

## Trade Concentration and Homeland Security on the Canada-United States Border

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*Abstract: Peace, trade, and culture are the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy, yet the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration and 30-point Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border demonstrate that trade is clearly first among equals. The events of September 11, 2001, have increased the political and administrative spotlight on border security with the prevailing rhetoric that an "efficient flow" of routine trade and traffic will allow border officials to focus on "higher risk" individuals and freight. However, the maintenance of a dangerous concentration of trade through a limited number of border crossings is an unintended consequence of this approach. This concentration poses its own threat to binational economic security and will likely be worsened because the 30-point Action Plan has five points that facilitate increased concentration at the border and entirely lacks a focus on deconcentrating the flow of goods. The article concludes with a few speculative policy ideas for long-term deconcentration.*

### Introduction

In his 1961 address to the Parliament of Canada, President John F. Kennedy said, "Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners, necessity has made us allies." In the intervening 40 years, Canada and the United States have remained strong allies in the international arena. The horrific events of September 11, 2001, reinvigorated this alliance and created an additional stress for the world's largest trading partnership. The Federal Aviation Administration started to divert 224 inbound flights with more than 33,000 passengers to Canada even before American Airlines Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, providing clear evidence of a highly functional, cooperative relationship. Additionally, nearly 3,000 Canadian troops including the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group—representing the largest deployment of Canadian Armed Forces since the Korean War—have served in the Afghanistan region as part of the *U.S. military presence*.

These examples of strength in the bilateral relationship cannot hide one serious stress, Canada-U.S. border security, which has received considerable political attention lately. One reason the border has received increased attention is that shortly after September 11<sup>th</sup> it was widely misreported that some of the 15 hijackers entered the United States from Canada (Russo 2001; Laucius and Wake 2001). While the White House eventually announced that none of the hijackers entered the U.S. via Canada

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*The author thanks the Association for Canadian Studies in Montréal, Québec, for support to present a draft of this research at the April 2003 Canadian American Research Seminar in Niagara Falls, Ontario, acknowledges financial support for this research from his home institution (Arts and Sciences Teaching and Research Award and the School of Public Affairs and Administration), and thanks Christina Barker for assistance in map preparation.*



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The four key *Action Plan* themes are facilitating the movement of low-risk people and goods, jointly identifying threats before they enter North America, protecting and enhancing the border infrastructure, and strengthening intelligence sharing and coordination among enforcement agencies. Physical security and economic security are intertwined and so the American concept of "homeland defense" must and does include Canada, and vice versa. Canadian Deputy Prime Minister (formerly Foreign Affairs Minister) John Manley was designated as Governor Tom Ridge's counterpart for homeland security. What seems clear on both sides of the border is that our efforts to protect ourselves, must not obstruct the economic relationships that make us each others biggest trading partner. This is in keeping with research on the U.S.-Mexico border where Peter Andreas demonstrated that U.S. policymakers' promotion of "borderless economies based on free market principles in many ways contradicts and undermines" their pursuit of other policy goals with regard to drugs and illegal immigration (1996: 51). Andreas (1996, 1998, 2000) identified numerous symbolic border actions designed to reinforce a sense of territorial integrity amidst a continued and dominant policy preference for increasing economic and social integration. Andreas even referred to the symbolic actions as "image management" rather than coherent policy designed to achieve the identified objectives.

Likewise, on the Northern border this has not been a time for political or administrative risk taking. For example, the idea of perimeter security<sup>2</sup>, promoted a few years ago by the U.S. Ambassador to Canada at a border security conference (Giffin 2000) and in the CUSP report (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 2000), did not make the 30-point plan. Also, the overall philosophy of expediting low-risk travelers and goods to free up resources to focus on higher risk people and goods has remained intact (DFAIT 2000: 4, 2001; Embassy of the United States of America (Canada) 1995). Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Stephen Flynn identified the external pressure that drives these policies: "officials are finding themselves under mounting pressure to improve the 'facilitation' of transborder flows. After all, a just-in-time delivery system works only if the goods actually do arrive just in time. . . . Advocates of better-policed borders are battling against rising volume and mounting pressure for expedited customs clearance" (2000: 61).

