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Investigating Ownership Values as a Catalyst of Financial Scandal in Canada's Public Sector

Matthew S. Mingus

The February 2006 national election in Canada was driven by numerous political scandals rather than by a positive sense of what needs to be accomplished in Canada. The two key scandals were the events leading to the resignation of David Dingwall as president of the Royal Canadian Mint and the Sponsorship Program scandal that led to the Gomery Inquiry. This article examines these two financial scandals to determine if they may have been driven by a shift from traditional democratic, public-sector values to the market-based, private-sector values of the New Public Management (NPM). It appears that the NPM played little role in these scandals, although the model of contracting out for government services bears some responsibility for the Sponsorship scandal because this tool was used to avoid transparency.

At the end of the day, any system of government will eventually witness acts of corruption and abuses of power by individuals, organizations, and political parties. The New Public Management (NPM) approach to governing, however, may breed additional scandal and corruption because of an inherent conflict between the core values of NPM and the core values of representative democracy. The core values of democracy include social equity, the rule of law (fair treatment for all), and equal participation rights, while the core values of NPM include market-driven functionality (efficiency and competition), ownership, and managerial autonomy. The 'ownership society,' as expressed through the concepts of capitalism and the market, appears to directly conflict with the essential mindset that government ought to exist to serve the needs of society or to serve the public interest.

This article explores this value conflict; describes the Gomery Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and the resignation of David Dingwall as president of the Royal Canadian Mint, which were arguably the core issues in the February 2006 Canadian national election; and discusses whether this value conflict made the environment more conducive to these scandals. The research question for this article is whether these two key scandals provide

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any evidence that the private-sector values supported by the NPM played a role in the scandals by overriding traditional public sector values.

This discussion is important outside of the 2006 election results, which saw Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper brought into power along with his current minority government. A perceived lack of legitimacy in government has led to a concentrated focus on democratic reform at the national level and in five of the ten provinces. This ongoing value conflict may be a source of this diminished legitimacy. Do politicians and voters sense the tension between this managerial approach and their longer-term regime values, or are other factors driving the call for democratic reform? The broader question therefore remains: Is the value conflict between NPM and traditional public sector values part of the ongoing legitimacy crisis that has led to calls for democratic reform throughout Canada?

Values of the New Public Management

All successful advanced economies use a blend of democratic and market-based approaches to achieve social cooperation and economic development. In Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and many other advanced economies, this has traditionally taken the form of allowing capitalism to run free until it creates specific public problems. This strategy is in keeping with the 'invisible hand' of the market as advocated by Adam Smith in 1776. This concept asserts that individuals will, and ought to, pursue their own self interests, which will collectively achieve the greatest possible value for society.¹ Government, in this view, must maintain stable legal systems, so that contracts are binding, and must also maintain a system of property or ownership rights. These measures allow business owners to reasonably anticipate profit from their ownership ventures.

When markets fail by creating externalities, trampling on human rights, or simply asserting too much power in the affairs of the average citizen or the community, governments frequently step into the fray and establish non market-based laws and regulations to overcome these perceived failures of capitalism. Such was the case in the United States in the late 1800s, when regulatory agencies were established to restrain the increasing corporate power of the Carnegies and the Rockefellers. Additionally, in foreign affairs, the judiciary, and national defense, it is common for nations to determine that the public function is too important to allow markets to take the lead. Governments will establish and maintain the requisite programs and services in these areas before waiting for market failures or other specific reasons for public involvement.

NPM is shorthand for applying private-sector or market-based techniques to public services. This managerial approach to governing incorporates a range of ideas, including establishing internal competition to increase bureaucratic efficiency, focusing on performance and outcomes measures, contracting out traditional public services, and outright privatizing traditionally public functions. The approach is supported by a strong underlying belief that the ownership model of the private sector is more efficient and

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more effective than that of the public sector. While such a view is dominant in the United States, it also exists in systems throughout the world. Reginald C. Mascarenhas states this belief clearly: "funding expenditure on public services through taxation is seen as diverting resources to lesser productive purposes and is crowding out the private sector."² A disdain for bureaucracy and red tape supports this belief more than solid research does, thus the approach may be rooted more in political views of the civil service than in organizational, managerial, or public policy research.

