarcates the genus of visual experience in terms of a conjunct that could be satisfied whether or not one was seeing or hallucinating, and then attempts to differentiate seeing by way of a second conjunct that requires a certain kind of causal connection between the subject’s experience and an external object. The Conjunctive Analysis counts external objects as objects of seeing just because they play a causal role in producing a visual state that the subject could enjoy even if he were hallucinating. And external objects are indirect objects of experience. What is directly given is what one could be aware of anyway, even if one were merely hallucinating.

A good deal has been said about why the direct/indirect distinction is bad phenomenology and bad epistemology. But the difficulties with the Conjunctive Analysis go further. There is a problem with attempting to analyze seeing by genus and differentia. One will only get an analysis if the analysans is not itself part of the analysis
of the genus. So we may allow a disjunctive genus of “neutral” visual experience, the genus consisting of acts of seeing or hallucinating (or after-imaging). But one cannot then go on to analyse seeing as occurring when we have an instance of this disjunctive genus and a further condition which rules out hallucination (and after-imaging). That would be unilluminatingly circular. No light would be shed on what it is to be an act of seeing, beyond its being different from an act of hallucinating (or after-imaging). By way of an analogy, consider following psuedo-analysis of an in-off in snooker, a shot in which the striker hits the cue ball and it ends up in the pocket:

An in-of in snooker is a foul shot in snooker (genus) which is neither a push nor a mere failure to strike the object ball, nor the potting of a ball other than the object ball, nor the touching of a ball by the striker with anything other than the tip of the cue (differentia). 

It takes the genus of a foul shot in snooker and then proceeds to differentiate the in-offs within the genus by means of further conditions. Forget the fact that the differentiating condition is here disjunctive; the real problem is that the genus of being a foul shot in snooker is itself disjunctive, and being an in-off is included among the disjuncts. Roughly, the rules of snooker say that to be a foul shot in snooker is to be either an in-of or a push or a mere failure to strike the object ball or the potting of a ball other than the object ball or the touching of a ball with anything other than the tip of the cue. So the account of an in-off by genus and differentia provides a necessary, non-empirical equivalence, but no analysis of an in-off. It does not tell us what essentially and intrinsically it is to be an in-off.

Nevertheless, this perfectly correct observation about a merely disjunctive genus being unfit for analysis is seriously overstated by the Disjunctivist slogan that hallucination and seeing have nothing in common. The genus of acts of visual experience can be merely disjunctive even though the acts (seeing, hallucinating) have something in common. (As if in-offs, pushes and pottings in snooker did not have snooker tables and cues and balls in common!) The crucial point is that the something in common need not be an act of awareness of which seeing is a subspecies. There can be a common element in awareness, which explains seamless transitions and so forth, but which is not itself a common act of awareness.
Why isn’t awareness of a sensible profile a common act of awareness as between seeing and hallucination? It may be held to be; and if so, we would part company with even the minimal Disjunctivist criticism of the Conjunctive Analysis. But it does seem that once we adopt the act/object treatment of visual experience it is more natural to individuate a an act of awareness occurring at a time in terms of an object that includes all one is aware of in the relevant sensory modality at that time. Otherwise we would have the result that in an act of visual awareness of a red sphere we would also have acts of visual awareness of redness, sphericity, the sphere and the red sphere. To the extent this offends – and I do not say it must – it will be natural to say that there are acts of seeing and acts of hallucinating but no common acts of awareness of sensible profiles; that is, nothing to provide the non-disjunctive genus of acts of visual awareness.

Suppose instead that we can treat hallucination and seeing as subspecies of the genus of acts of awareness of sensible profiles, with seeing differentiated by also being awareness of instantiations of sensible profiles. Still, since we have to invoke the full characterization of seeing in order to state the condition that differentiates seeing within the genus of acts of awareness of sensible profiles, we hardly have an “analysis” of seeing, as opposed to just another way of stating that there is a common factor in seeing and hallucinating.

