PHIL 6320: GRADUATE SEMINAR IN EPISTEMOLOGY
Dr.
McGrew, Fall 2006
Required Texts:
Louis Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/episem06.htm
Course Description: At the opening of the 21st century, epistemology is fragmented along
a number of definite fault lines. This course focuses on two of these: the
dispute over the adequacy of epistemic foundationalism in the face of two
classical skeptical challenges (Cartesian skepticism and the problem of
induction), and the recent controversy regarding epistemic internalism and the
attendant move to naturalize epistemology.
Using both classic statements of the issues and some
recent articles, we will examine the way in which one’s position on these
issues shapes one’s entire philosophical outlook, paying particular attention to
the epistemology of non-deductive inference. By the end of the course, students
should have not only an excellent feel for the terrain in contemporary
epistemology – the broad context in which other debates may be located – but
also a clear understanding of the considerations that pull us in each direction
on these critical matters.
Course Requirements: This course meets Tuesday and Thursday of each week at 11 a.m. except
for scheduled holidays. Late papers will not generally be accepted without a
medical excuse. Attendance and class participation are taken into account in
the determination of the final grade. In particular, I reserve the right to
subtract five points from the final semester grade for each unexcused absence
beyond the third. Students are expected to come to class having done the
reading indicated on the syllabus and may be asked (with or without advance
warning) to summarize it for the class.
Grading:
Aside from attendance, the course grade is based on written work (including a prosectus
(10%), an outline (20%), a draft (20%), and a final paper (50%) that corrects
and deepens the draft) and on the quality of class participation, including
demonstrated preparation for class. Students are urged to proofread their
papers with extreme care before turning them in.
Academic Integrity: You are responsible for making yourself aware of and
understanding the policies and procedures in the Undergraduate Catalog that
pertain to Academic Integrity. These policies include cheating, fabrication,
falsification and forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, complicity and
computer misuse. If there is reason to believe you have been involved in
academic dishonesty, you will be referred to the Office of Student Conduct. You
will be given the opportunity to review the charge(s). If you believe you are
not responsible, you will have the opportunity for a hearing. You should
consult with me if you are uncertain about an issue of academic honesty prior
to the submission of any assignment.
The
grading scale is:
|
A 93-100 |
B 83-87 |
C 73-77 |
D 60-67 |
|
B/A 88-92 |
C/B 78-82 |
D/C 68-72 |
E below
60 |
A copy of the grading standard used for evaluation of
written work is available in my office.
Note:
The following course schedule is tentative. Because the material is difficult,
some of it may take longer than the indicated time. You are expected to do the
readings in accordance with the sequence of topics even if we are off schedule.
Any alterations in deadlines for papers will be announced in class ahead of
time.
Week 1: Sep 5, 7
Overview of the course; two approaches to the theory of knowledge; the problem of appearance and reality; the structure of skeptical arguments.
Week 2: Sep 12, 14
The classical foundationalist project. Traditional epistemology and the classical conception of justification. The regress argument. Foundationalism as a structural solution to the regress. Moderate foundationalism. A critique of foundationalism.
Week 3: Sep 19, 21
Coherentism as an alternative to foundationalism. A critique of coherentism.
Week 4: Sep 26, 28
Immediate experience and direct acquaintance. Foundationalism reconsidered.
Week 5: Oct 3, 5
The internalist/externalist controversy. The relation of epistemology to psychology. The case for naturalized epistemology.
Week 6: Oct 10, 12
BonJour on the internalism/externalism debate.
Week 7: Oct 17, 19
A critique of Quine’s case for naturalizing epistemology.
Week 8: Oct 24, 26
A response to BonJour.
Week 9: Oct 31, Nov 2
A metaepistemological problem for naturalized epistemology.
Week 10: Nov 7, 9
Success, rationality, internalism, externalism, and the connection to truth.
Week 11: Nov 14, 16
The classical problem of induction. Presuppositions of Hume’s formulation; two meanings of “probable argument.” Hume’s dilemma reformulated.
Week 12: Nov 21
Inference to the Best Explanation: its romise and its problems.
Week 13: Nov 28, 30
Bayes’s Theorem: the geometry of reason.
Week 14: Dec 5, 7
Sherlock Holmes as a Bayesian epistemologist.