One example of NPM is commonly termed 'corporatization.' Simply put, corporatization attempts to

replicate the private sector corporate model within the operating environment of a government organization. A recent study of 11 corporatizations in the Canadian context determined that cost efficiency, employee productivity, and the overall financial health of the organizations increased following corporatization.³ Unfortunately, this study did not attempt to measure

The approach is supported by a strong underlying belief that the ownership model of the private sector is more efficient and more effective than that of the public sector.

the impact of this NPM approach on democratic values; indeed, it did not examine value systems at all.

When Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan began the current movement toward privatization and 'running government like a business' in the early 1980s, governments in Canada did not wait long to adopt this approach. NPM is generally dated as an early 1980s response to a serious financial crisis within the public sector of many nations; however, some aspects of it clearly predate the 1980s. For example, on 15 January 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower issued Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 55-4 stating that, "the Government shall not start or carry on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if the product or service can be procured more economically from a commercial source."⁴ This bulletin codified the attitude that the private sector should be the sector of first choice for society. Earlier presidential management reform efforts lacked elements of the NPM, except for the concept of pay for performance documented by William R. Divine in 1951.⁵

In keeping with the NPM movement, however, President George H.W. Bush ratcheted up this commitment with Executive Order 12803 on 30 April 1992, which encouraged all federal departments and agencies to assist state and local governments in privatizing federally-financed infrastructure assets. This order called for all levels of government to financially benefit from these sales to the private sector, but required no plan for ensuring continual public benefits from future revenues that may be derived by the purchaser. The Crown Jewels were effectively on the market. Privatization is a common NPM theme that takes a significant step beyond corporatization by actually turning over public programs, services, and/or facilities to the private sector. Rather than running government like a business, private enti-

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ties are contracted to perform these governmental functions or parts of the government are literally sold off to private interests. This privatization can take the form of selling off public lands, contracting to have a corporation run a prison or water treatment facility, or creating educational vouchers so that citizens can choose a private school if desired. The specific form of the privatization determines the extent to which the government loses control over formerly public programs.

Many extensive studies of the NPM, including research that seeks to compare public management reforms in numerous countries, provide little or no discussion of the underlying value system.⁶ These values include individual market-driven functionality (efficiency and competition), ownership, and managerial autonomy. It is frequently expressed that the monopolistic nature of public programs is a key reason for bureaucratic inefficiency. The logic is that public servants in a monopoly setting do not have incentives to perform well, and that markets can provide competition to increase performance incentives. In contrast, the basic profit sharing concept attempts to increase productivity by making more people owners, and stock options attempt to make senior corporate managers perform better through the lure of increased ownership. What is frequently excluded in the NPM research is a clear discussion of flaws with the ownership model or of the aspects of society that should be exempt from this ownership model.

Along with markets, competition is necessarily part of the 'public choice' solution to perceived failures in public management. For example, Vincent Ostrom's concept of 'democratic administration' involves the need for multiple units of local government, such as school districts.⁷ The more school districts that exist, the easier it is for people to choose where to live based on the school district they believe will best serve their needs. This

The idea is that competition in service delivery is as important as whether the service provider is public or private.

multiplicity, in theory, forces school boards and administrators to compete for students who, ideally, will come with dollars attached to them. Educational vouchers and schools of choice are additional routes to increasing public choice (i.e. allowing people to get what they want out of government and forcing units of government to compete with each

other). The idea is, quite simply, that competition in service delivery is as important as whether the service provider is public or private. This approach serves as an additional example that private sector values—competition in this case—can be merged with public sector discussions. Ostrom cleverly works the word 'democratic' into his theory, although it is about individual choice rather than the public good.