However the status of the genus of acts of awareness of sensible profiles turns out, there remains a seldom remarked upon problem with the differentiating condition invoked in the Conjunctive Analysis of seeing. Philosophers sometimes speak of a “Hume” world, a world which is as close to ours at the manifest level as it can be compatible with there being no causation in that world. It seems an epistemic possibility that our world is a Hume world, but this does not have to be the epistemic possibility in which we never see anything. Therefore being connected to the thing seen by an appropriate causal process originating with the thing seen cannot be an a priori and necessary condition on seeing that thing. (Indeed, something which first strikes many a student of the history of vision is that the now standard conception of vision as requiring something coming from the visible object was a relatively late discovery. A standard Medieval conception was that something went out from
the eye to the things seen, and this was only refuted by the relatively arcane observation that the visible stars were too far away to be reached by any such subtle probe.)

The same point – that it is not a priori that seeing requires an appropriate causal process originating with the things seen – arises from the coherence of the supposition of seeing through walls (or seeing the future without benefit of backward causation, for that matter). Someone could coherently arrive at the conclusion that he is not merely hallucinating but actually sees through walls, even though he knows that no causal process transmits information through the wall. That he is seeing the objects on the other side of the wall might still remain the best explanation of why he knows so much about their features. The claim that he is veridically hallucinating the actual features that the objects happen to have would itself need further explanation. How in the absence of relevant causation does there continue to be an impressive accidental correlation between what he experiences the features of objects on the other side of the wall? A better hypothesis is that he is seeing the things and their features, that is why there is an impressive correlation between what he experiences and the features of those objects. The things on the other side of the wall and their visible features are disclosed to him.

Seeing is just having things and the visible features of those things disclosed to one, whereas veridical visual hallucination is just awareness of the visible profiles that they actually happen to instantiate. There! We have just made the distinction without invoking causation. Which is a good thing, because it seems the distinction could be exemplified even in a Hume world, contrary to the Conjunctive Analysis. (Notice that this is consistent with the widely held view that every actual case of seeing is necessarily constituted by the causal process that actually constitutes it.)

The final bone of contention with the Conjunctive Analysis concerns whether seeing admits of an analysis at all. We can say that seeing is just having things and their visible features disclosed to one. But although this emphasizes the disclosure of particulars as necessary to seeing (as opposed to hallucination), it does not analyze seeing. For what it is to be visible is itself to be explained in terms of seeing. Seeing is a distinctive kind of awareness whose
objects can be clarified. So also with visual hallucination. But this is not to say that we can analyze seeing, let alone analyze it as the kind of awareness found in visual hallucination plus appropriate causation. Finding a contrasting condition that demarcates the thing under analysis is not in general to provide an analysis. To be red is to be a color that is not pink or green or blue or yellow or brown or white or black. None would take that to be an analysis of red. To be an act of seeing is to be a visual experience (awareness of a visible profile) that is not an act of hallucination or afterimaging. True; and as far as I can tell genuinely necessary and a priori. But no analysis: it does not set out what it is intrinsically and essentially to be an act of seeing.

16. Having sketched a view of hallucination, I would like to conclude by showing how it can be extended to accommodate illusion.

I have been working with a rough, implicit distinction between hallucination and illusion, along the following lines. Hallucination involves no novel awareness of any particulars, whereas in illusion this need not be so. In illusion, one is seeing some particular, but one’s experience somehow gets the particular wrong. So one sees the stick as bent when it is in fact straight, or one sees the curled rope as a snake, when it is just a rope. We can say that illusion is seeing a particular combined with non-veridical seeing of the particular as thus and so. By contrast, hallucination involves no relevant seeing of particulars at all. (While hallucinating a dagger, you might also genuinely see some particulars to the right, as it might be, of your hallucinated dagger. But when you see those particulars as say, next to a dagger, you will be having an illusion induced by a local hallucination. The local hallucination itself is not a non-veridical case of seeing as.)

Now the non-veridical seeing as which is definitive of illusion involves the same dual structure that we discerned in the case of hallucination. There is, as it were, primary and secondary seeing as. Consider for example the difference between the Necker Cube flip, where an apex which appeared behind now suddenly appears in front, and a Duck-Rabbit flip, where an unchanged visible array no longer looks like a drawing of a duck’s head but instead like a drawing of a rabbit’s head. In the Necker Cube flip there is a change
in the presented array, a change in the profile that is presented to you. The apex that was furthest away is now closest.