### Bilateral Trade Flows Are Intensely Concentrated

George Costaris from the Canadian Consulate General in Detroit makes the trade ramifications of disrupting specific crossings along the Canada-U.S. border abundantly clear. He stressed that a full 43% of the \$1.4 billion per day of trade between these two nations flows through just three Michigan-Ontario border crossings (Mingus 2002: 5). Nevertheless, the data on this topic are muddled, leaving Costaris with one view, Industry Canada and Transport Canada with another, and so on. One reason the data are muddled is that Statistics Canada maintains data by Port of Clearance (not synonymous with specific border crossings) while Transport Canada maintains the data by border crossing, but does not capture the value of the goods or all transportation modalities. Several Canadian Ministers were contacted in September 2002 and each referenced Transport Canada as the source for statements in their press releases and on their websites. The reason is quite simple: Transport Canada knows how many trucks travel across each border crossing with a high degree of accuracy and its reports are readily available electronically. They are not, however, an acceptable proxy for import and

export data because they do not capture the value of the goods. When thinking of economic security, the value of disrupted goods is more critical than the number of disrupted trucks.

Statistics Canada maintains detailed import and export information by Port of Clearance and the information is less accessible and less user friendly than the Transport Canada data. Most tables and figures in this article are based on original analysis of an extensive data set (474,620 records) purchased from Statistics Canada. Table 1 presents Canadian imports and exports by mode of transportation, for the entire world and for the United States in particular. Canada runs a substantial trade surplus in its roughly \$400 billion annual trade flow. While 87% of Canadian exports are bound for the U.S., only 64% of the imports are from the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. runs a large trade deficit with Canada. It is noteworthy that 76% of exports to the U.S. are by rail and road as are 87% of imports from the U.S. The reason for the difference in value by mode of transportation is primarily attributable to Canada's energy exports to the U.S. via pipelines and power lines.

**Table 1**  
Canadian Imports and Exports by Mode of Transportation

Mode	Total Imports		Imports from USA	
	Value	Percentage	Value	Percentage
Air	48,479,828,927	14.1	21,121,701,854	9.7
Other	5,608,159,230	1.6	3,556,175,482	1.6
Rail	24,455,328,338	7.1	19,606,322,848	9.0
Road	210,672,372,753	61.4	170,502,462,652	78.1
Water	53,777,503,728	15.7	3,535,788,639	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$342,993,192,976</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>\$218,322,451,475</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Mode	Total Exports		Exports to USA	
	Value	Percentage	Value	Percentage
Air	34,443,452,365	8.6	21,875,022,607	6.2
Other	51,550,096,307	12.8	51,549,906,375	14.7
Rail	76,119,960,300	18.9	75,268,400,229	21.5
Road	195,803,660,077	48.7	192,449,700,919	54.9
Water	44,548,345,618	11.1	9,591,970,389	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$402,465,514,657</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>\$350,735,000,519</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Trade data is for 2001 and is in Canadian dollars.

Source: Original analysis of Statistics Canada database.

In focusing on the question at hand, trade concentration at U.S.-Canada border crossings is portrayed in Figures 1 and 2. (Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix A provide some of the aggregate data used to develop these figures.) This data was developed by excluding trade that is transported by water or air and by excluding all trade that is not directly between Canada and the U.S. The analysis is complicated by two factors: (1) knowing the exact Port of Clearance does not ensure that the goods crossed at a specific border crossing, and (2) the Ports of Clearance for imports and for exports are not identical. In fact, there are more than twice as many Ports of Clearance for rail and road

imports as for rail and road exports. This concentration is evident in Figure 1. The reason for this is that the major U.S. ports of clearance for rail and road are also likely to be the major ports of clearance for rail and road elsewhere.

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



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The bottom line is that the top 10 U.S. ports of clearance for rail and road exports account for 42.4% of total U.S. exports. Add the Fort I

the goods. When thinking of more critical than the number of port information by Port of Clearance friendly than the Transport based on original analysis of an Statistics Canada. Table 1 pre-rtation, for the entire world and ntial trade surplus in its roughly exports are bound for the U.S., re, the U.S. runs a large trade ports to the U.S. are by rail and for the difference in value by da's energy exports to the U.S.