Similarly, Mascarenhas' work suggests that outsiders do not see the immense variety that exists within public organizations, including quasi-governmental organizations and public corporations, and thus he advocates for the market model. He shows that an enterprise culture can be established

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within public organizations, as has been done in Australia, Britain, and New Zealand, where managers were given greater autonomy and authority, yet held closely accountable for results. However, Mascarenhas still concludes that "the design of public organizations under the NPM fails to recognize the network of organizations responsible for a policy area or policy field."⁸

As Larry D. Terry observed, the entrepreneurial model also comes with "a heavy reliance on domination and coercion, a preference for revolutionary change (regardless of the circumstances), and a disrespect for tradition."⁹ Within a governmental context, the first of these values could result in movement back to the earlier era of absolutist states, while the second value could rob the capitalist economy of the very stability that it requires from government in terms of contract law and property ownership, and the third could rob society of an integrated political system that develops over centuries rather than years. (It should be remembered that Canada is a teenager on the international stage—having just 140 years since its confederation to develop its political culture.) Terry argues that adopting these values within the public sector would not be good for either the public or private sectors.

Terry also argued that public entrepreneurs are oblivious to democratic values, such as those of fairness, justice, representation, and participation.¹⁰ The administrative values in the Canadian Public Service are neutrality, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, and representativeness.¹¹ As in most democratic systems, the concept of ownership can only be applied to the citizenry, while politicians and public managers are, at best, stewards of the public interest.¹² In effect, their role is analogous to that of the legal guardian for a child or the trustee of a family trust. The managerial thrust seeks to apply the ownership concepts within government, ultimately focusing primarily on efficiency and to a lesser extent on effectiveness. These concepts are important public sector values in Canada, but political accountability via a responsive bureaucracy and the rule of law, which is essential to fair treatment of individuals (i.e. neutrality), are important competing values. These values are frequently paramount public values because an efficient bureaucracy, as was noted more than a century ago, can serve any master.

The question with NPM is whether it brings a package of values into public organizations that ultimately allows private interests and greed to supersede the public interest, broadly conceived. The case of Canada and the scandals that were core issues in the 2006 federal election provide further insight.

Recent Scandals in Canada

It is clear to even occasional observers of Canadian politics that perceived and real scandals have been a driving force in recent elections, even though only two specific cases and one election are discussed in this article. Significant aspects of the NPM seek to move private sector values into the public

sector. The ensuing value conflicts may promote financial mismanagement and scandal because the private-sector values encourage cost reduction, financial incentives for performance, and other means to achieve efficiency.

Corporate financial scandals, such as the failures of Enron, Nortel, and WorldCom, rock the world financial markets. In the case of Canada, Nortel, a large international telecommunications corporation, lost \$10 billion in stock market value in one day when it revealed that three years of financial statements over reported the company's earnings. While this action cost the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars at the very least, it was shrugged off as just another bad day on the market.¹³ Frequently, a significant factor in these financial scandals is that true corporate financial performance is hidden from the owners in order to raise more capital and receive higher executive performance bonuses. When similar problems involving far fewer dollars occur in government, they are blamed on politics and bureaucracy rather than on the private-sector values embraced by the NPM.

Recent Canadian experience provides numerous examples of such problems, including the Sponsorship Program scandal that involved party-level and departmental-level corruption and the ousting of David Dingwall as president of the Royal Canadian Mint after an individual-level scandal that revealed several departmental-level problems. These two are discussed briefly, in turn.

Sponsorship Program and the Gomery Inquiry

The Liberal Party's Sponsorship Program scandal and the ensuing Gomery Commission reports were a key reason that Conservative Stephen Harper became Prime Minister on 6 February 2006. This particular scandal is easily traced back before Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin's time in office (2003-2006), yet he and his party were made to pay for errors committed by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and his colleagues from 1994 through 2003.

Under the Sponsorship Program, federal tax dollars were funneled through private advertising agencies to specific sporting projects and cultural events, ostensibly to market Canada and the value of federalism within Quebec, a province with strong secessionist tendencies. These private agencies were paid excessively generous fees and commissions, which were then used to provide official and unofficial donations to specific politicians, to provide official and unofficial donations to the Quebec Wing of the Liberal Party of Canada, and to pay employees who performed no work for the hiring agency, among other misuses. The overpayments were clearly intended to benefit the Liberal Party, and extensive steps were taken to keep the program secret and to bypass standard contracting procedures and campaign financing laws. The program was run out of Public Works Canada, although it was supervised directly by the Prime Minister's Office, and involved at least five Canadian Crown Corporations, including Canada Post, VIA Rail, and the Business Development Bank of Canada. Virtually everyone within government involved with the scandal was a political appointee of Chrétien.¹⁴ In some cases, hefty commissions were paid to the private agencies simply to