Consider then a Necker Cube flip from a veridical presentation of a wire cube to an illusory presentation of the same wire cube. After the flip, one is seeing the wire cube, but one is seeing it as having a certain orientation, which it does not have. This is primary seeing as in the sense that how the thing is seen is a matter of a distinctive difference in the sensed profile. Illusion is seeing a particular combined with non-veridical seeing of the particular as thus and so. When the seeing as is primary in this way, one is aware of a particular and one is aware of a complex profile, only part of which is instantiated by the particular. One also sees the particular as instantiating parts of the profile, parts that it does not instantiate.

Then there are cases in which the illusory seeing as is not, in this sense, primary. I suppose that there are versions of the rope-as-snake illusion that are phenomenologically more or less as follows. So far as the presented profile goes, it may just be the profile of a coiled rope over there in the corner of the darkened hut. But because you are primed by your fear of snakes, it immediately strikes you as a snake. Here is the secondary object of your experience, determined by how things immediately strike you. Your having an illusion of a snake is your being presented with an instantiated profile and its immediately striking you as a snake.

Once again, a plausible act/object account of illusion, combined with the correct observation that we sometimes have illusions of things that do not or could not exist, does not imply that sometimes the objects of illusion are objects that do not exist. Suppose in a poorly lit room you see a Bouvier des Flanders with a harness on its back. Because you have been primed by your recent study of mythical beasts, you see the huge dog as a Pisan Chimera, a lion with an antelope head growing out of its back. There are no Pisan Chimeras, and perhaps there couldn’t be. But once again, one need not postulate non-existent objects to respect the act-object account of illusion. Your having an illusion of a Pisan Chimera is your seeing a huge dog and the dog’s striking you as a Pisan Chimera. As before, we simply have an intensional context, not a non-existent intentional object.
What then of the remaining sub-category of delusory experience, namely afterimages? Although they do not proceed from a heat oppressed brain, but from fatigued retinas, I venture that afterimages raise no distinctive ontological issues that are not already present in the case of hallucination. To afterimage is to be aware of an uninstanitated sensible profile. Or more exactly, taking into account the special case of “veridical” after-imaging, to after-image is to be aware of a sensible profile without being aware of anything instantiating it in the scene before the eyes.44

Notice one last advantage of this Anti-Mentalist account of delusory experience. There has always been lurking a strong, if not explicitly stated, argument from mentalistic accounts of hallucination, illusion, and after-imaging to a Projectivist treatment of all sensory qualities. Consider a mixed case, an experience with both delusory and veridical elements. Say you convincingly hallucinate a red circular patch, as it were “alongside” the exactly isomorphic red circular patch that you are seeing. It seems to you that you are seeing two red, circular patches. Even if we allow only the Selective Theory, and hold that in hallucinating you are aware of a mental object that has both the red quale and the circular quale somehow in it, while in seeing you are aware of a real red circular patch, there remains a powerful observation which the Projectivist can turn to his advantage. Isn’t it the case that the redness and the circularity of the real red patch look for all the world just to be the very same redness and circularity that are had by the mental object? And isn’t the only viable explanation of this that even in the case of seeing things and their sensible features we are directly aware of features of mental objects, which we project onto the things seen? The result, which can be couched but not changed by treating sensible properties as dispositions to cause mental objects in us, is a dreadful kind of Kantian Relationalism about experience. All the senses directly reveal about external objects is how they affect us; they show us nothing of how such objects are in themselves.

Our Anti-Mentalistic account of delusory experience cuts off this line of argument. It admits the powerful observation, but explains it without invoking mental objects and mental qualia. It is the very same redness and circularity in the two cases, but these are not qualia had by mental objects. They are ordinary qualities instantiated in a
real patch, which is being seen while the same qualities also figure in an uninstantiated profile, which is being hallucinated. The way is thus opened up for an account of sensed qualities as intrinsic, non-relational features of sensible particulars. The senses can make manifest how things are in themselves, at least how they sensibly are in themselves. The Projectivist would be thus exposed as the victim of an “Introjective Error”; the error of drawing sensed qualities into the mind.45 This is the radical “Direct” Realism mentioned at the beginning.