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Imports from USA

Value	Percentage
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3,556,175,482	1.6
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170,502,462,652	78.1
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<b>\$218,322,451,475</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Exports to USA

Value	Percentage
21,875,022,607	6.2
51,549,906,375	14.7
75,268,400,229	21.5
192,449,700,919	54.9
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centration at U.S.-Canada border Table 4 in Appendix A provide s.) This data was developed by y excluding all trade that is not omplicated by two factors: (1) hat the goods crossed at a spe- imports and for exports are not s of Clearance for rail and road

imports as for rail and road exports. Fortunately for the purpose at hand, the extent of concentration is evident and unavoidable in spite of these potential limitations, and would likely be even more concentrated if the exact border crossing was available. The reason for this is that goods cleared through some Ports of Clearance away from the border are also likely to cross through the busiest land crossings while goods cleared at a Port of Clearance near a border crossing are unlikely to turn around and cross the border elsewhere.

Figure 1. Canada's Busiest Land Export Border Crossings (to the U.S.A.)





Figure 2. Canada's Busiest Land Import Border Crossings (from U.S.A.)



The bottom line is that the Windsor-Detroit and Sarnia-Port Huron crossings account for 42.4% of Canada's land exports and 47.2% of Canada's land imports with the U.S. Add the Fort Erie-Niagara Falls-Buffalo crossings and another 16.3% of these exports and 14.2% of these imports are accounted for. At this point we are talking

about 60% of land trade between Canada and the U.S. crossing five vulnerable bridges and tunnels. In all, 81% of land exports and 76% of land imports are cleared through the ten busiest Ports of Clearance with 95% of land exports and 89% of land imports being cleared through the top twenty (see Appendix A). The geography of the Great Lakes truly makes these two nations extremely vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks on the trans-border infrastructure. Add a few natural gas pipelines and hydroelectric cables to the list of targets and the picture is bleaker.

The reader may ask, "Why are these likely targets?" These are targets for the same reason terrorists would attack the symbolic center of the capitalist world by attacking the World Trade Center in New York. The trading relationship between Canada and the United States is the largest in the world and the goal of modern terrorists is to "create a climate of extreme fear. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence. And it inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets" (Wilkinson 1996: 12).

To add global perspective, trade between the U.S. and the Province of Ontario exceeds U.S. trade with all European nations, combined. Ontario-Michigan trade alone exceeds all U.S. trade with Japan. For those who may believe that this trade is all automotive related, take note that in 2001 44 different Harmonized System 02 categories exceeded \$1 billion in total imports while 45 different categories exceeded \$1 billion in total exports. Canada-U.S. trade is therefore much more diversified in terms of content than one might expect, further exacerbating the potential economic impact of border disruptions, which need only occur at a few border crossings to have substantial impact because of the hazardous level of trade concentration.

### Post 9-11 Actions Likely to Increase Concentration

One aspect of the New Public Management (Peters and Pierre 1998; Box et al. 1999) and Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Toonen 1998) movements in public administration is an increased focus on responding to the needs of the customer (client, consumer, taxpayer, end user, etc). This philosophy sways modern public administration to a great extent, including moving politicians and administrators away from a broader conception of serving the "public interest." When discussing border crossings and customs issues, the largest customer group is the businesses that ship goods back and forth and the second largest customer group is the border town residents ("locals") who regularly cross the border for work, education, pleasure, shopping, etc. In addition there is the tourist, who is the single largest source of income for many modern communities. Tourists are less relevant to border administrators because their ability to impact the policy process is minimized by their lack of a visible, organized presence. Business groups in tourist-economy towns may help offset this dynamic. An examination of participation in the recent CUSP process demonstrates these "clients" clearly enough.

At an abstract level these customer groups all desire a safe border; however, at a concrete level they are more concerned with speed and efficiency at the border. Delays are expensive. Unpredictability is costly. Closing the border for security reasons has an almost immediate impact on people who may never have crossed the border. For example, when the borders were closed on September 11, 2001, and slowed dramatically in the following days, the *Toronto Star* reported on September 13<sup>th</sup> that "Honda, Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler plants in the province [Ontario] cancelled some

shifts on Tuesday, yesterday, the United States" (Theobald). Both sides of the border, including the United States. Reportedly some just-in-time manufacturers require delivery of parts from suppliers within a few hours from signing the contract.