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These activities occurred within the highly charged political environment leading up to the failed 1995 Quebec referendum for separation from Canada. Funding for the projects increased significantly after the referendum failed by less than one percent of the vote. The Cabinet-approved policy was for Canada to market itself within Quebec, one of its own sub-national units of government. Martin referred to this scandal as a "serious breach of public trust."¹⁵

After an Auditor General of Canada report on the financial mismanagement of this program in November 2003, Martin was able to assume control of his party and become Prime Minister. His Cabinet's first action was to end the Sponsorship Program. He then appointed Quebec Superior Court Judge, Justice John Gomery, to head up the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. The Gomery Inquiry, as it is commonly called, was charged with determining the facts of the situation and then finding solutions that would help ensure that similar problems did not recur. The fact finding report was released on 1 November 2005.¹⁶

With the exception of one retired public servant, who benefited financially after his retirement from working with the Sponsorship Program, the individuals involved were highly politicized and their critical error was almost blind obedience to the political officials in charge of the program. The Gomery Inquiry found, "reluctance, for fear of reprisal, by virtually all public servants to go against the will of a manager who was circumventing established policies and who had access to senior political officials."¹⁷ This program was clearly a top priority for Prime Minister Chrétien's government and public servants chose to stay out of the way rather than lose a battle with the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The systemic value problem was described as "the existence of a 'culture of entitlement' among political officials and bureaucrats involved with the Sponsorship Program, including the receipt of monetary and non-monetary benefits."¹⁸ In other words, personal and political greed was one driving force in this scandal, but pursuing corporate profits or a market approach at the expense of the public interest was not a factor.

The tool of contracting out government responsibilities is closely associated with the NPM, but in the case of this scandal, it appears that the standard public service values were trumped by political power rather than by NPM values. In fact, Canada had good policies in place to assure that governmental contracts were awarded on a fair and competitive basis, but these policies were simply violated under direct political supervision throughout the course of the Sponsorship Program. If anything, NPM would support the need for the competitive awarding of contracts and so NPM values were not followed. Neutrality, however, is a core public service value that was ignored.

Canada has a strong public service, but the public service appears to have continually bent over backwards to support the government of the day

with high priority agenda items. The PMO can assert tremendous power on a limited number of issues, more or less in exchange for its staying out of the way on the vast array of other issues. Evidence that such patronage-based scandals predate the NPM goes back to Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who took power in 1896. When asked by a newspaper editor to avoid the patronage of Conservative Sir John A. Macdonald, Laurier replied, "it is the business of governments to stay in office."¹⁹ The secret network of contracts evident in the Sponsorship scandal was simply a newer way to accomplish an old task.

Justice Gomery suggested that two key 'fixes' in the Sponsorship scandal would be to develop a new depoliticized appointment process for Deputy Ministers, to shield them from the political winds that drove public servants to follow the lead of the government of the day and to split the role of the Clerk of the Privy Council Office, so that the senior Canadian public servant would not also effectively be the Deputy Minister for the Prime Minister. The Harper government rejected these changes in favor of maintaining the indirect link of Deputy Ministers to Parliament through their appropriate ministers.²⁰

The Crown Corporations, which embrace the competitive model even more, have greater flexibility and secrecy (i.e. private sector values). Five of these organizations were involved in the scandal specifically because they could move money around with less oversight. Nevertheless, the CEOs were political appointees of Chrétien and were ultimately fired or asked to resign because of their roles in this scandal. One protection built into the system is that the appointments of Crown Corporation CEOs are for five-year terms, ensuring that the damage of a bad apple is limited. Appointment processes, however, are one area that has undergone extensive scrutiny since the Gomery Inquiry and policy changes have been made. The next case also involves a figure in a federal Crown Corporation.