There is then nothing in delusory experience, be it hallucination, illusion or after-imaging, which threatens a “Direct” Realist account of veridical experience. In fact, in each of these cases, we are always and only directly aware – or better, just aware – of something real and entirely non-mental.46

NOTES


2 For example; in what follows I shall suggest that both sides in the debate over “non-conceptual content” are essentially correct and that both sides in the Intensionalism versus Qualia debate are mistaken in that experience is neither propositional nor qualia-involving.

3 For a recent defense of the Conjunctive Analysis see Howard Robinson’s Perception (London: Routledge, 1994). Some Conjunctivists, like David Lewis in ‘Prosthetic Vision and Veridical Hallucination’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1980) substitute a condition of systematic counterfactual dependence for the causal condition. They also sometimes require that there be matching between the object seen and the content of the experience. This last condition seems to me to be at odds with a proper understanding of illusion as seeing something combined with non-veridical seeing of it as such and so. One can see one’s house in the distance as a dot. There is no significant matching, but one is seeing one’s house. More on this account of illusion below.

4 Intentionalism has it that enjoying a visual experience is a sui generis propositional attitude – visually entertaining a content – a relation between subjects and propositional contents concerning various possible scenes. In this way, experience “says” things about one’s environment. In simple hallucination the content
entertained (what experience “says”) is false. In veridical perception the content entertained is true. On the Conjunctivist version of Intentionalism veridical perception differs from hallucination only in this respect: in hallucination one’s coming to entertain a content is oddly or non-standardly caused.

On the Adverbial Theory, enjoying a visual experience is sensing in a certain manner, so that when hallucinating a red thing you are being appeared to redly. The adverb characterizes the manner of sensing so as to attach a character to the sensing without requiring that the sensing have an object, material or immaterial. In general then, something of the form

S enjoys an visual experience of an F

gets translated into something of the form

S is appeared to F-ly

which commits us to events of appearing along with manners or ways of appearing, but not to contents visually entertained nor to sense data-like mental arrays. On this view, being appeared to F-ly would be the common factor as between seeing an F and hallucinating an F.

If you like, the act of awareness that is seeing is the common act of awareness *qua* appropriately caused by certain external particulars. The causal gloss is to be understood as capturing a necessary feature of anything that counts as seeing. But the “basis” or the thing that is so glossed is just the common act of awareness, something you could have even when you are just hallucinating. Thanks to Kit Fine for this way of putting the Conjunctive Analysis.

For a variant on this argument see Chapter VI of Robinson’s *Perception*, ibid. Michael Thau independently offered essentially the same argument in conversation. Harold Langsam accepts a version of it in his fine paper ‘The Theory of Appearing Defended’, *Philosophical Studies* 87 (1997). Langsam appeals to what he calls the same cause/same effect principle, suitably qualified to require that the causes and the effects be specified in intrinsic terms.


There is available an alternative, and perhaps more readily comprehensible formulation, according to which the claim that it looks to you as if an F is there is made true either by your seeing something which looks to you to be an F or by its merely seeming to you that you see something which looks to you to be an F. (p. 76)
This needs further refinement to distinguish hallucination from mere illusion. For an account of that distinction see the last section of this paper.

Suppose the Disjunctive Theorist now insists that she is not treating hallucination as an act of a higher order than the act of seeing, but rather insisting that both acts are in a certain way second-order. Seeing always involves seeming to oneself to be seeing, the cane toad and the dazed truck driver notwithstanding. Hallucination is falsely seeming to oneself to be seeing.

Even so, our little missing explanation argument can be pressed. Hallucinating n lights is again to be analyzed as falsely seeming to oneself to see n more lights than one is in fact seeing. Once again we can ask for an explanation of why one falsely seems to oneself to be seeing n more lights than one is in fact seeing. Once again the natural, appealing and correct explanation is that one is hallucinating n lights – an explanation which the Disjunctive Theorist has rendered empty.