Imagine the impact of a terrorist attack on bridges or tunnels, or a more general security concern. Security officials should be aware of the impact. Table 2 lists five points of concern. The concentration of trade at a few points to make the border even more vulnerable. Goods to clear at customs create a bottleneck in infrastructure to allow more trade. Even more concern is that not all goods of trade through these critical

#### Probable Inc

#### Five (5) Key Items In 30-Point

3. Single Alternative Inspection measures, for two-way traffic, complete pilot project evaluation, and border. Discuss expansion of border.
15. Clearance away from the border to facilitate trade through away from the border, including inland preclearance at the border, and maritime.
18. Intransit Container Targeting in Canada/US by exchanging information to develop advance electronic clearance overseas.
19. Infrastructure improvement and technological improvement in traffic management and training exercises.
20. Intelligent Transportation System initiatives to facilitate the system and electronic communication.

As explained earlier, border policy facilitates concern. ostensibly to free up resources individually they each sound like they increase the flow of people and goods through border infrastructure. In po

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shifts on Tuesday, yesterday, and today because of delays in delivery of auto parts from the United States" (Theobald 2001). By September 15<sup>th</sup> Ford had shut down plants on both sides of the border, including plants as far away as Atlanta, Georgia (CP 2001). Reportedly some just-in-time contracts between Michigan and Ontario businesses require delivery of parts from suppliers in Ontario to plants in Michigan in as little as six hours from signing the contract (Flynn 2000: 59).

Imagine the impact of a terrorist attack that removes even one of these critical bridges or tunnels, or a more comprehensive attack on five or six key crossings. Border security officials should be imagining such a possibility and planning to minimize its impact. Table 2 lists five points adopted in the *Action Plan* that seem likely to increase the concentration of trade at critical crossings. The main reason is that these items seek to make the border even more efficient for shippers—a laudable goal—by allowing goods to clear at customs centers away from the border, improving the on-the-ground infrastructure to allow more vehicles across these key bridges, and so forth. What is of even more concern is that no item in the *Action Plan* seeks to reduce the concentration of trade through these critical bottlenecks rather than facilitating additional trade.

Table 2

#### Probable Increase in Concentration at Border Crossings

##### Five (5) Key Items In 30-Point Action Plan Increase Concentration of Trade Flows

3. Single Alternative Inspection System—Resume NEXUS pilot project, with appropriate security measures, for two-way movement of pre-approved travelers at Sarnia-Port Huron, complete pilot project evaluation and expand a single program to other areas along the land border. Discuss expansion to air travel.
15. Clearance away from the border—Develop an integrated approach to improve security and facilitate trade through away-from-the-border processing for truck/rail cargo (and crews), including inland preclearance/post-clearance, international zones and pre-processing centers at the border, and maritime port intransit preclearance.
18. Intransit Container Targeting at Seaports—Jointly target marine intransit containers arriving in Canada/US by exchanging information and analysts. Work in partnership with the industry to develop advance electronic commercial manifest data for marine containers arriving from overseas.
19. Infrastructure improvements—Work to secure resources for joint and coordinated physical and technological improvements to key border points and trade corridors aimed at overcoming traffic management and growth challenges, including dedicated lanes and border modeling exercises.
20. Intelligent Transportation Systems—Deploy interoperable technologies in support of other initiatives to facilitate the secure movement of goods and people, such as transponder applications and electronic container seals.

As explained earlier, the overall philosophy driving recent U.S.-Canada border policy facilitates concentration of trade by expediting low-risk travelers and goods, ostensibly to free up resources to focus on higher risk people and goods. Although individually they each sound like good ideas, the five points listed in Table 2 will clearly increase the flow of people and goods through an overly burdened and easily targeted border infrastructure. In point of fact, the 21<sup>st</sup> item in the Action Plan is the only item

that recognizes this danger. It reads, "Critical Infrastructure Protection. Conduct binational threat assessments on trans-border infrastructure and identify necessary additional protection measures, and initiate assessments for transportation networks and other critical infrastructure" (DFAIT 2001). The fact that this point focuses on "assessment" rather than action is of significant concern. The author visited five of these critical border crossings in 2002, including walking around them to observe the structural design, and did not detect active attempts to protect the structures or to keep individuals away from critical design elements.