Ousting of David Dingwall as President of Royal Canadian Mint

Although the Sponsorship Program scandal loomed large for several years in Canadian political life, it might not have dominated the election if other perceived scandals had not reinforced the view that the Liberals were corrupt and had developed a 'culture of entitlement' from too many years in power. The resignation of David Dingwall as president of the Royal Canadian Mint provides one such example that was politically marketed by the opposition parties to reinforce the belief that the Liberals had this entitlement mentality. In all, seven heads of federal Crown Corporations left for reasons other than an expired five-year term from 12 December 2003, when Martin became Prime Minister, through 28 September 2005, when Dingwall resigned. All were Chrétien appointees, and most left with some hint of scandal in the air. Several of the appointees were fired in relation to mismanagement of the Sponsorship Program.²¹

Dingwall resigned from his \$277,000 a year position at the Royal Canadian Mint amid public allegations of excessive office expenses at the mint, failure to register as a lobbyist when working for Lorus Therapeutics,

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and working as a lobbyist for Bioniche Life Sciences on a contingency basis, which is against federal program regulations (i.e. he allegedly received a \$350,000 success fee to help Bioniche obtain \$17.2 million in federal financing). The lobbying allegations concerned actions that occurred before he was at the mint.

This scandal rapidly mutated from the public's asking why Dingwall felt entitled to expense a \$1.29 pack of gum while on a business trip for the mint to why he evaded testifying to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee; the scandal further escalated to questions about Dingwall's activities as a lobbyist before Chrétien appointed him to the mint and why the Liberal government was paying him a severance package although he had voluntarily resigned. "What skeletons were they hoping to keep buried?" was a common inquiry during Question Period, prompted because Dingwall had been Chrétien's Minister of Public Works, had promoted Chuck Guité to run the Sponsorship Program, and was accused of having received direct financial benefits from the program after he lost his seat in the House of Commons in 1997. During the Gomery Inquiry, Guité famously recalled Dingwall extending his hand and saying "Welcome aboard. You won't rat on them, you won't rat on us."²²

As it turned out, an independent audit of his office expenses cleared him of any wrongdoing at the mint, confirmed his statement that he was never reimbursed for a pack of gum, and showed that 74 percent of the office expenses were for the salary and benefits of the four people who worked in the office.²³ After reviewing all the office expenses for his 30 month period at the mint, he was asked to pay back roughly \$6,700, most of which was attributed to clerical payroll errors outside of his control. In addition, Dingwall was praised for turning around the financial condition of the mint and posting profits after several years of losses.²⁴

An arbitrator awarded him a \$417,000 severance package, on top of his government pensions, after determining that he had performed his job well and was clearly pressured to resign from the mint for political reasons leading up to an election. The arbitrator concluded the resignation was "manifestly involuntary" because "there was no apparent interest in determining whether the allegations had a basis in fact before he [Dingwall] was required to decide anything."²⁵

After Harper became Prime Minister, the skeletons-in-the-closet questions continued because the Conservative government redacted most of the details of 487 pages of correspondence identified by the Privy Council Office as being related to Dingwall's resignation and the decision to award a severance package.²⁶ The redaction was criticized as continuing the lack of transparency at the same time that the government's key legislative agenda was to get a new Federal Accountability Act approved through the Parliament. One is left to ponder either a vast conspiracy that would take the sponsorship scandal back into the Conservative Mulroney years or unsavory e-mails and letters by opposition Members of Parliament that were best left buried with a Liberal scandal when these same individuals soon became Conservative Ministers.

Again, the Dingwall affair reads more like a standard political scandal than one that was created by a shift to NPM values. In fact, the expense audit at the mint showed exceptionally strong policies that were well implemented. Had the expenses not been subjected to open, public scrutiny, in keeping with public sector values, this scandal may not have emerged at all. The expenses were treated as if a profit-generating international Crown Corporation should be subjected to the same standards as any other purely public domestic agency. There is also some likelihood that politicians would not have taken aim at Dingwall by investigating his expenses if there has not been a connection between him and the Sponsorship scandal. Also, if politicians were not driven by the media mentality to make statements in time for the evening news, this particular scandal may not have erupted.

Selecting leaders of massive Crown Corporations through a partisan appointment process was uncovered as the true challenge in this situation. There are some hints of change in this area, including hiring a search firm to find replacements for several Crown Corporation executives. The traditional public sector values of transparency and bureaucratic responsiveness to political institutions have carried over into the establishment of Crown Corporations, where government most clearly should be 'run like a business' because the business model has been explicitly agreed to as the appropriate method for governmental involvement. Instead, the politics of friendship and ideology may regularly trump hiring leaders with the best business acumen. In fact, U.S. President Andrew Jackson's rotation in office principle from the 1830s²⁷ applies to Canadian Crown Corporations because leaders are appointed for five-year terms that are seldom renewed even when performance is stellar.