At least this is so, if we allow a use of ‘see’ which covers both hallucination and veridical visual perception, as in ‘After the drug takes effect you will see things, some of which aren’t really there.’ In the course of discussing G.E. Moore’s use of the expression ‘directly see’, Richard Cartwright offers just this paraphrase of Macbeth’s thought. Cartwright’s ‘Macbeth’s Dagger’ is reprinted in his *Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1987).

But see below, for points about how (i) original *de re* knowledge of quality and (ii) the Waterfall Illusion raise difficulties for the Adverbial Theory. More generally, it seems that any development of the Adverbial Theory will be in a certain way conjunctive.

I note that in some quarters there is some skepticism about the idea of knowing what a quality is like on the grounds that qualities are the ways in which particulars can be alike or unalike. As against this we do make direct comparisons and contrasts among qualities themselves, and these comparisons and contrasts are what structure the relevant quality spaces. Nor is there an easy translation of such comparisons and contrast among qualities into remarks about particulars. When we say that orange is more similar to red than it is to blue, we are not even implying that every orange thing is more similar to any red thing than it is to any blue thing. Moreover the apparent existence of uninstantiated colors like supersaturated red renders hopeless the general program of translating comparative remarks about colors into comparative remarks about particulars.

‘Whom one immediately takes it to be’ admits of an ambiguity that tracks the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Suppose someone blissfully ignorant of American politics sees George W. Bush and believes that he is called ‘George Herbert Bush’. He then hallucinates the man. Which man, the son or the father? I suppose that even if his hallucination immediately strikes him in such a way as to lead him to say ‘That is George Herbert Bush’ his hallucination is of George W. Bush, the speaker referent of his use of ‘George Herbert Bush’ and not the semantic referent. Similar points apply to a variety of other cases in which one is confused about who is who.

The special case of veridical hallucination requires a qualification. As in the surgery case, you can hallucinate lights when there are indeed lights there in the
scene before your eyes. The more exact statement is that in hallucination you are
aware of a complex of qualities but not aware of any instantiation of it in the scene
before the eyes. “Before the eyes” is something of a term of art which has caught
on in philosophical discussions of seeing; things over my shoulder can be “before
my eyes” when I am looking in a mirror.

Which is not to say that one could not attempt to use descriptive devices such
as ‘the kind of dog that looks like this, whatever kind that is’. But once again
one would run into the problem of small whippets, a mixed breed of terriers and
English greyhounds. These mongrels can look just like large Italian greyhounds.
In any case, the fact that thanks to a hallucination one would be, at best, in a
position to pick out the breed by way of an attributive use of a definite description
drives home the point that hallucination does not acquaint one with so-called
‘natural’ kinds like breeds.

How can so-called “natural” kinds be sensible kinds? Part of the explanation of
how that is so is given in ‘Manifest Kinds’, *Journal of Philosophy* (1998), where
it is argued that the manifest forms of many natural kinds partly individuate those
kinds.

See below for a discussion of whether external causation is analytically neces-
sary for seeing, as the Conjunctive Analysis entails.

For sympathy with the air, see William Alston, ‘Back to the Theory of
Appearing’, *Philosophical Perspectives* 15 (1999). Alston there refers to a view
I once entertained to the effect that the object of hallucination was a brain state.
Susanna Siegel also takes up my old unpublished view in her dissertation *Percep-
tion and Demonstrative Reference* (Cornell, 2000). My point in trying out the
brain state view was to attempt to identify hallucination with a radical illusion
of location and of kind, a case where one is visually aware of something, but
nevertheless a case in which one gets the location and nature of the thing in
question radically wrong. As against this I would now say that a brain state is
too small-scale and abstract a thing to be an object of visual awareness. And in
illusion, however radical, there is always something which the subject sees and
wrongly sees as thus and so. Since a brain state cannot be seen, it cannot be the
object of a radical illusion. At the very least, attempts to assimilate hallucination
to illusion in this way leave us with the nagging question as to how a particular
thing that could not be veridically seen could be nonetheless seen when one is
enjoying an illusion.

pp. 187–188.