### Ideas for Long-Term Deconcentration of Trade

Perhaps policymakers in North America need reminding of Eric Hoffer's (1951: 73) words in *The True Believer*, "A pleasant existence blinds us to the possibilities of drastic change. We cling to what we call our common sense, our practical point of view. Actually, these are but names for an all-absorbing familiarity with things as they are. The tangibility of a pleasant and secure existence is such that it makes other realities, however imminent, seem vague and visionary. Thus it happens that when the times become unhinged, it is the practical people who are caught unaware." The argument, in other words, is that in spite of the traumatic attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, everything is basically business as usual in North America. Americans have largely recovered from the horrific shock. While citizens and businesses have increased the political pressure to implement much of what was in the border policy pipeline well before the attacks, the policymaker's mind frame still dwells in the "house of common sense" in spite of the all-too-uncommon enemy. Trade magazines are still able to boldly declare, "The Canada-U.S. Border Is Always Open for Business" (McElrea 2002: 7).

In terms of trade concentration border, officials and policymakers need to consider some vibrantly non-linear proposals if for no other reason than to actively recognize the quandary these two nations find themselves stuck in so that when opportunities arise they may take incremental steps toward a more secure future. This section presents some ideas for change, unconventional as they may seem with common sense as the reference point.

If one concludes that economic security is a critical element of North American border security and homeland security, then more questions must be allowed to run free. Key among these questions is "Can economic security exist so long as current forces are aligned to maintain the concentrated flow of trade through so few tunnels and bridges?" One might ask, "Of what good is a 5,500 mile long undefended border when so little of it is actively used for commercial purposes?" Intensive physical security is required at these concentrated border crossings, perhaps even by the military, as well as discussions on a long-term plan to deconcentrate the flow of trade. Six ideas designed primarily to start this discussion follow.

1. Reconsider free trade in North America—U.S.-Canada trade has more than doubled since implementation of the FTA in 1989 and cross-border truck traffic is expected to continue rising at 10% per year. This has helped make Canada the strongest economy in the world and has dramatically increased the commercial traffic across key bridges and tunnels. Much of this trade is repeated at each step in the manufacturing process. For example, (a) Canadian mineral ores and hydroelectric power head to an American steel mill, (b) steel heads

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back to numerous Canadian parts manufacturers, (c) engine parts made in Canada travel to a U.S. plant that builds engines and (d) sends them back to Canada to be put into vehicles that are (e) sent to automobile dealers back in the U.S. This obviously simplified example suggests picture perfect market integration if you are an economist, but in total the dynamic creates a precarious situation for an opportunistic terrorist group seeking visible economic damage. Such trade might be less economically desirable if those who move the goods back and forth across the border incurred the cost of maintaining the border infrastructure, including border security.

2. Balance out cross-border trade over time by charging crossing fees that decrease as the goods are moved through less busy and less risky crossings. No fee would be charged at dry land border crossings. In effect the fee might start to balance out the increased transportation costs of taking other routes and/or other modes to get goods to market. The goal here would be to make using the more concentrated crossings a more expensive alternative. (An alternative approach would be significant tax credits for moving goods through a specified list of less concentrated and less risky border crossings. Credits would apply even if the mode of transportation were switched to rail, thereby providing a potential subsidy to struggling rail lines, which could become a key part of the solution. The goal would be to make using less concentrated crossings less costly and therefore more appealing.)
3. Invest in turning the Trans-Canada Highway into an efficient four-lane highway over Lake Superior and invest in interstate highways that allow truck traffic to efficiently connect from the Trans-Canada in a Southwesterly direction to I-90 and I-80. This might provide a competitive alternative route that could help billions of dollars of goods from Ontario to the West avoid the existing concentrated crossings. Specifically, over \$4 billion in exports move from Ontario to North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington each year, with an additional \$21 billion moving from Ontario to California, Nevada, and Utah. The current focus on trade corridors lacks a focus on developing new alternative corridors to diversify Canada-U.S. trade movement. While some might argue that this may lack a significant return on investment, this argument would be missing the point that the existing interstate highway system (that feeds the concentrated border crossings) was not developed on a cost-benefit rationale.
4. Calculate the public investment per "truck mile" traveled on highways in highly concentrated trade corridors then offer similar funding for corporations and/or transportation companies that make long-term commitments to move goods through less concentrated crossings. For example, CN Rail could plan on such funding in developing infrastructure if they could attract enough business to support their strategic approach.
5. End tax subsidies and abatements that encourage continued development in North America's industrial core. If the proximity of and compactness of industries in this area really creates an economic symbiosis, then let those economic advantages speak for themselves. Even though transportation and communications costs have dropped dramatically since the 1950s (Boeckelman 1996: 2), a less concentrated economic system has been stifled in the United