Concluding Comments

A growing uneasiness with the New Public Management exists among public administration theorists, as they question if the values and integrity of democratic governance may be incompatible with the NPM. This article has attempted to provide a general and somewhat speculative discussion that increased scandal and corruption may be one aspect of this incompatibility, which is described herein as a clash of core values. One reason for this is described well by Ronald Moe and Robert Gilmour, "the distinguishing characteristic of governmental management, contrasted to private management, is that the actions of government officials must have their basis in public law, not in the pecuniary interests of private entrepreneur and owners or in the fiduciary concerns of corporate managers."²⁸

Moe and Gilmour also explain that the hierarchical executive in government is to ensure accountability for managerial actions to political leaders, rather than to promote control over employees. Unfortunately, unwavering support for political leaders and their appointees appears to have been the problem in the scandals discussed in this article. Dozens of interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 with Members of Parliament, senior public officials, and staff at the Privy Council Office and Prime Minister's

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Office straddled both sides of the federal election discussed in this article, since the government switched from a Liberal Party minority government to a Conservative Party minority government. These interviews revealed only one instance in which substantial financial fraud existed on the part of public servants without any prodding from the political level.²⁹

While the Sponsorship Scandal provides some support that contracting out government responsibilities may provide fertile ground for financial mismanagement and even explicit corruption, neither scandal supports the idea that ownership values or market forces, as embodied in the NPM, are the source of such scandals. On the contrary, one former Crown Corporation leader stated that "much of this country's growing cynicism about politics can be traced to a deep-rooted feeling

If anything, these scandals provide evidence that the people are the problem rather than the regime values or the institutional structure.

that our governments are not abiding by rules they have established for those they were elected to govern."³⁰ The rule of law, or fairly applying the law to the public as well as politicians and public servants, is a core public sector value in any democratic setting. If anything, these scandals provide evidence that the people are the problem rather than the regime values or the institutional structure.³¹

Widespread calls for democratic reform, including overhauling the electoral system, creating more power for individual parliamentarians (presumably at the expense of the Cabinet and/or Prime Minister), creating an elected senate, and incorporating more citizen involvement, exist within Canada.³² Space does not allow for a complete consideration of these democratic reform efforts; however, it is helpful to note that British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec have all initiated democratic reform efforts in the past decade. These efforts have looked substantially different in each province, although Ontario is implementing an effort similar to the one in British Columbia, and will have a provincial referendum to adopt a new electoral system in Fall 2007. All options are on the table, including a possible shift away from the current single member, first-past-the-post electoral system. The federal government is paying attention to these regional efforts, yet is largely a follower in terms of discussing such institutional reforms.

While NPM values do not appear to be the source of these recent scandals, the democratic reform movement might address some of the scandals' roots. The Gomery Inquiry called for bureaucrats to recognize that their first allegiance is to the people of Canada, rather than their Minister or even the Prime Minister.³³ Much of the democratic reform effort also calls for Canada to abandon what has increasingly become a 'leader centric' system of government.³⁴ One of the current Conservative government's key campaign issues was to pass a comprehensive Federal Accountability Act, which was accomplished as this omnibus bill received Royal Assent on 12 December

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2006. This act takes a rather traditional view of ethics and accountability, including focusing on an ethics commissioner, campaign finance, lobbyist registration, reporting responsibilities of the public service to Parliament, among other concerns. Unfortunately, the act fails to focus on value differences between the public and private sector models, to discuss where each set of values may be appropriate within government, or to move forward any clear democratic reform agenda.

The recent scandals are not the only reason for the democratic reform efforts in Canada, which were prompted by some quirky provincial election results, but they do add greatly to the perceived legitimacy crisis. While Canada is far from a corrupt society, its Corruption Perception Index has been increasing gradually almost every year since Transparency International started this global index in 1996.³⁵ Legitimacy and scandal do not fit hand in hand, yet no evidence is found in these two cases that NPM and scandal go hand in hand either.

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