There is a view that items in the category of quality are autological, i.e. hold
of themselves; so that supersaturated red is (predicatively) supersaturated red. It is
an interesting view, but I don’t think it can be made secure enough to rest anything
upon it.

The Waterfall Illusion is a good test case for an account of visual experience:
we need to recognize the direct experience of contraries, without our own account
becoming contradictory. In having a property complex built up out of contrary
properties we do not have a contradictory object, only one that could not be fully
instantiated. A property complex consisting of the property of moving and its contrary is no more a contradictory object than is a set consisting of those two properties. By contrast, it would be a good question to ask the Adverbial Theorist just how it is possible to have a sensing that is a *rungs-moving-and-staying-still-ly* kind of sensing. The problem is not with the adverbial barbarism. It concerns how the barbarism can be understood without implying a contradiction in the supposed sensing itself, just as if there we supposed to be a kind of running which was running at the same time quickly and slowly, and by the very same standard of speed. I just throw this out as a challenge: What is the Adverbial Theorist’s account of the Waterfall Illusion?

25 Similarly, as against the whole approach that Thomas Nagel made so seductive in ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, *Philosophical Review* LXXIII (1974), the first issue is not what it is like to be a bat, but what “sonic hardness” is like. The whole character of the bat’s sensory consciousness is given by the qualities of which it can be aware.

26 In his second Dewey Lecture, Putnam rejects the Sense Datum theorist’s explanation of subjective matching as between a dream and a veridical experience: the explanation starts with a familiar fact, the fact that when I am dreaming it seems to me as if I were seeing this or that and offers an explanation in terms of utterly mysterious entities or processes – one which lacks all detail at the crucial points, and possess no testability whatsoever. (‘Sense, Nonsense and The Senses’, op cit. p. 475.)

But these remarks represent a serious underestimation of what the Sense Datum View and other common factor views are in a position to explain.

27 David Lewis famously argued against such structural properties in “Against Structural Universals”. But as David Armstrong immediately pointed out, the whole Lewis argument depends upon the assumption that the only mode of combination available for properties is mereological. And clearly there are non-mereological modes of combination. For example there is the relational state of Mary’s loving of John, somehow made up of Mary, the relation of loving, and John. But this is not mereological combination. For if it were, the same would have to be said of the relational state of John’s loving Mary. But since these two relational states involve the same constituents, the consequence of thinking of each as a mereological sum of those constituents is that the relational states would co-exist in just the same circumstances. But it is an unfortunate fact that love need not be reciprocated. In short, given that there are non-symmetric relations and relational states involving them it follows that there are non-mereological modes of combination.

While ontology is at issue, it is worth dispelling a potential confusion. My one remark to the effect that supersaturated red might never be instantiated aside, nothing I say in the text is inconsistent with Armstrong’s principle of instantiation, which has it that every universal or basic property is instantiated. Everyone should admit that you can take instantiated basic properties and construct from them
a structural property which is uninstantiated. So the sensible profile account is fully consistent with the principle of instantiation. There is no extra ontological baggage carried by the sensible profile account, none that is beyond the rejection of Nominalism and the adoption of a genuinely constructive approach to complex properties. As far as I can see anyone who took senses or modes of presentation seriously would find it very hard to avoid doing the same.

You need not believe in “transcendent universals” – universals that exist even though nothing ever exemplifies them – in order to accept the sensible profile account.


29 For contrasting views on this issue see Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Non-Conceptual Content Defended’ and John McDowell’s ‘Reply to Commentators’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).

30 Those like John Searle in his influential book Intentionality, op. cit. who would assimilate the case of veridical hallucination to the Fregean paradigm by including among sensory manners of presentation the requirement that the external particulars presented are the causes of the very experience of presentation thereby miss the radical openness to the real which sensing provides.

31 For more on this see ‘The Authority of Affect’, op. cit.

32 Intentional Object treatments of experience can be found in John Searle Intentionality, op. cit. and in Gilbert Harman ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990).

33 The case of anchoring a hallucination to a past perception is not immediately relevant since there is no such thing as perceiving the non-existent.