States in part because of the development of active state and local tax weapons to attract and retain manufacturers in the industrial core.

6. Ask other people who are willing to voice "uncommon sense" to give this issue some serious thought and add their best discussion points to this conversation. A new forum is needed that will be different from the useful consumer-driven CUSP process because this process made it difficult for even standard public investment allocation pricing to be utilized in policy making.

These six points are intended to spur discussion and hopefully move thought among border officials and policymakers out of its current rut. The detailed arguments are omitted to focus attention on the core ideas. Little such dialogue appears to be occurring among the customs, immigration, and border security community and their political leaders in Canada and the U.S. Perhaps these officials are simply realists because they see an array of forces aligned against an ambitious economic security agenda. These factors would likely include the Canadian Trucking Alliance, Detroit Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters, Canadian/American Border Trade Alliance, and countless other advocacy groups on both sides of the border. Nevertheless, those who might oppose meaningful change in the short-term may be the same people who have much to lose if border officials fail to address the hazard to economic security that is posed by trade concentration along the Northern border of the United States.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> While the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (Parliament of Canada 2001) was insistent in its recommendation that Citizenship and Immigration Canada "make an effort to educate the public" to refute "unsubstantiated and unwarranted" concerns about Canada's border security, expert public relations will hardly erase reporting such as this excerpt from Canada's own *Ottawa Citizen*: "'There's no question that groups affiliated with political violence consider Canada a safe haven,' said Vincent Cannistraro, a former director of counterterrorism for the CIA, told the Los Angeles Times. 'It has been that way for a long time due to a benign environment'" (Laucius and Wake 2001). None of the 15 hijackers involved in the events of September 11, 2001, arrived in the United States via Canada, but this does not mean that Canada is not still a significant concern because of past events.

<sup>2</sup> Movement toward the concept of a common North American perimeter might make Canada a more desirable target for terrorists if such movement means that Canada would adopt immigration, refugee, and customs policies similar to U.S. policies. The "perimeter" idea is focused on harmonizing entry policies to Canada and the United States so that controls on the common border could be reduced or eliminated. Mexico is sometimes included in this concept as well.

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## Appendix A. Canadian Land Imports and Exports

**Table 3**  
**Value of Canadian Land Exports (rail, road, other) to USA by Port of Clearance**

Port of Clearance	Value	Percent	Cumulative (%)
Windsor - Ambassador Bridge	73,064,979,697	22.89	22.89
Sarnia	61,850,345,169	19.37	42.26
Fort Erie	49,326,690,907	15.45	57.71
Lacolle	18,281,520,358	5.73	63.43
Pacific Highway	11,698,179,557	3.66	67.10
Emerson	11,394,416,978	3.57	70.67
Lansdowne	10,643,347,596	3.33	74.00
Coutts	9,527,932,813	2.98	76.98
Fort Frances	6,934,367,780	2.17	79.16
North Portal	6,721,843,848	2.11	81.26
Huntington	6,449,186,553	2.02	83.28
Kingsgate	6,384,141,991	2.00	85.28
Philipsburg	6,312,754,262	1.98	87.26
Monchy	4,558,339,024	1.43	88.69
Regway	4,188,698,200	1.31	90.00
St. Stephen	3,873,976,330	1.21	91.21
Gretna	3,359,954,742	1.05	92.26
Niagara Falls	2,854,740,647	0.89	93.16
Prescott	2,831,304,855	0.89	94.05
Rock Island	2,594,650,557	0.81	94.86
Woodstock	2,243,675,965	0.70	95.56
Carway	2,230,305,902	0.70	96.26
Sault Ste. Marie	2,208,978,273	0.69	96.95
Trout River	1,811,856,620	0.57	97.52
Sidney	939,015,363	0.29	97.81
Next 75 Ports of Clearance	6,982,457,035	2.19	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>319,267,661,022</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