34 Parsons and Zalta exemplify the two basic approaches to the theory of non-existent objects.

On Parson’s approach as it appeared in Non-Existing Objects (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) there is a general abstraction schema which implies that there are “non-existent” entities corresponding to non-denoting descriptive phrases such as ‘the golden mountain.’ These entities are then said to have are two kinds of properties. There are the “nuclear” properties such as being golden and being a mountain. These allow us to say such things as that the golden mountain is golden and a mountain. The non-nuclear properties are just the straightforward properties of the entity in question. This distinction is roughly parallel to the distinction in the text between primary (non-nuclear) and secondary (nuclear) features. With respect to this approach as applied to the case of hallucination, the remark would be that once we understand the primary/secondary structure of hallucination, we do not need to invoke the non-existent objects that Parsons’ abstraction schema would generate from reports of what is hallucinated. The primary objects exist and their primary features are just their features, whereas the secondary “objects” and the secondary “features” are just façon de parler, ways of talking about what and how the primary objects are taken to be.
Engaging more deeply with Parsons would involve a discussion of his arguments against a Fregean theory of fictional objects. The thing to do would be to show just why, thanks to the distinctive nature of sensory modes of presentation, the considerations he cites in the fictional case do not carry over to the objects of hallucination. See Terence Parsons ‘Fregean Theories of Fictional Objects’, *Topoi* 1 (1982).

Zalta makes a crucial distinction between non-existent objects encoding properties and their exemplifying properties. Here the remark should be that once we understand the primary/secondary structure of hallucination, we do not need to invoke non-existent objects encoding such properties as being lights on in a ceiling and being at a certain distance and direction form a vantage point. Sensible profiles exist and “encode” such properties by being complexes built out of them. The related non-existent objects do no extra work, at least when it comes to hallucination. See Edward Zalta, *Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), and *Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1988).

35 Harman, op. cit.
37 For those who like intricate puzzles we may now add the further fact that as far as John Nash’s real life goes, Charles Herman is also a fictional object of hallucination, one invented by the screenwriters of *A Beautiful Mind*!
38 This view, often heard in conversation is, roughly, the counterpart for objects of hallucination of an account of fictional objects presented in Saul Kripke’s unpublished Locke Lectures and in Peter Van Inwagen, ‘Creatures of Fiction’. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (1997).
40 Christopher Peacocke urged on me the thought that awareness of (what I have called) the layout, at least when understood as a structure of actual distances, directions and orientations from the subject’s vantage point, may not narrowly supervene on the subject’s total brain state. I think we agree here. I hold that the natural kinds that are the actual spatio-temporal relations will not be present in the primary object of hallucination, but only qualitative surrogates of these. Compare the remarks in the body of the text about the kind Italian Greyhound.

The qualitative surrogates of the actual spatio-temporal relations might be thought of as the “a priori forms of sensible intuition”, to borrow an old phrase. They are the aspects of spatial and temporal organization – being here, being there, being adjacent, being engulfed, being bounded (and thus being shaped thus and so), being now, being then, being after, overlapping, occluding etc. – with which hallucination could acquaint a subject.

That is, an in-off in snooker is comparable to one kind of “scratch” in pool. Oddly the characterization of an in off as hitting the cue ball and having it end up in the pocket allows for an in-off nothing, i.e. hitting the cue ball into the pocket without contacting another ball. But that is how I remember it from my misspent youth. Maybe there is always an inexistent ball that the cue ball goes in to the pocket off. (By the way, for those who are not familiar with the game, snooker stands to pool as golf stands to miniature golf – its trivial but not ludicrous.)

Similar remarks could be made if we thought of the phenomenon of priming as involving what I have called the mechanism of anchoring reference to that of the priming thoughts. Then the account of your having an illusion of a Pisan Chimera would appeal not to how the primary object strikes you but to the contents of the priming and anchoring thoughts.

An example of veridical after-imaging might be the following. As a result of having a strong green light shone into my eyes I after-image a pink circular patch on the wall in front of me. As a matter of fact there is a pink circular patch painted on the wall in front of me. It just happens to be wholly obscured by my after-image.


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