Note: Trade data is for 2001 and is in Canadian dollars.

Source: Original analysis of Statistics Canada database.

### Value of Canadian Land Exports to USA by Port of Clearance

Port of Clearance
Windsor - Ambassador Bridge
Sarnia
Fort Erie
Niagara Falls
Emerson
Pacific Highway
Lacolle
Windsor - Main Long Road
Lansdowne
Ontario
Coutts
Toronto - Main Long Road
North Portal
Montréal - Main Long Road
Calgary
Philipsburg
Oshawa
Toronto - Pearson Int. Airport
Vancouver - Main Long Road
Edmonton
British Columbia and Yukon
Montréal - C.D.L. Intra-Canada
Toronto - Dixie I. Suff. Way
Winnipeg
Sault Ste. Marie
Next 219 Ports of Clearance
<b>Total</b>

Note: Trade data is for 2001 and is in Canadian dollars.

Source: Original analysis of Statistics Canada database.

## ports and Exports

## to USA by Port of Clearance

Percent	Cumulative (%)
22.89	22.89
19.37	42.26
15.45	57.71
5.73	63.43
3.86	67.10
3.57	70.67
3.33	74.00
2.98	76.98
2.17	79.16
2.11	81.26
2.02	83.28
2.00	85.28
1.98	87.26
1.43	88.69
1.31	90.00
1.21	91.21
1.05	92.26
0.89	93.16
0.89	94.05
0.81	94.86
0.70	95.56
0.70	96.26
0.69	96.95
0.57	97.52
0.29	97.81
2.19	100.00
<b>100.00</b>	

Table 4

## Value of Canadian Land Imports (rail, road, other) from USA by Port of Clearance

Port of Clearance	Value	Percent	Cumulative (%)
Windsor - Ambassador Bridge	61,834,032,901	31.93	31.93
Sarnia	23,000,151,862	11.88	43.81
Fort Erie	17,837,333,555	9.21	53.02
Niagara Falls	9,644,436,145	4.98	58.00
Emerson	6,433,450,915	3.32	61.32
Pacific Highway	6,078,648,380	3.14	64.46
Lacolle	6,056,576,939	3.13	67.59
Windsor - Main Long Room	5,816,578,197	3.00	70.59
Lansdowne	5,684,248,511	2.94	73.52
Ontario	4,720,061,656	2.44	75.96
Coutts	4,378,878,602	2.26	78.22
Toronto - Main Long Room	3,855,423,251	1.99	80.21
North Portal	3,674,663,689	1.90	82.11
Montréal - Main Long Room	2,356,835,151	1.22	83.33
Calgary	2,217,481,198	1.15	84.47
Philipsburg	2,172,293,293	1.12	85.60
Oshawa	1,760,230,523	0.91	86.50
Toronto - Pearson Int. Airport	1,712,421,533	0.88	87.39
Vancouver - Main Long Room	1,552,051,868	0.80	88.19
Edmonton	1,436,667,709	0.74	88.93
British Columbia and Yukon	1,404,340,007	0.73	89.66
Montréal - C.D.L. Intrm. Term	1,401,979,064	0.72	90.38
Toronto - Dixie I. Suff. Wh.	1,000,555,083	0.52	90.90
Winnipeg	934,189,275	0.48	91.38
Sault Ste. Marie	933,339,070	0.48	91.86
Next 219 Ports of Clearance	15,759,622,877	8.14	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>193,656,291,234</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

Note: Trade data is for 2001 and is in Canadian dollars.

Source: Original analysis of Statistics Canada database.